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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation comprises three experimental studies that explore how management’s financial 
disclosure behavior and security strategies influence the costs associated with cybersecurity 
breaches.  The first study examines the cost of litigation in connection with cybersecurity 
incidents.  The purpose of this study is to determine how the characteristics and content of 
cybersecurity incidents’ disclosure affects jurors’ liability assessments.  Specifically, this study 
explores how jurors react to management timeliness in disclosing the incident and the 
plausibility of the explanations provided to justify the disclosure strategy. The second and third 
studies explore the value relevance of cybersecurity risk management (CRM) assurance.  In 
particular, the second study examines whether engagement in voluntary assurance over CRM 
before the occurrence of an incident affects investors’ reactions after the incident, and whether 
these reactions differ based on whether assurance is expected or not expected based on industry 
norms.  The third study scrutinizes how perceptions of disclosure timeliness affect investor 
decisions and explores the use of CRM assurance as a potential tool to mitigate the deleterious 
effects of delayed disclosures of cybersecurity incidents. Overall, the results reported in this 
dissertation suggest that timely disclosure of a cybersecurity breach reduces liability, improves 
management credibility assessments, and results in higher valuation judgments. Moreover, the 
findings reveal that CRM assurance further leads to enhanced management credibility 
assessments and valuation judgments and that the impact of CRM assurance is particularly 
beneficial when not necessarily expected for the industry. In combination, these three studies 
address calls for research exploring the costs of cybersecurity and inform regulators currently 
engaged in developing both cybersecurity disclosure requirements and voluntary assurance 
services designed to address stakeholders’ information needs regarding companies’ cybersecurity 
 iii 
activities.  These studies also add to the literature and theory documenting the link between 
disclosure timeliness and litigation risk, and the value of voluntary assurance services. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-attacks have continued increasing in size, frequency, and cost to companies 
(Ponemon 2018). Therefore, regulators, accounting standard setters and practitioners are 
interested in understanding how companies are addressing cybersecurity risks and are engaged in 
several initiatives to promote the adoption of cybersecurity risk management (CRM) practices in 
organizations and to increase voluntary disclosure of CRM and security breach events. The three 
studies in this dissertation answer a call for research on the cost of cybersecurity attacks (AAA 
2017) and explore the impact of cybersecurity disclosure and CRM assurance on judgments and 
decision making in accounting. 
This dissertation comprises three experiments that explore the cost of cybersecurity 
incidents.  Specifically, in the first study I investigate how management’s disclosures and 
remedial tactics in connection with a cybersecurity incident impact jurors’ assessment of a 
company’s liability.  The second and third studies explore how the disclosure of a cybersecurity 
incident and a company’s engagement in CRM assurance influence investors’ perceptions and 
valuation judgments.  The following subsections provide additional detail on the motivation for 
each study, the research method employed, the main findings and contributions to practice, 
theory, and accounting literature. The overall contribution of this dissertation is discussed in the 
last subsection.  
Study One: Jurors’ Liability Assessments After Cybersecurity Breaches: The Impact of 
Disclosure Timeliness and the Plausibility of Management Justifications 
 In study one, I explore the impact of a cybersecurity breach disclosure timeliness and the 
plausibility of management justifications for the disclosure timing on jurors’ assessments of 
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causal attribution and liability. Studying the cost of liability associated with cyber-attacks is 
important given that post-data breach costs, including legal costs, are considered one of the main 
cost drivers of cyber-attacks (Ponemon 2018). Research on the impact of disclosure timeliness 
suggests that timely disclosures reduce the cost of litigation (Skinner 1994, 1997). Based on this 
evidence, timely disclosure of cyber-attacks would be desirable. However, evidence of major 
recent breaches (e.g., Yahoo, Equifax) suggests that companies delay the disclosure of cyber-
attacks (Fung 2017; Haselton and Lee 2017). It is possible that firms elect to delay the disclosure 
of cyber-attacks given management career incentives to delay the disclosure of bad news 
(Kothari, Li, and Short 2009). However, firms may have valid reasons to delay these disclosures 
given the complexities associated with discovering the breach and conducting subsequent 
investigations.  As such, it is important to explore how the use of plausible and implausible 
justification for a cyber-attack disclosure’s timeliness impacts jurors’ judgment and decision 
making.  
 I use a 2 x 3 experiment and manipulate disclosure timeliness (more or less timely) and 
the plausibility of management justifications (plausible, implausible, or control) between-
subjects. The dependent variables are participants’ assessment of causal attribution (mediator) 
and liability assessments. As predicted, I find that more timely disclosures result in more 
favorable assessments of causal attribution and liability. I also find that causal attribution 
mediates the relationship between disclosure timeliness and liability assessments. However, I am 
unable to find support for the predicted interaction of timeliness and plausibility on causal 
attribution. Additional analysis reveals that timeliness of disclosures and participants disclosure 
preferences drive perceptions of plausibility. 
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 This study informs companies and market participants about the cost of delayed 
disclosure of cyber-attacks. The findings have implications for regulators and standard setters 
interested in developing more disclosure requirements over cybersecurity. This study also 
contributes to the literature and theory on the impact of disclosure timeliness and the literature on 
remedial tactics to reduce liability by providing initial insights into the importance of disclosing 
cyber-attacks on a timely manner and showing that the benefits of remedial tactics, as 
documented in prior research, may be context specific. 
Study Two: Investors’ Judgments and Decisions After a Cybersecurity Breach: Understanding 
the Value Relevance of Cybersecurity Risk Management Assurance  
In study two, I investigate how voluntary CRM assurance affects non-professional 
investors’ judgments and decisions. The study also examines how the value relevance of CRM 
assurance is altered when such assurance violates or conforms to users’ expectations. The 
AICPA developed in 2017 a CRM reporting framework and is promoting its use for voluntary 
disclosure of cybersecurity. The AICPA is also promoting assurance services through a Systems 
and Organization Controls (SOC) for cybersecurity engagement. Although there are known 
benefits of engaging in voluntary assurance, prior attempts of the accounting profession to 
promote assurance over information technology have largely failed (Gendron and Barrett 2004; 
Barett and Gendron 2006; Boulianne and Cho 2009). As such, investigating the impact of CRM 
assurance after cyber-attacks and understanding how investors’ expectancies of influence their 
judgments and decision could help shed light on the value relevance of CRM assurance. 
This study employs a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment. The independent variables are 
CRM assurance (present or absent) and expectancies of assurance (conform to or violate 
expectancies). The dependent variables are valuation judgments and management credibility 
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assessments (mediator). I predict and find that companies that engage in voluntary CRM 
assurance receive higher stock price valuations and more favorable investor assessments of 
management credibility. Moreover, I find that investors’ assessments of management credibility 
and stock price valuations are more extreme in the presence of positive and negative expectancy 
violations. Additional analysis reveals that investors’ perceived benefits of assurance-as-
insurance and perceived accountants’ cyber-expertise are important determinants of investors’ 
decision behavior. Further analysis also sheds light on the benefits and potential penalties 
associated with a firm’s in-house CRM practices.  
Evidence of the benefits of CRM assurance have implications for regulators, accounting 
professionals, and market participants and may help promote the use of CRM assurance to 
mitigate the negative impact of cyber-attacks. This study also adds to the literature and theory 
exploring the value relevance of voluntary assurance by identifying expectancy violations as a 
relevant variable that influences investors’ judgments and decisions. 
Study Three: The Impact of Disclosure Timeliness and Cybersecurity Risk Management 
Assurance on Investors Judgments and Decisions 
 Study three explores the impact of a cybersecurity breach disclosure’s timeliness in the 
context of investors’ judgment and decision making. This study also explores whether voluntary 
CRM assurance could help mitigate the negative impact of delayed disclosures. The market 
reaction to disclosure timeliness has been studied in the context of bad earnings news and 
restatement disclosure. Research find that the market negatively reacts to delayed disclosure of 
restatements (BenYousset and Khan 2016). However, no such negative reaction is found in the 
context of delayed disclosure of bad earnings (Givoly and Palmon 1982; Kalay and Loewenstein 
1986). These results suggest that the impact of disclosure timeliness is context specific. 
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Therefore, studying the impact of a cyber-attack disclosure’s timeliness on investors’ judgment 
and decision making is central to further understand the cost and implications of cybersecurity 
breaches.  
 To conduct this study, I use a 2 x 2 experiment in which disclosure timeliness (more or 
less timely) and the CRM assurance (present or absent) are manipulated between-subjects. The 
dependent variables are valuation judgments and assessments of management credibility 
(mediator). I find that more timely disclosures lead to more favorable valuation judgments and 
more favorable assessments of management credibility. I also find that management credibility 
mediates the relationship between disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments. Nevertheless, 
although I find that the interaction of timeliness and CRM assurance is significant and impacts 
credibility assessments, the results are in the opposite direction predicted. This finding suggests 
that CRM assurance significantly influences credibility assessments only when the breach is 
disclosed in a timely manner. Additional analysis reveals that perceptions of disclosure 
timeliness are context specific and influenced by users’ perceptions of cybersecurity disclosures. 
 The findings of this study inform companies and market participants about the negative 
implications of delayed disclosure of cyber-attacks, in particular the impact on firm value and 
credibility. The results are also relevant for regulators and standard setters promoting CRM 
disclosure and assurance and highlights the importance of timely disclosure of security events as 
part of a company’s CRM program. This study also adds to the literature and theory on the 
market implications of disclosure timeliness by identifying context specific determinants of 
perceived timeliness which could help further understand mixed results from prior research. 
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Overall Contribution 
 The three studies in this dissertation aim to answer a call for research on the cost of 
cybersecurity to companies and shareholders (AAA 2017). These studies look at the cost of 
litigation and firm value which are important cost drivers after a cyber-attack. Moreover, these 
studies investigate the impact of disclosure timeliness and voluntary CRM assurance which 
makes the insights from these studies timely and relevant for regulators and standard setters 
currently engage in CRM disclosure and assurance initiatives. 
 Results from the three studies support several of the predictions. Overall, findings from 
Study One and Study Three sheds light on the cost of delayed disclosure of cyber-attacks and 
show that delayed disclosures increase liability and reduce perceptions of management 
credibility and stock price value. The results suggest that disclosure timeliness is a strong 
determinant of liability and valuation judgments and that the use of remedial tactics to reduce 
liability and voluntary CRM assurance do not effectively mitigate the effects of delayed 
disclosure of a cyber-attack. CRM assurance, however, enhances credibility and firm value when 
a cyber-attack is timely disclosed. Results from Study Two sheds light on the potential use of 
CRM assurance to mitigate the negative market reaction to cyber-attacks and suggests that 
market expectancies could help drive the demand for voluntary CRM assurance. Altogether, 
these studies help further our understanding of how cybersecurity disclosure and assurance affect 
judgment and decision-making and suggest that timely disclosure and voluntary CRM could help 
reduce the cost of cyber-attacks.   
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STUDY ONE: JURORS’ LIABILITY ASSESSMENTS AFTER CYBERSECURITY 
BREACHES: THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE TIMELINESS AND THE 
PLAUSIBILITY OF MANAGEMENT JUSTIFICATIONS 
Introduction 
There are competing incentives for companies required to publicly disclose cybersecurity 
incidents. The Litigation Reduction Hypothesis suggests that companies may have incentives to 
timely disclose bad news to reduce the associated litigation risk and reduce expected legal costs 
(Skinner 1994, 1997). On the other hand, companies may also have incentives to strategically 
time the disclosure of bad news either due to management's career incentives (Kothari, Li, and 
Short 2009) or due to a desire to first collect all the relevant facts, as prior research suggests that 
investors reward accurate estimates (Hirst, Jackson, and Koonce 2003; Rupar 2017). Although 
prior research shows that timelier disclosures lower the likelihood of litigation (Donelson, 
McInnis, Mergenthaler, and Yu 2012), little is known about how the disclosure timeliness 
impacts jurors’ liability assessments when remedial tactics are opportunistically employed to 
obfuscate managers’ self-serving intentions. 
Accordingly, in this study, I explore the impact of disclosure timeliness on jurors’ 
liability assessments in the context of cybersecurity incidents. The purpose of this study is to 
determine how the characteristics and content of cybersecurity incidents’ disclosures impact 
jurors’ liability assessments. Specifically, this study explores how jurors react to management 
forthcomingness (i.e., timeliness) in disclosing the incident and to the plausibility of the 
explanations provided to justify the disclosure strategy (i.e., timing). This study is relevant in 
light of the increased incidence of cybersecurity attacks and their associated cost1. Moreover, 
                                                     
1The 2018 Ponemon Institute report on the cost of data breaches indicates that the average cost of a data breach is 
around $3.86 million, about $148 for each lost or stolen record containing sensitive information (Ponemon 2018). 
The report shows that the U.S. is the country with the highest average cost of a data breach ($7.91 million). These 
costs include detection and escalation costs, notification costs, and post data breach costs (including help desk 
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studying the litigation risk associated with companies’ disclosures of cybersecurity incidents is 
timely considering recent media attention to high profile cybersecurity incidents, such as the 
Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo) and Equifax breaches. For instance, Yahoo is undergoing the first securities 
class action lawsuit in connection with two cybersecurity incidents that, Yahoo’s alleges, 
occurred in 2013 and 2014 but were discovered and announced in 2016. 2 3 The timeliness aspect 
has gained media attention after the SEC announced an investigation into the timing of the 
disclosures (Fung 2017). Moreover, early in September 2017, Equifax announced a massive data 
breach and the announcement was made six weeks after the breach was discovered. The timing 
of the disclosure is being questioned following reports that three Equifax executives, including 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), engaged in insider trading after the breach was discovered but 
before the announcement (Haselton and Lee 2017).  
Drawing on Skinner’s (1994, 1997) Litigation Reduction Hypothesis, which suggest that 
earlier financial disclosures reduce expected legal costs, I predict that more (less) timely 
disclosures will decrease (increase) jurors’ liability assessments. Moreover, I further explore the 
impact of disclosure timeliness on jurors’ liability assessments drawing on Correspondence 
Inference Theory (CIT), which posits that individuals assess whether the behavior is intentional 
(internal attribution) or accidental (external attribution) based on the most likely alternative, after 
weighing all the potential choices. Accordingly, I predict that more (less) timely disclosures 
                                                     
activities, investigative activities, legal expenditure, and identity protection services, among others). The average 
cost of detection and escalation costs, notification costs, and post data breach costs in the U.S. are $1.21 million, 
$0.74 million, and $1.76 million, respectively. Also, the average lost business costs in the U.S. is $4.20 million; the 
U.S. being the country with the highest average notification costs, post data breach costs, and lost business costs. 
2 Studying the potential consequences of securities class action litigation is also important considering the spike in 
the volume of securities class action cases in 2016. According to a report on recent trends in securities class action 
litigation released by NERA Economic Consulting, is the highest number of filings since the 2000 dot-com crash 
(NERA Economic Consulting 2017). 
3Yahoo’s shareholders filed a securities class action lawsuit against Yahoo alleging that they failed to disclose that 
users' data was not encrypted with an up-to-date and secure encryption scheme. 
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result in weaker (stronger) correspondence of inferences about a company’s intention to act 
opportunistically, hereafter referred as causal attributions. 4 I also predict that stronger causal 
attribution towards a company's intent to act opportunistically lead jurors to generalize their 
inferences about the company and, in turn, mediate the relationship between disclosure 
timeliness and jurors' liability assessments. Lastly, I predict that the relationship between 
disclosure timeliness and causal attributions is moderated by the plausibility of management 
justifications for their disclosure strategy.  
To test my predictions, I use a 2 x 3 between-subjects experiment in which participants 
are required to assess a company’s liability after a cybersecurity incident. The independent 
variables of interest are the timeliness of the disclosure (more timely versus less timely) and the 
plausibility of management’s justification for the company’s disclosure strategy (plausible, 
implausible, and control group with no justification). Specifically, the timeliness of the 
disclosure is manipulated by informing participants that the incident was disclosed three days, 
for the more timely condition, or three months, for the less timely condition, after the company 
became aware of the incident. The plausibility of management’s justifications is manipulated by 
including a quote in which the defendant’s attorney justifies the company’s disclosure strategy. 
Specifically, in justifying less timely disclosures, plausible justifications include allegations that 
the delay was necessary to disclose accurate facts, while implausible justifications include 
allegations that the delay was required to disclose accurate facts but the initial facts released 
were not accurate. In contrast, in justifying less timely disclosures, plausible justifications 
include allegations that the company traded-off accuracy for timeliness and that accurate 
                                                     
4 Correspondence is defined as “the extent that the act and the underlying characteristics or attributes are similarly 
described by the inference” (Jones and Davis 1965, 223). Accordingly, in this study correspondence of inference is 
operationalized as the degree to which an individual believes that behavior was intentional or unintentional.  
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information was provided in subsequent disclosures, while implausible justifications include 
allegations that the delay was timely and accurate, which considering the complexities of the 
event may be perceived as “too good to be true”. After being provided with the case information, 
participants indicate their perceived causal attributions and evaluate the company’s liability 
toward the plaintiff.  
I find that more (less) timely disclosures decrease (increase) jurors’ liability assessments 
and weaker (stronger) assessments of causal attributions. I also find that assessments of causal 
attribution mediate the relationship between disclosure timeliness and jurors' liability 
assessments. However, the predicted interaction between disclosure timeliness and plausibility is 
not significant. Evaluation of participants' assessments suggests that more timely disclosures 
result in weaker assessments of causal attributions, regardless of the plausibility of justifications. 
Moreover, in contrast with prior research that suggests that the use of remedial tactics results in 
lower negligence verdicts (Cornell, Warne, and Eining 2009; Reffett 2010), the results suggest 
that in the context of disclosure timeliness justifications have no such effect. Additional analysis 
reveal that disclosure timeliness and participants’ preferences (for timeliness or accuracy) drives 
perceptions of plausibility and that, in turn, perceived plausibility influences assessments of 
causal attribution and liability. 
This study has several practical implications. First, results of this study shed light on the 
cost of cybersecurity disclosures and inform companies, investors, and analysts. In particular, 
this study provides evidence that timely disclosures are desirable and help reduce the cost of 
liability associated with cyber-attacks. Evidence from this study is particularly interesting 
considering that participants have strong negative reaction to a disclosure delay of three months 
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while there are known cases of longer delayed disclosures.5 This study also informs regulators 
that are currently evaluating disclosure requirements over cybersecurity. In particular, although 
the findings suggest that justifications are not helpful in reducing liability assessments for 
companies that delay the disclosure of cyber-attacks, the findings also indicate that jurors are 
unable to detect when timely disclosures are implausible.  
 This study adds to the accounting literature on the use of justifications to reduce legal 
liability and shows that the benefits of justifications are context specific and are not helpful in 
reducing liability associated with delayed disclosures of cyber-attacks. Last, this study 
contributes to the literature and theory that documents the link between disclosure timeliness and 
litigation risk. In particular, this study uses an experimental approach to test and build on the 
Litigation Reduction Hypothesis and help address limitations from prior archival research that 
relied on various proxies for timeliness given the lack of concrete data available regarding the 
timing of bad news disclosures (e.g. Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994; Skinner 1994; 
Skinner 1997; Donelson, Mc Innis, Mergenthaler, and Yu 2012). An experimental setting 
provides the means for a cleaner operationalization of this important variable and helps further 
our understanding of the implications of disclosure timeliness, such as the link of disclosure 
timeliness and perceived plausibility, causal attributions, and liability. 
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. The next section includes a discussion 
of the background and the theoretical motivations driving the predictions. Section III discusses 
the methods, including a description of the participants, the task, and the main variables in the 
                                                     
5 There are known high-profile cyber-attacks for which disclosures were delayed for over a year (e.g. Yahoo, Uber). 
Also, I obtained data from Audit Analytics from 169 cyber-attacks disclosed between 2007 to 2018. On average 
disclosures of cyber-attacks are delayed for 55 days. The delay in disclosure range from zero (0) to 1,104 days. 
About 20% of the disclosure in the data set were disclosed over 60 days after learning about the attack. 
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analysis. Section IV discusses the results of the hypotheses, and additional analysis and Section 
V concludes.  
Background, Theory, and Hypothesis 
Information Security Disclosures 
 The requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 for companies to establish 
and maintain an adequate system of internal controls, which includes the identification and 
testing of relevant information technology controls, contributed to the increased voluntary 
disclosure of information security activities by organizations (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and 
Sohail 2006). Research in this area shows that voluntary disclosures concerning information 
security are positively associated with a company’s market value and that disclosures of 
proactive security measures have the greatest impact (Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail 2010).  
More recent debates about the threat of cybersecurity incidents as a national security 
concern have motivated further actions from the U.S. Congress. For instance, in March 2017 the 
U.S. Senate Bill 536 (2017) was introduced to create the Cybersecurity Disclosure Act of 2017. 
This Act will require disclosure of cybersecurity expertise on the board of directors and the 
nature of such expertise or, in the absence of this expertise in the board, companies should 
disclose steps that are taken to incorporate a cybersecurity expert onto the board. Further 
regulation has been enforced at the state level, such as New York State’s Cybersecurity 
Requirements for Financial Service Companies (NYSDFS 2017). This regulation requires 
financial service companies to implement a cybersecurity program based on the entity's 
assessment of cybersecurity risks, and that is designed to detect and prevent incidents. The 
regulation also requires these companies to submit a certification of compliance with the New 
York State's Department of Financial Services. Companies are also required to maintain a 
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written cybersecurity policy, to appoint a CISO, to evaluate the qualifications of cybersecurity 
personnel and provide relevant training, and to maintain and test relevant controls for 
cybersecurity. 
Despite these efforts to promote more transparency regarding how companies manage 
and control cybersecurity risks and recent efforts to enforce more transparency regarding 
companies’ cybersecurity practices, there is little guidance and concrete requirements regarding 
disclosure of actual cybersecurity incidents. Although enforcement has not been released by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), their “Corporate Finance Disclosure Guidance: 
Topic No. 2” (U.S. 2011) provides guidance on the disclosure of cybersecurity risks and 
cybersecurity incidents by highlighting other mandated disclosures that may require a discussion 
of cybersecurity. For instance, requirements of Regulation S-K Item 503(c) for risk factor 
disclosure would apply to the disclosure of cybersecurity if the risks make an investment 
speculative or risky (SEC 2011). Furthermore, cybersecurity risks or incidents should be 
disclosed in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of the annual report in 
instances in which the costs or consequences represent a material event. The SEC also highlights 
other areas for companies to determine whether disclosures are necessary, such as in the 
registrant's "Description of Business," the disclosure of "Legal Proceedings" when applicable, 
and as part of the disclosures to the financial statements. The SEC’s “Corporate Finance 
Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2” also provides a reference to applicable accounting standards 
for guidance on the proper recognition of losses and estimates in the event of a cyber incident. 
Still, the guidelines furnished by the SEC do not specifically address critical aspects of the 
disclosure of cybersecurity incidents, such as the timeliness of disclosures. 
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Current regulatory enforcement that refers to the timeliness of disclosures is only 
applicable to the disclosure of incidents that result in the breach of personally identifiable 
information. This is further complicated by the fact that there is not a set of uniform compliance 
requirements as associated laws are individually enacted by the states. In general, U.S. 
companies are allowed to delay the disclosure of cybersecurity incidents. In most states, the 
wording of data breach notification laws, as it relates to time limits and allowed reporting delays, 
is ambiguous as it prompts for reasonableness at the time of selecting a disclosure strategy. For 
instance, Arizona requires the disclosure to be made “in the most expedient manner possible, " 
and Texas requires it "as quickly as possible." Even the compliance requirements in the state of 
California, which is known for the severity of penalties regarding privacy and consumer 
protection laws, do not specify time limits. To illustrate, the requirements of the article 7, 
1798.29 in the California Information Practices Act of 1977 requires that “the disclosure shall be 
made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the 
legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in subdivision (c), or any measures necessary 
to determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the data system.”. 
Consistent with regulations from other states, California allows for delayed disclosure when this 
is requested by enforcement agencies: “(c) The notification required by this section may be 
delayed if a law enforcement agency determines that the notification will impede a criminal 
investigation. The notification required by this section shall be made after the law enforcement 
agency determines that it will not compromise the investigation”.  
Disclosure Timeliness and Litigation Risk 
The lack of time limit requirements for the disclosure of cybersecurity incidents creates 
an opportunity for companies to strategically delay such disclosures considering the decision is, 
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most of the time, at a company’s discretion. Nonetheless, unreasonable delays in disclosing 
cybersecurity incidents may have significant liability implications. Prior literature on voluntary 
disclosures of bad news finds that these disclosures have an impact on a company’s stock market 
returns and identifies the timeliness of disclosure as a relevant factor that may explain the market 
behavior (e.g., Skinner 1994). This body of literature documents the potential consequences of 
delaying the disclosure of bad news and also identifies competing incentives. For instance, 
sudden stock price declines on earning announcement days may lead investors to perceive that 
management failed to disclose the bad earnings news promptly and this may result in litigation 
and loss of reputation (Skinner 1994). Skinner (1994) argues that although timelier disclosures 
may not prevent litigation, these will undercut the plaintiff arguments about management's 
failure to disclose the news promptly and will result in a smaller plaintiff class as there will be 
fewer investors completing transactions during the non-disclosure period. In contrast, there is 
also an argument that weighs the potential incentives for managers to delay the disclosure of bad 
news due to career concerns (e.g., performance-based compensation tied to annual results) or 
given concerns about disruptions in operations (e.g., impact on seasonal sales).  
There is archival evidence supporting the legal liability argument about managers' 
incentive to pre-disclose bad news early. Skinner (1994) reported that companies voluntarily 
disclose bad news to a greater extent than good news which suggests that management pre-
discloses bad news to alleviate liability concerns. This finding is consistent with subsequent 
research that revealed that managers have a strong tendency to pre-disclose bad news and that 
more timely disclosures of bad earnings news resulted in lower settlement amounts (Skinner 
1997). Similarly, evidence from a sample of securities class-action lawsuits disclosing bad news 
showed that more timely disclosure of bad news deterred litigation (Donelson et al. 2012). 
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Despite the apparent evidence suggesting that managers have an incentive to pre-disclose bad 
earnings, there is conflicting evidence that contradicts the liability argument for voluntary 
disclosure of bad news given a lack of evidence that companies disclose bad earnings news 
before the formal earnings announcement date (Francis at al. 1994).  
In this study, I draw on the Litigation Reduction Hypothesis (LRH) to develop baseline 
expectations regarding the impact of disclosure timeliness on jurors’ liability assessments. 
Skinner’s (1994, 1997) LRH uses two main arguments to establish that timelier disclosures 
reduce expected legal costs. First, the LRH explains that timelier disclosures shorten the 
nondisclosure period and result in a smaller class period. This suggests that there is an economic 
component to the relationship between disclosure timeliness and litigation risk and that a larger 
economic impact, given the size of the class period, results in higher litigation risk. Second, LRH 
explains that timelier disclosures weaken arguments regarding management's failure to disclose 
on time. This second component of the relationship between disclosure timeliness and litigation 
risk suggests there is a process by which individuals assign blame or responsibility and that this, 
in turn, influences the assessment of a company’s legal liability. Thus, LRH posits that, 
regardless of the context of the lawsuit and the arguments of the plaintiff (e.g., regardless of the 
motivations for the lawsuit), disclosure timeliness will influence jurors’ liability assessments. 
This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to a greater (lower) 
likelihood that jurors will find the company liable. 
Causal Attribution and Generalization of Inferences 
To complement the assumptions of LRH, Jones and Davis’ (1965) CIT develops 
additional expectations that aid in better understanding the relationship between disclosure 
timeliness and litigation risk as depicted in Figure 1. CIT is a theory within the body of 
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attribution theories which describes two conditions in the inference process: the assumptions 
about the actor's (1) knowledge and (2) ability to execute an action. These two conditions help an 
individual judge whether an act was intentional or whether it was accidental or incidental (also 
referred to as internal or external attributions, respectively). Correspondence is defined as “the 
extent that the act and the underlying characteristic or attribute are similarly described by the 
inference” (Jones and Davis 1965, 223). For instance, in the context of delayed disclosure of bad 
news, the most correspondent inference may be that which assumes with high confidence that the 
delayed disclosure is a result of the inherent uncertainty of the event (external attribution). 
Alternatively, the most correspondent inference may be that which assumes with high confidence 
that the delayed disclosure is a result of management’s intention to behave opportunistically 
(internal attribution). In this study, the term causal attribution refers to a participant’s 
correspondence of inference about the cause of behavior, such that if a behavior is perceived as 
intentional (incidental or accidental) the assessment of causal attribution will be higher (lower).  
CIT posits that individuals make inferences based on expectations about the behavior of 
an average person in the same circumstances and that in the existence of competing explanations 
(intentions) for behavior, an individual will indicate extreme confidence in the causal attribution 
when one of the intentions is perceived to be much more likely than others (Jones and Davis 
1965). I argue that perceiving the delayed disclosure of a cybersecurity incident as an intentional 
act is more than likely. Prior research shows that managers have career incentives to obfuscate 
the disclosure of bad news and to strategically time such disclosures (Kothari, Li, and Short 
2009). Moreover, the delayed disclosures of high-profile cybersecurity incidents, such as the 
Target and Neiman Marcus data breaches, have been highlighted in media articles and the media 
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suggests that these disclosures may have been strategically timed to maintain sales over the 
holiday’s season (e.g., Freifeld 2014).  
Consistent with CIT, in the context of delayed disclosures, I argue that jurors will 
perceive the plaintiff inferences as highly correspondent with the company’s behavior and will 
assume with high confidence that the delayed disclosure is a result of management’s intention to 
behave opportunistically. Accordingly, I expect that less timely disclosures will lead to extreme 
assessments of causal attribution. Besides, CIT establishes that if the consequences of an act are 
positive (negative), a perceiver will have more favorable (unfavorable) dispositions toward the 
actor. Accordingly, I argue that causal attributions should mediate the relationship between 
disclosure timeliness and liability assessments, such that stronger (weaker) jurors’ assessments of 
causal attribution will increase (decrease) jurors’ liability assessments. Based on the above 
discussion, the second set of hypotheses are stated as: 
H2a: Less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to stronger (weaker) 
jurors’ assessments of causal attribution. 
H2b: Jurors liability assessments will increase (decrease) as jurors’ assessment of causal 
attribution is stronger (weaker).  
 
The Plausibility of Justifications 
Considering the complexity of cybersecurity incidents and the challenges that companies 
face to be able to disclosure accurate and comprehensive information on a timely manner, I argue 
that companies may be able to use remedial tactics to mitigate the potential negative impact of 
their disclosure strategy. The literature on the use of justifications for reducing jurors' liability 
assessments suggests that jurors are less likely to issue negligence verdicts when the defendant 
apologizes or uses first-person justifications as a remedial tactic (Cornell et al. 2009). Prior 
literature suggests that remedial tactics may be used to mitigate the negative impact of jurors’ 
affective reactions toward negative outcome information (Reffett 2010). Nevertheless, this 
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literature also highlights that the use of remedial tactics is only effective when they are perceived 
as credible (Grenier, Pomeroy, and Reffett 2012). Grenier et al. (2012) studied the credibility of 
remedial tactics by manipulating the source of internal inspections used as remedial tactics in 
cases of undetected fraud. The broader theoretical concept of interest is the plausibility of the 
justifications as a source of credibility.  
Plausibility refers to “the credibility or believability of an assertion within the context of 
a larger argument” (Mitroff and Mason 1983, 199). Prior research suggests that companies’ 
stakeholders are able to identify instances in which management uses self-serving disclosure and 
blame poor performance on external factors (Barton and Mercer 2005; Kimbrough and Wang 
2014). Specifically, Barton and Mercer (2005) in an experimental study found that plausible 
explanations result in higher analyst’s earnings forecast while implausible explanations harm 
management reputation and result in lower earnings forecast. Moreover, using archival data, 
Kimbrough and Wang (2014) document that investors use consensus industry and company-
specific information to assess the plausibility of management explanations and that companies 
that provide implausible (plausible) explanations experience significant market penalties 
(rewards).  
From a theory perspective, Kelley's (1973) attribution theory (that extends CIT) explains 
that one’s internal causes (desirable behaviors) are discounted when there is high external 
justification for an action. Thus, a plausible justification about a company’s disclosure strategy 
should moderate the impact of disclosure timeliness on jurors’ assessments of causal attribution 
such that a plausible justification mitigates the negative impact of less timely disclosure. In 
contrast, an implausible justification should “backfire” and lead to stronger negative assessments 
of causal attribution (Barton and Mercer 2005). This leads to the third hypothesis: 
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H3: The plausibility of justifications moderates the strength of the effect of the timeliness 
of disclosure on jurors’ assessment of causal attribution, such that implausible (plausible) 
justifications lead to stronger (weaker) jurors’ assessment of causal attribution. 
  
Methods 
  This study employs a 2 x 3 experimental design in which the timeliness of the disclosure 
(more timely versus less timely) and the plausibility of management’s justification for the 
company’s disclosure strategy (plausible, implausible, and no justifications) is manipulated 
between-participants. Using a sample of jury-eligible participants as a proxy for jurors, I test 
whether the timeliness of disclosures and the plausibility of justifications impact jurors perceived 
causal attribution and liability assessments. 
Participants 
To test the hypotheses, participants that represent jury-eligible individuals who represent 
eligible jurors in an actual court case similar to that used in the experiment are desired. As such, I 
recruited 168 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).6 Prior research using 
MTurk workers have found them to be a good proxy for actual jurors (Grenier, Pomeroy, Stern 
2014; Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2015; Grenier, Lowe, Reffett, and Warne 2015; Brasel et 
al. 2016; Maksymov and Nelson 2017). Research generally finds that MTurk workers are 
demographically diverse and are a source of reliable data (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 
2010; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011). Screening procedures were conducted to assure 
participants meet basic criteria for juror eligibility such as being at least 18 years of age and a 
                                                     
6 The desired sample size was 180 (30 participants per cell) participants. To achieve equal cell sizes, the Qualtrics 
survey was set-up to randomly assign participants to one of the six experimental conditions and a quota was set-up 
in Qualtrics to stop collecting data once the desired cell-size was achieved for each experimental condition. There 
were 432 attempts to complete this study. From the 432 attempts, there were 168 usable responses (28 per cell), 95 
incomplete surveys, 82 surveys in which participants failed to meet the qualification criteria, 55incomplete surveys 
given that participants failed to pass the review questions, and 32 surveys with either a duplicate IP address or Mturk 
ID. 
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United States citizen. Also, Grenier, Reffett, Simon, and Warne (2017) encourage the use of 
additional screening to ensure that the participants are appropriate. Thus, additional screening 
excluded participants that may have a potential bias toward the case facts including participants 
that have worked for an insurance company or health provider, lawyers or employees in a law 
firm, and individuals that have suffered financial loss due to identity theft.  
Participants were compensated $2.50 for completing the 20 to 25 minutes task7; however, 
only those that answer all the review questions (including the attention check question) 
accurately were allowed to complete the study. Access to the experimental materials is restricted 
to avoid duplicate responses from the same Mturk ID and the same IP address to alleviate issues 
of repeated participation (Arnold and Triki 2017). 8 As an additional control measure for the 
quality of the participant pool, only MTurk workers with the “Masters”9 designation were 
recruited for this study.  
On average, participants are 29 to 38 years old, with slightly liberal political views, and 
full-time employed. About 52 percent of the participants are female, 99 percent of participants 
have at least a high school degree and about 50 percent of the participants have at least a 
bachelor’s degree. About 17 percent of the participants have previously served on a jury, 16 
percent of participants have been a victim of a cybersecurity attack, and 50 percent of the 
participants have made personal investments in the common stock of a company. 
                                                     
7 Compensation is deemed reasonable, considering MTurk workers’ average wage of $3.00 (Rennekamp, Rupar, and 
Seybert 2015).  
8 Consistent with suggestions provided by Arnold and Triki (2017), a reminder about the importance of scientific 
research was also be presented to discourage participants from participating a second time. 
9 MTurk “Masters” have higher approval rates and low number of abandoned HITs (Farrell et al. 2017). 
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Task 
The experimental materials follow the format used in prior research examining jurors’ 
assessment of auditor’s liability. Specifically, consistent with Brasel et al. (2016), participants 
are first provided background information to educate them on disclosures of cybersecurity risks 
and practices along with review questions on the material.10 Participants subsequently received 
general information about the defendant, Aplus Insurance, which is portrayed as a successful and 
leading health and well-being company headquartered in California, together with general case 
facts, such as the date of the data breach, the date the company became aware of the breach, the 
extent of the breach, the impact of the breach on the company’s stock price, and information 
about an investigation announced by the SEC into the timing of the breach disclosure. 11  
After the provision of summarized case facts, I present the case allegations and the 
defendant’s arguments. The allegations against the defendant resemble those that Yahoo is 
currently facing. Specifically, the plaintiff arguments claim that the defendant made false and 
misleading statements by failing to disclose the lack of appropriate encryption of its customers’ 
information. Participants are also informed that the plaintiff presented evidence to support their 
allegations, which shows that the lack of encryption was not disclosed, and that the timeliness of 
the disclosure is brought as an allegation of negligence, as it took them eight months to uncover 
the breach and an additional three months to disclose the breach (only for the not-timely 
condition). Participants are informed about the defense arguments and evidence provided about 
                                                     
10 Brasel et al. (2015) also provide background information on additional concepts, such as material misstatements, 
reasonable assurance, auditor negligence, critical audit matters, and due professional care, relevant to their study. 
However, my experimental materials are adapted to fit the context of this study such that only background 
information about financial statements and additional information regarding cybersecurity is presented to 
participants. 
11 Participants are informed that the attacker gained access to personal information from customers and employees, 
such as names, birthdays, social security numbers, street addresses, email addresses, and employment information. 
This is consistent with information frequently targeted by attackers. 
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actions taken to notify about the breach and to protect affected customers and employees. Also, 
as part of the arguments from the defense, the defendant’s apologies are displayed followed by 
the defendant’s justification for the timeliness of the disclosure. After receiving the judge’s 
instructions, participants are required to answer case questions and to complete a demographics’ 
survey. The case materials were subjected to review and validation by a lawyer with experience 
in this area of business law.  
Independent Variables 
 
The first independent variable is the timeliness of the disclosure. Timeliness is 
operationalized as the difference between the date when the company learned of the breach and 
the date the breach was disclosed. Participants are informed about the timeliness of the 
disclosure when provided with the case facts and the arguments from the plaintiff. Participants in 
the more timely condition are notified that the company disclosed the incident in three days, 
while in the less timely conditions participants are notified that the company disclosed the 
incident in three months.  
The second independent variable is plausibility. Plausibility is operationalized as the 
extent to which the defendant’s attorney justifications are more or less plausible. As illustrated in 
Figure 2, this variable is manipulated at three levels: 1) plausible, 2) implausible, and 3) no 
justification. Given that the plausibility of an assertion is assessed within the context of a larger 
argument (Mitroff and Mason 1983), I operationalize plausibility in the context of other relevant 
case facts and manipulate the accuracy of management disclosures between-subjects to build 
plausible and implausible conditions. 12 Specifically, given that the case facts state that the 
                                                     
12 The company, industry, the details about the company’s financial condition, and facts about the breach, such as 
the economic impact and the breach data and discovery date, are fixed between participants. This is consistent with 
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breach was discovered eight months after the event, it is plausible that the investigation would be 
complicated and will impede companies’ ability to release accurate information about the impact 
of the breach in a timely manner. In justifying less timely disclosures, plausible justifications 
include allegations that the delay was necessary to disclose comprehensive and accurate 
information about the extent of the breach. In contrast, implausible justifications for less timely 
disclosures, include allegations that the delay was required to disclose all relevant facts but also a 
caveat to notify that it was later determined that the magnitude of the incident was greater than 
what was initially disclosed. Participants in the less timely condition are also presented with a 
timeline of the disclosure timelines that shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to 
disclose a cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude and argues that the disclosure was made 
44 days later than the average disclosure.  
Plausible justifications for more timely disclosures include allegations that the company 
released the news in a timely manner to notify customers and employees about the breach, so 
they could take actions to protect their identities, and that accurate facts were subsequently 
disclosed. In contrast, implausible justifications for timely disclosures take the position that the 
breach was disclosed promptly and that all the facts released were accurate. Considering the 
complexity of the event and that it went unnoticed for eight months, the timely and accurate 
release of information may be perceived as “too good to be true.” Also, participants in the timely 
condition are presented with a timeline of the disclosure timelines that shows that on average, it 
takes 47 days for a company to disclose a cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude and argues 
that the disclosure was made 44 days earlier than the average disclosure. See Figure 3 for details. 
Prior research suggests that it is difficult for unsophisticated users to detect when companies 
                                                     
Barton and Mercer’s (2005) operationalization of plausibility in which they manipulated the location of an incident 
to convey a plausible and an implausible condition. 
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behave opportunistically (Koonce, Williamson, and Winchel 2010). Similarly, jurors may be 
unable to detect implausible explanations on their own, and the plaintiff may need to highlight 
such allegations. Thus, within each experimental condition I include an argument in which the 
plaintiff implies that the justifications provided by the defendant are not plausible. 
Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable of interest is the jurors' liability assessments. In this study, 
the primary measure of liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant 
liable using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “extremely unlikely” (equal to 1) to 
“extremely likely” (equal to 7).13  
The second dependent variable is causal attribution. Causal attribution represents the 
participants’ level of confidence in their assessment of causal attribution. The measure of causal 
attributions is adapted from Koonce et al. (2010). In assessing the causal attribution, participants 
are first informed about two potential reasons for the timing of the disclosure: 1) that the delay 
was caused by the company’s intent to strategically disclose the cyber-attack to portray the 
company in a favorable light, or 2) that the delay was caused by the company’s difficulty in 
estimating the extent of the breach due to the inherent uncertainty of the event. Then, participants 
are required to assess the causal attribution using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from 
“completely incidental” (equal to 1) to “completely intentional” (equal to 7) and then to indicate 
their level of confidence in their assessment using a 7-point, fully labeled, confidence scale that 
ranges from “not confident at all” (equal to 1) to “very confident” (equal to 7). Causal attribution 
                                                     
13 Eutsler and Lang (2015) find that a fully labeled 7-point scale provides the greatest benefits to researchers. They 
argue that labeling results in many benefits, such as reduced response bias, maximization of variance, maximization 
of power, and minimization of error. They provide evidence that variance is maximized when using 7-point scales.  
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then equals the points allocated to the causal attribution question times the participant’s level of 
confidence in their assessment.14  
Results 
Manipulation Checks and Review Questions 
To test the effectiveness of the manipulation of disclosure timeliness, I ask participants about 
their agreement with the following statement: "Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach in a timely 
manner.”15 I find that participants in the timely condition (mean=5.71) agree to a greater extent 
that Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach in a timely manner, (F=236.800, p<0.001) compared to 
participants in the not timely condition (mean=2.07). In addition, to test the manipulation of 
plausibility, I ask participants about their agreement with the following two statements: “Aplus 
Insurance’s justification for the timing of the disclosure is credible” and “Aplus Insurance’s 
justification for the timing of the disclosure is believable”. I find that participants in the not 
timely/not plausible condition perceived justifications as less plausible (mean=2.89) that 
participants in the not timely/plausible condition (mean=3.125) but the difference between 
conditions is not statistically significant. Likewise, participants in the timely/plausible condition 
assessed justificantions as more plausible (mean=5.375) than participants in the timely/not 
plausible condition (5.214) but the difference between groups is not statistically significant. This 
analysis suggest that participants perceived timely disclosures as more plausible and less timely 
disclosures as less plausible, regardless of the context of justifications (plausible/implausible) 
manipulated between participants.  
                                                     
14 The measure of causal attribution is scaled by seven (7) to use 7-point scales in the analysis consistently. 
15 The participants use a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” (equal to 1) to “strongly agree” (equal 
to 7).  
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Testing of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
H1 predicts that less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to a 
greater (lower) likelihood that jurors will find the company liable. Panel A of Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics for the participant's liability assessments. I tested H1 using analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), and the results are tabulated in Panel B of Table 1. 
As indicated in Table 1, I find support for the hypothesized relationship between 
disclosure timeliness and liability assessments. Consistent the predictions, liability assessments 
are lower in the timely condition than in the not timely condition (F=28.161, p<0.001). Two 
additional measures of liability assessments are also captured. The first measures a juror’s 
verdict, which is a dichotomous variable equal to one (1) if participants assess the defendant as 
liable, and that otherwise equals zero (0). The second measures the percentage of imposed 
damages on the company after the participant is informed that a majority of the jury found the 
company liable and therefore a determination of damages to be awarded needs to be made. The 
amount of potential damages to be awarded ranges from zero (0) percent to one-hundred (100) 
percent of the $10 Billion alleged loss. The result of the ANOVA (untabulated) using the two 
additional measures of liability assessments are qualitatively similar and consistent with the 
results of the main analysis. 
Hypothesis 2 
H2a predicts that less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to 
stronger (weaker) jurors’ assessments of causal attribution. I present descriptive statistics for 
participants’ assessments of causal attribution in Panel A of Table 2. The results of the analysis 
of variance (ANOVA), tabulated in Panel B of Table 2, support the hypothesized relationship 
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and indicate that delayed disclosure of a cyber-attack lead to stronger jurors assessments of 
causal attribution (F=42.118, p<0.001).  
H2b predicts that jurors’ liability assessments will increase (decrease) as jurors’ 
assessments of causal attribution are stronger (weaker). Results of the mediation analysis, 
following Hayes (2017) process analysis are tabulated in Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.16 As 
shown in Panel A of Table 3, I find a positive and significant relationship between delayed 
disclosures and assessment of causal attribution (t=2.541, p=0.060) and between assessments of 
causal attribution and liability assessments (t=8.506, p<0.001). Moreover, inspection of bootstrap 
confidence intervals for the analysis of indirect effects, included in Panel B of Table 3, confirms 
the hypothesized mediation.17  
Hypothesis 3 
H3 predicts that the plausibility of justifications moderates the strength of the effect of 
the timeliness of disclosure on jurors’ beliefs about a company’s intention to act 
opportunistically, such that implausible (plausible) justifications lead to stronger (weaker) jurors’ 
beliefs about a company’s intention to act opportunistically. I present descriptive statistics for 
participants’ assessments of causal attribution in Panel A of Table 2. As shown in Panel B of 
Table 2 and Panel B and Panel C of Table 3, the results of ANOVA (F=0.128, p=0.440) and 
conditional Process analysis (t=-0.082, p=0.467) does not support the predicted interaction 
between disclosure timeliness and plausibility of justifications.  
                                                     
16 I use Hayes (2017) Process model 7 to test moderated mediation. 
17 The analysis of bootstrap confidence interval does not include zero which denotes statistical significance (Hayes 
2017). 
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Additional Analysis 
Perceived Plausibility 
Given the results, I conducted additional analysis to examine whether an ANOVA would 
be feasible by creating an alternative binary variable using the median cut-off of participants 
perceived plausibility. The analysis results in cell-sizes of 40 participants in the timely-plausible 
condition and 43 participants in the non-timely-implausible condition. In contrast, there are only 
16 participants in the timely-implausible and 13 participants in the non-timely-plausible 
condition. The results suggest that disclosure timeliness is driving participants’ perceived 
plausibility. The results of Chi-square test of independence are statistically significant (Chi-
square=25.016, p<0.001) and confirm that perceptions of timeliness and plausibility are not 
independent. 
Mercer’s discussion of the impact of inherent plausibility on the credibility of 
management disclosures suggest that perceived plausibility is not objective and may not be 
necessarily related to the actual plausibility or credibility of a disclosure. In contrast, Mercer 
suggests that perceived plausibility depends on the extent to which information deviates from 
expectations and prior believes. As such. I conducted additional analysis to determine whether 
disclosure timeliness and jurors’ preferences impact perceived plausibility and, in turn, jurors’ 
assessments of causal attribution and liability. In particular, I collected data about participants’ 
preference for accuracy (Prefer_Accuracy). Participants indicated their agreement with the 
following statement: “Aplus Insurance’s should have emphasized more on disclosing 
comprehensive and accurate information about the cyber-attack than in disclosing the 
information on a timely manner”. Then, I conducted mediation analysis using disclosure 
timeliness as the independent variable, plausibility, preference for accuracy, and the interaction 
 
 
31 
of plausibility and preference for accuracy with timeliness as covariates, perceived plausibility 
and causal attribution as mediators, and liability assessment as the dependent variable.  
Descriptive statistics reveal that on average, participants have more preference for 
timeliness than for accuracy (mean=3.74). As shown in Panel A of Table 4 and as illustrated in 
Figure 4, I find that delayed disclosures and preference for accuracy lead to lower assessments of 
plausibility (t=-6.368, p<0.001 and t=-2.598, p=0.005, respectively). However, evidence of a 
negative and statistically significant interaction (t=5.245, p<0.001) between preference for 
accuracy and timeliness (delayed disclosures) confirms that participants preferences drive 
perceptions of plausibility. Specifically, this significant interaction suggests that participants in 
the more timely condition with higher preference for accuracy, over timeliness, perceived 
justifications as more plausible. The analysis also shows that higher perceptions of plausibility 
lead to lower assessments of causal attribution (t=-11.543, p<0.001). However, in contrast with 
the results of the main analysis, the relationship between causal attribution and liability 
assessments is only marginally significant (t=1.268, p=0.103). This finding, together with 
evidence from bootstrap analysis, as shown in Panel B of Table 4, suggest that the impact of 
timeliness on liability assessments is mediated by jurors’ perceptions of justifications 
plausibility. 
Perceived Timeliness 
I collected additional data to capture how participants beliefs and expectations influence 
their perceptions of timeliness. First, I developed a four-item formative construct to capture 
participants’ perceptions that delayed disclosures of cyber-attacks are acceptable 
(Delay_Acceptable). Using 7-point scales participants indicated their agreement with the 
following statements: 1) “delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the 
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increased sophistication of hacking techniques”, 2) “delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is 
acceptable given the complexity of determining the scope of the breach”, 3) “delaying the 
disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable to conduct required investigations”, 4) “delaying the 
disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable even when there is loss of identifiable information from 
customers and employees”.18 Principal components analysis (PCA) confirms that all items load 
on the same construct with item loadings above the 0.5 threshold (Nunally 1978). Moreover, I 
confirmed that the VIF is below 3.3 (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006) for all items.19 As such, 
I use the average value of the four items as a single Delay_Acceptable measure for the analysis. 
Moreover, to capture participants perceptions of companies’ incentives to delay disclosure 
(Delay_Incentive) participants indicated their agreement with the following statement: 
“managers have more incentives to disclose bad news on a timely basis than incentives to delay 
the disclosure of bad news”. 
Evaluation of the single items individually and the Delay_Acceptable formative construct 
reveal that the timeliness of disclosure is driving participants’ perceptions that delayed 
disclosures of cyber-attacks are acceptable and perceptions of companies’ incentives to delay 
disclosure. Specifically, timely disclosures lead to higher assessments that delayed disclosures 
are acceptable (mean=3.714) and that companies have more incentives to disclose bad news on a 
timely basis (mean=4.024), compared to delayed disclosures with means of 2.632 and 2.940, 
respectively. Although the additional data was collected to explore other potential determinants 
                                                     
18 I developed this construct with formative items. In contrast with reflective constructs, in a formative construct 
causality flows from the items to the construct (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). The four items included 
measure whether delayed disclosures in the context of cybersecurity breaches are acceptable based on context 
specific complexities of cyber-attacks or personal preferences. 
19 For formative constructs, Petter, Strub, and Rai (2007) suggest using PCA, rather than traditional EFA, to assess 
construct validity and to assess collinearity (i.e., VIF < 3.3) to evaluate the construct's reliability. 
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of perceived timeliness, Chi-square test of independence (untabulated) is significant and shows 
that disclosure timeliness is not independent from perceptions that delayed disclosures of cyber-
attacks are acceptable (Chi-square=37.55, p=0.021) and perceptions of companies’ incentives to 
delay disclosure (Chi-square=19.222, p=.004). 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of disclosure timeliness and the 
plausibility of management justifications on assessments of causal attribution and liability. I 
predict and find that more timely disclosure lead to more favorable assessments of causal 
attribution and liability and that assessments of causal attribution mediates the relationship 
between disclosure timeliness and liability. However, I was unable to find evidence that the use 
of justifications (plausible or implausible) help reduce liability.  
This study has relevant implications for companies, investors, and analysts interested in 
understanding the cost of cybersecurity. In particular, the findings of this study suggest that a 
company’s forthcomingness in disclosing the breach, even without disclosing all the facts, could 
help reduce the liability associated with cybersecurity breaches. Studying the cost of litigation in 
the context of cyber-security is pertinent considering that post data breach costs, including legal 
expenditures, represent one of the main cost drivers of cybersecurity incidents in the U.S. 
(Ponemon 2018). Having a broader understanding of the cost of cybersecurity could help 
companies to manage their cyber-risks effectively and help inform analysts and non-professional 
investors decisions. Also, this study provides evidence that suggests that jurors have difficulty 
assessing when justifications are plausible and implausible, and as such, justifications could be 
used opportunistically by companies trying to reduce their litigation risk. This finding is relevant 
for regulators and standard setters interested in promoting timely disclosure of cybersecurity. 
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This study also add to the literature on the use of remedial tactics to reduce litigation and 
provide evidence that such remedial tactics are not necessarily useful in reducing liability 
associated with delayed disclosure of cyber-attacks. Moreover, this study contributes to theory 
via the Litigation Reduction Hypothesis by developing and testing a more comprehensive model 
for explaining jurors’ judgment and decisions making (JDM) processes. Specifically, I provide 
evidence of the significant influence of disclosure timeliness and perceived plausibility, based on 
participants beliefs and preferences, on assessments of causal attribution leading to final liability 
assessments.  
The results should be evaluated in light of the inherent limitations. For instance, a 
limitation in studying the cost of litigation, using jurors’ liability assessments, is that many times 
the plaintiff and the company try to reach a settlement. However, it is still important to study 
jurors’ judgment and decision making given that the settlement outcomes are many times 
influenced by the potential outcomes of jury trial (Maksymov, Pickerd, Lowe, Peecher, and 
Reffett 2017). Moreover, it is possible that the results of this study may not be generalized to 
other type of participants, such as investors and analysts, given the differences in background 
and knowledge and individual preferences. As such, future research could explore the impact of 
disclosure timeliness in other contexts, such as judgments and decisions of financial statement 
users.  
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STUDY TWO: INVESTORS’ JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS AFTER A 
CYBERSECURITY BREACH: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE RELEVANCE OF 
CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE 
Introduction 
Cyber-breaches have drawn increased scrutiny due to their increasing frequency and 
magnitude of occurrence, and the associated financial impact on companies and investors. In 
response to these concerns, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is 
proposing new voluntary assurance services to address the information needs of users regarding 
company’s cybersecurity activities and aiming to standardize associated reporting frameworks. 
Because use of the proposed services and the associated framework developed by the AICPA is 
voluntary, organizations’ decision to engage in cybersecurity risk management assurance (CRM) 
is primarily risk-based. The AICPA acknowledges that it is the organization and its stakeholders 
who would drive the adoption of these services (AICPA 2017a). Prior research suggests that 
companies’ underinvestment in cybersecurity may be a result of limited evidence regarding the 
benefits of such investments (Gordon, Loeb, Lycyshyn, Zhou 2015b). Consequently, this study 
answers a call for research by the AICPA (AAA 2017) to better understand the cost of cyber-
security breaches, users’ associated information needs, and how and why CRM assurance may 
be feasible and desirable for an organization.  
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, I examine whether knowledge about a firm’s 
engagement in voluntary CRM assurance, prior to a cyber-breach, affects non-professional 
investors’ judgments and decisions, after the breach. Second, I investigate whether the changes 
in investors’ judgments and decisions differ in magnitude depending on whether CRM assurance 
violates or conforms to industry norms. Although prior accounting research that explore the 
benefits of voluntary assurance document greater stock price assessments (Brown-Liburd and 
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Zamora 2014) and lower cost of capital (Dhaliwal, Zhen Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011), some 
studies suggest that the benefits of assurance are context specific and are only significant when 
the assured information is positive (Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff 2009) and relevant to the 
company (Cheng, Green, and Chi Wa Ko 2015). Thus, the value relevance of voluntary 
assurance in the context of cybersecurity is a very different proposition given that cyber-
breaches, to some degree, are believed to be unavoidable. As such, I aim to explore whether the 
benefits of voluntary assurance hold in the context of CRM assurance when assurance fails to 
prevent liability. Moreover, in contrast with recent research that explores the effect of joint or 
separate provisioning of CRM assurance and cyber-breaches on investors’ willingness to invest 
(Perols and Murthy 2018), I take a step back and assess the value relevance of voluntary CRM 
assurance in isolation by exploring investors’ decision behavior given the presence or absence of 
assurance in light of market expectations.  
The theoretical underpinnings for this study are drawn from Wallace’s (1980) work on 
the economic demand for audits in free markets and the associated Insurance Hypothesis. The 
Insurance Hypothesis posits that the demand for audit services is driven by their use as a tool to 
manage a company's liability exposure. Drawing on the Insurance Hypothesis, I predict that 
CRM assurance is positively associated with investors' valuation judgments. Moreover, 
consistent with prior studies on investor judgment and decision making, I also predict that 
assessments of management credibility mediate the effects of CRM assurance on investors’ 
valuation judgments. 
A fundamental aspect affecting the value of assurance that is not captured in the 
voluntary assurance literature is the market expectations for assurance which may differ based on 
industry norms or other such characteristics creating expectations. Thus, I draw on Expectancy 
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Violations Theory (EVT) in predicting that the relationship between CRM assurance and 
assessments of management credibility will be stronger when expectations of a company 
engaging in assurance services are violated (do not conform to industry norms). Specifically, I 
predict that investors’ assessments of management credibility will be more favorable for 
companies that engage in voluntary CRM assurance and are not expected to do so compared to 
companies that engage in voluntary CRM assurance as expected. In contrast, investors’ 
assessments of management credibility will be less favorable for companies that do not engage in 
voluntary assurance and are expected to do so compared to companies that do not engage in 
voluntary assurance, but for which this is the norm.  
I test the predictions using a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment in which participants are 
required to make valuation judgments and to assess the credibility of management after a cyber-
breach. The independent variables of interest are the presence or absence of CRM assurance and 
the expectancies regarding whether the company should engage in CRM assurance. Specifically, 
the presence of assurance is manipulated by informing participants that the company has a CRM 
program in place and operating effectively, and that the company engaged in voluntary assurance 
over their CRM program and received a clean opinion from the auditors. In contrast, participants 
in the no-assurance condition are informed that, although the company has not engaged in 
assurance over their CRM program, the company has a CRM program in place and operating 
effectively.20 Moreover, the expectation on whether the company should engage in CRM 
assurance is operationalized by informing participants that engagement in CRM assurance is 
expected or not expected based on the behavior of other companies in the same industry. To test 
the predictions, participants assess the company’s stock price value and management’s 
                                                     
20 This design is chosen after examining the trend of current cyber-breach disclosures. We noted that companies 
usually disclose that they have controls in place and operating effectively.  
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competence and trustworthiness (the two components of management credibility documented in 
prior research (e.g., Clor-Proell 2009; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005; Rennekamp 2012)).  
Consistent with the predictions, I find that voluntary CRM assurance, prior to the 
occurrence of a cyber-breach, results in more favorable investor valuation judgments after a 
cyber-breach is disclosed. I also find that this relation is mediated by management credibility 
assessments. The results also support the predicted moderated mediation and provide evidence 
that the indirect effect of assurance on valuation judgments, through assessments of management 
credibility, is conditional on whether firms’ practices violate or conform-to-expectancies.  
Additional analyses explore how investors’ perceived benefits of assurance-as-insurance 
(AAI) and perceived accountants’ cyber-expertise (ACE) impact investors’ decision behavior. I 
find that the direct effect of CRM assurance is associated with higher valuation judgments only 
when users perceived higher benefits of AAI. Moreover, I find that expectancy violations only 
influence decision behavior for participants that perceived higher accountants’ cyber-expertise. 
Using additional data collected to explore the impact of disclosure of companies’ cyber-risk 
management practices, I find that investors reward (penalize) companies with (without) formal 
CRM programs in place. 
This study has several relevant practical implications. The AICPA is promoting the use of 
the Trust Services Framework and Criteria, which was recently updated to address cyber-risk 
management, and is encouraging accounting professionals to use this framework to provide 
voluntary assurance over CRM. However, prior efforts in promoting similar voluntary assurance 
services, such as the WebTrust seal of assurance, have largely failed or as in the case of SysTrust 
morphed into primarily internal services for management (i.e., SOC II reports). As such, a more 
in-depth understanding of the potential reaction by investors to new assurance services over an 
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entity’s cybersecurity activities is timely in providing additional evidence to the AICPA that may 
assist in maximizing the benefit of their cybersecurity initiatives. Moreover, the results of this 
study provide evidence of the perceived value of CRM assurance and shed light on the need for 
and benefit of such assurance. This evidence informs regulators (such as the SEC) and financial 
statement stakeholders, trying to promote further disclosure and assurance over companies’ 
cyber-risk practices (AAA 2017; AICPA 2017a; Cohn 2018). The findings of the study suggest 
that organizations’ stakeholders may be able to drive the demand for voluntary CRM assurance, 
particularly if voluntary CRM assurance becomes expected for specific industries. As such, to 
create the demand that justifies the cost of voluntary CRM assurance the profession may need to 
effectively market and promote SOC II and III CRM assurance services. 
 This study contributes to the literature on investor judgment and decision making. 
Specifically, this study addresses investors’ judgments and decisions after cyber-breaches and 
adds context to the archival literature on cybersecurity events by aiding in understanding the 
underlying drivers behind investors decision-making. For instance, this study provides evidence 
that, in general, market participants value voluntary CRM assurance-as-insurance but the extent 
of the impact of CRM assurance depends on investors’ perceived benefits of assurance-as-
insurance and perceived cyber-expertise of auditors. Moreover, although prior research addresses 
investors’ reactions to other types of negative news, these studies generally limit their focus to 
disclosures of negative financial performance (e.g., bad earnings news). In contrast, using the 
context of non-financial disclosures (such as cyber-breaches) sheds light on the factors likely 
driving market reaction towards other types of negative events and disasters.  
I also add to the literature and theory that documents the demand for voluntary assurance 
(Wallace 1980). This study contributes to theory by examining Wallace’s (1980) insurance 
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hypothesis within the investor JDM context. The context of this study enables testing of the 
insurance hypothesis and supports this theorized explanation of the demand for voluntary 
assurance in high litigation risk settings. Moreover, this study further contributes to theory by 
integrating EVT into the theoretical model underlying the insurance hypothesis. The theoretical 
model developed in this study highlight the role of market expectancies, based on industry 
norms, in explaining the magnitude of demand for voluntary assurance  
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background 
and explains the theoretical motivations driving the predictions. Section III discuss the methods 
by providing a description of the participants, the task, and the main variables in the analysis. 
Section IV discusses the results of the hypotheses, and additional analysis and Section V 
concludes.   
Background, Theory, and Hypothesis 
The Cost of Cybersecurity Breaches 
The incidence of cybersecurity incidents during the late 1990s and early 2000s and the 
conflicting views of their economic impact motivated early event studies to determine the cost of 
security breaches.  Some of these event studies examine the impact of specific types of attacks, 
(such as Ettredge and Richardson 2003), while other studies consider a broader set of incidents 
(e.g., Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou 2003 and Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2004).  
Ettredge and Richardson (2003) focused on a single event, the DOS attack of internet companies 
in 2000, to study the market reaction to cybersecurity incidents.  Interestingly, they found that 
there was an adverse market reaction toward companies that were attacked but also toward 
similar companies (within the same industry and size) that were not attacked.  Other evidence 
gathered in the late 1990s from US corporations that disclosed an information security breach 
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suggest that there is a negative stock market reaction to cybersecurity incidents in general 
(Campbell et al. 2003).  However, further analysis revealed that the negative market reaction was 
only associated with breaches that involved unauthorized access to confidential data (Campbell 
et al. 2003).  The findings provide evidence that the nature of an event is a relevant piece of 
information for market participants.  Those results are consistent with the results of Cavusoglu et 
al. (2004).   Cavusoglu et al. (2004) reported an average 2.1 percent decrease in companies' 
market value within the two days surrounding the disclosure of a data breach.  Additional cross-
sectional analysis revealed that smaller companies and internet companies were more penalized 
than their counterparts and that the significant adverse market impact had been increasing over 
the years. 
To reconcile mixed findings reported in early event studies regarding the impact of cybersecurity 
incidents on stock market returns and to explore a potential shift of investors' assessments over 
time, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2011) analyzed evidence of stock returns over the 1995-2007 
period.  This study confirmed prior findings of significant negative stock market returns for 
companies that experienced a security breach, regardless of the type of breach.  Also, their study 
found evidence of a downward shift in the impact of security breaches on stock market returns 
following the 9/11/2001 attacks.  Two possible explanations may explain this downward shift: 
"1) more effective remediation and disaster recovery and 2) a perceived decrease in the tendency 
of customers to refrain from doing business with companies experiencing an information security 
breach" (Gordon et al. 2011, 33). 
Cyber-risk Management 
Concerns about the continued growth of cybersecurity incidents and the perceived failure 
of companies to adequately invest in cybersecurity, motivated the early accounting research on 
 
 
46 
cyber-risk management.  These events and concerns lead to the development of economic 
models to determine the optimal investment in information security.  For instance, the Gordon 
and Loeb (2002) model was developed to determine the optimal level of investment and 
resources that companies should allocate to secure their information.  Their model proposed that 
increased vulnerability to data loss increases the optimal investment in information security; 
however, the model also acknowledged that for extreme levels of vulnerability the benefit of 
information security investment is minimal as the cost may overweight the benefits of the 
investment.  Accordingly, the model established that the optimal investment in information 
security should be determined by evaluating the reduction in expected loss and not necessarily 
considering the vulnerability alone.  Overall, the model proposed that the optimal investment in 
information security should not exceed 37% of the expected loss.  The model was later extended 
as the authors acknowledged the importance of considering the cost of externalities to determine 
the optimal investment in information security (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Zhou 2015a). 
Additional research on the economic aspects of preventing security breaches considers 
the use of cybersecurity insurance and information sharing in the discussion of information 
security investment practices.  Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail (2003) discussed the importance of 
cyber-risk management to assess the optimal investment in information security but included the 
use of cybersecurity insurance as a relevant piece of information to be utilized for the cost-
benefit analysis necessary to determine the optimal investment in cybersecurity following the 
Gordon and Loeb model. Gordon et al. (2003b) posited that to conduct this analysis requires 
companies to determine the dollar value of their information security risk exposure, after 
considering information security controls in place to reduce such exposure, and then to assess 
insurance coverage.  Other factors to reduce the cost of preventing data loss were also examined.  
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For instance, Gordon, Loeb, and Lucyshyn (2003) documented the potential benefits of the 
federal government initiative, back in the early 2000s, of information sharing between companies 
about threats to computer security and the incidence of security breaches.  Their analysis showed 
that information sharing lowered the cost of information security; however, the lack of incentives 
for companies to share information prevented the realization of such potential benefits (Gordon 
et al. 2003). 
Models to determine the optimal investment in information security do address the 
qualitative factors and non-financial criteria that should be considered in evaluating the optimal 
information security investment.   To illustrate, Bodin, Gordon, and Loeb (2005) proposed the 
use of an analytic hierarchy process as a tool to evaluate and compare relevant criteria for 
information security decisions.  Bodin et al. (2005) emphasized the role of the Certified 
Information Security Officer (CISO) in evaluating the qualitative factors and non-financial 
criteria.  Subsequently, Bodin, Gordon, and Loeb (2008) introduced a new risk metric to 
complement the analytic hierarchy process tool earlier proposed by Bodin et al. (2005).  Over 
time, researchers have continued using new techniques to develop models to help companies 
assess their cybersecurity insurance needs (e.g., Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti, and 
Sadhukhan 2013). 
More recent literature highlights the top management team composition and their 
compensation structure as a relevant aspect of cyber-risk management. For instance, Kwon, 
Ulmer, and Tawei (2013) showed that the involvement of an IT executive in the top management 
team and the amount of compensation (fixed and variable) for the IT executive is negatively 
related to the incidence of information security breaches.  This finding stresses the importance of 
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the involvement of IT experts for strategic decision making and cyber-risk management in 
organizations. 
This body of research has significantly contributed to the development of risk management 
practices which are relevant to IT governance decision making (Debreceny 2013) and for 
compliance with regulatory requirements to disclose significant risk factors (SEC 2011, 2018).  
Furthermore, the objectives behind the early developed economic models for information 
security investment are still being applied and are consistent with current best practices, as well 
as the principles of risk assessment and risk response in the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
framework developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations’ (COSO). 
Assurance over Information Security 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) act of 2002 requires management of public companies to 
assess the effectiveness of internal controls and requires auditors, under SOX section 404, to 
attest on management's assessment of internal controls (US 2002). Auditing Standard No. 5 
(AS5) provides guidance for auditors to conduct an audit of management’s assessment of the 
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) and establishes that, as part of 
the audit of internal controls, auditors should understand and evaluate the effectiveness of 
information technology general controls (PCAOB 2007). Accordingly, in connection with the 
audit of a company’s ICFR, auditors are required to understand and evaluate controls over 
information security, such as controls to ensure that logical access to critical applications is 
restricted to only authorized users. Although there is an overlap between information security 
and cybersecurity controls, the scope of an audit of internal control is limited to controls relevant 
to financial reporting, as required by AS5, regardless of whether an application beyond the scope 
of the audit hosts critical data that could be the target of a cyber-breach. 
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Recent initiatives are being promoted to standardize the disclosure of companies' 
cybersecurity risk management and controls. For instance, early in 2017, the AICPA released an 
updated edition of the Trust Services Principles and Criteria (TSPC) and a newly developed 
cybersecurity risk management reporting framework. The TSPC was revised to better address an 
organization’s cybersecurity risks and to align the prior version of the TSPC with the Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s (COSO’s) Internal Control 
Framework updated in 2013. The TSPC provides a mechanism for CPAs interested in 
performing attestation over the security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and 
privacy of information systems in an organization.21 
The cybersecurity risk management reporting framework was developed by the AICPA 
as a means for communicating relevant information about a company's cyber-risk management 
practices to stakeholders. CPAs are expected to use the framework to evaluate an organization’s 
cyber-risk management practices and to report on the effectiveness of controls. The ultimate goal 
of this initiative is to promote the use of a uniform reporting framework and to increase 
stakeholders’ confidence in a company’s cybersecurity disclosures. In particular, the AICPA is 
promoting the use of a system and organization control (SOC) reporting framework for 
cybersecurity (AICPA 2017a). A SOC is an examination engagement that should be performed 
in accordance with AICPA attestation standards. The use of this reporting framework provides a 
uniform set of criteria for disclosure and the assessment of the effectiveness of a company’s 
cyber-risk management practices. According to the AICPA (2017a), this reporting framework is 
meant to be voluntary and flexible to be suitable for organizations of varying sizes and 
                                                     
21 More details of the AICPA cybersecurity initiative, the revised Trust Services Principles and Criteria, and the 
SOC over cybersecurity is provided at the AICPA’s cybersecurity resource center. 
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/FRC/AssuranceAdvisoryServices/Pages/cyber-security-resource-center.aspx  
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industries. The AICPA is also developing other CRM assurance products, such as a SOC for 
cybersecurity specific for vendor supply chains (AICPA 2017b). 
Despite the development of a new assurance framework to specifically focus on 
cybersecurity risks, it is not the first time that the accounting profession has tried to address 
concerns about the security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy of 
information systems. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the AICPA and the Canadian 
Institute of Charter Accountants (CICA) developed SysTrust and WebTrust, which are a set of 
principles and criteria to assure the reliability of information systems and e-commerce 
transactions, respectively (Gendron and Barrett 2004). In contrast with current motivations 
associated with the increased incidence and magnitude of cyber-breaches, the development of 
SysTrust and WebTrust was motivated by the demand for assurance services to address system 
reliability (McPhie 2000) and the emergence of the internet and online transactions (Barett and 
Gendron 2006). SysTrust was initially designed to provide assurance over systems that support 
business activities and to focus specifically on the principles of availability, security, integrity, 
and maintainability (McPhie 2000). In contrast, WebTrust was developed to specifically address 
electronic commerce transactions and to focus on the principles of security, availability, business 
practices, and transaction integrity (Elliott 2002). The SysTrust and WebTrust principles and 
criteria were later merged into a single framework, the Trust Services Principles, and Criteria. 
This framework evolved into a more comprehensive framework that covers the principles of 
security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy and it is currently used by 
auditors to issue SOC 2 and SOC 3 reports.22     
                                                     
22 There are three types of SOC reports. SOC 1 reports are used by auditors to provide assurance over internal 
controls over financial reporting (ICFR) to user organizations. In contrast, SOC 2 and SOC 3 are used to provide 
assurance over, all or any combination of, the Trust Services framework principles. The difference between the SOC 
2 and SOC 3 reports is that SOC 2 reports are for restrictive use while SOC 3 reports are intended to meet the needs 
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 The development of Web assurance services, in particular, the WebTrust seal, motivated 
early research on voluntary third-party assurance.23 Overall, researchers found that Web 
assurance positively influenced consumers intentions to purchase online (Kovar, Burke, and 
Kovar 2000; Kaplan and Nieschwietz 2003) and that consumers could differentiate the quality of 
Web assurance seals (Lala, Arnold, Sutton, and Guan 2002). Although these initial findings seem 
to suggest that consumers valued third-party assurance, subsequent research failed to support the 
notion that external assurance results in incremental benefits for consumers. Specifically, 
Mauldin and Arunachalam (2002) found that Web assurance is only associated with higher 
intentions to purchase when consumers do not observe disclosures about internal assurance and 
are less familiar with the product. Bahmanziari, Odom, and Ugrin (2009) extended these 
findings, showing that external Web assurance did not impact consumers' trust or purchase 
intentions, neither on its own nor when interacting with internal assurance activities.  
Although WebTrust was initially expected to be successful (Elliot 2002), the rate of 
companies engaging in Web assurance was lower than expected (Barrett and Gendron 2006). 
This triggered intrigue regarding the profession’s behavior and researchers in accounting began 
to study WebTrust through the lenses of the professionalization of accounting (Gendron and 
Barrett 2004; Barett and Gendron 2006) and managerial decision-making (Boulianne and Cho 
2009) to further develop an understanding of the factors that contributed to the development, 
adoption, and, eventually, the perceived failure of the WebTrust seal of assurance. By 
conducting field study research, Gendron and Barrett (2004) found that accountants perceived 
that organizations were skeptical about the potential of WebTrust to provide additional comfort 
                                                     
of users who desire assurance on the controls of a service organization but do not have the need of a SOC 2 report. 
(Singleton 2011).   
23 Companies that received an unmodified opinion in their WebTrust report were allowed to display the WebTrust 
seal on their websites.  
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and increase consumers trust. This finding was mainly attributed to the existence of competing 
products sponsored by large technology organizations and available at a lower cost. Further 
evidence revealed that the profession failed to properly allocate marketing resources to promote 
their proposed Web assurance service and companies perceived that the benefits were not 
sufficient to justify the necessary marketing cost (Boulianne and Cho 2009). Other researchers 
questioned whether the accounting profession was misguided to focus on assurance targeted to 
individual consumers (Sutton and Hampton 2003) and argued for a focus on business-to-business 
and supply chain related activities where accounting professionals had reputational advantages 
(Khazanchi and Sutton 2001; Sutton and Hampton 2003). The challenges faced by the 
accounting profession in establishing a reputation and demand for Web assurance resulted in the 
transformation of WebTrust into a set of principles and criteria (in particular, first used together 
with SysTrust and eventually merged with SysTrust into a single framework, the Trust Services 
principles and criteria) to be used for advisory and business-to-business assurance services 
(Gendron and Barrett 2004; Barret and Gendron 2006).  
Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model in this study is based on Wallace's (1980) Insurance Hypothesis 
and EVT ((Burgoon and Hale 1988; Burgoon 1993). The insurance hypothesis addresses why 
organizations may desire assurance irrespective of regulatory demands and provides a conceptual 
foundation for exploring sources of the demand for voluntary assurance over cybersecurity. The 
Insurance Hypothesis particularly argues that users value and demand voluntary assurance as an 
alternative to traditional insurance products used to control for litigation risk. As illustrated in 
Figure 5, the model predicts that CRM assurance is positively associated with investors’ 
valuation judgments and that this relation is mediated by investors' perceptions of management 
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credibility. Then, drawing on EVT, I propose that expectancies should influence the strength of 
the demand modeled in the Insurance Hypothesis. In particular, I predict that expectancies of 
assurance will alter the strength of the relationship between voluntary assurance and perceived 
management credibility, which flows through to impact investors’ valuation judgments. The 
theoretical model presented in this study incorporates these considerations to better explain why 
investors might expect a company to engage in such services and how these expectancies alter 
investors' assessments of management credibility and related valuation judgments.   
Voluntary Assurance and the Insurance Hypothesis 
Wallace (1980) explains the reasonableness behind using assurance services as insurance, 
relative or as a complement of using traditional insurance policies with four main arguments. 
First, the perceived need for auditors to substantiate professional care, which may be beneficial 
to argue against allegations of negligence in a litigation setting. These effects should also carry 
over to other company stakeholders that may have concerns related to perceptions of due care. 
Second, Wallace highlights how clients benefit from the auditors' sophisticated legal expertise 
which allows the use of the auditor as a powerful codefendant. Third, the client and auditor’s 
shared interest and concern about their reputations ensures proper consideration of the impact of 
litigation. Last, Wallace argues that by engaging in assurance services companies can shift a 
portion of the blame and liability toward the auditor, as auditors are generally perceived as the 
guarantors of the accuracy of audited financial and non-financial information. 
Findings from prior research show that voluntary assurance results in higher stock price 
assessments (Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2014) and lower cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
In contrast, other research documents that the benefits of assurance are context specific. For 
instance, Coram et al. (2009) find that assurance of non-financial performance indicators 
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influence stock price estimates only when presenting positive indicators and Cheng et al. (2015) 
find that assurance of sustainability indicators increase willingness to invest when assured 
information is relevant to the company. I argue that the demand for CRM assurance, in the 
context of this study, is primarily motivated by Wallace's (1980) Insurance Hypothesis as among 
the main concerns regarding cyber-breaches are the litigation risks, company reputation, and the 
associated costs.24  
In developing the baseline expectations, I consider the arguments that justify the use of 
voluntary assurance to mitigate potential legal damages and prior findings on the positive impact 
of voluntary assurance. As such, theoretically, companies that report a cyber-breach, but have 
previously engaged in voluntary CRM assurance, should receive less negative investors’ 
valuation judgments. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Voluntary CRM assurance (no-assurance), prior to the occurrence of a cyber-breach, 
will result in less negative (more negative) investor valuation judgments after the 
disclosure of a cyber-breach.  
 
Voluntary Assurance and Management Credibility 
Findings from prior research suggest that companies engage in voluntary assurance 
services, mainly, to enhance their credibility and reputation (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 
2009). For instance, Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett (2011) find that assurance increased the 
credibility of CSR reports. I predict that management engagement in CRM assurance will result 
in more favorable assessments of management credibility, after the disclosure of a cyber-breach, 
                                                     
24 We argue about the Insurance Hypothesis as the more likely source of demand for cybersecurity assurance 
considering the nature of cybersecurity threats. In particular, given the sophistication of cyber-breaches, companies 
may be unable to reduce the risk and potential loss associated with a cyber-breach through the implementation of 
internal controls alone. As such, the use of cybersecurity insurance is a likely resource that firms can use to share 
their cyber-risk, either as an alternative or complement to other potential controls to reduce or avoid cyber-risks. 
Besides, we expect that the information regarding the presence or absence of assurance after a cyber-breach will 
impact investors’ judgments as the expected future loss will be lower given the use of assurance as insurance. 
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given two main reasons: 1) prior research establishes that audited disclosures are more credible 
than unaudited disclosures (e.g., Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Mercer 
2004), and 2) the benefits of using CRM assurance-as-insurance may lead to more favorable 
assessments of management competence given investors beliefs that management's decisions are 
in their best interest. Moreover, I predict that management credibility assessments will, in turn, 
impact valuation judgments. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
H2a:  Voluntary CRM assurance (no-assurance), before the occurrence of a cyber-
breach, will result in less negative (more negative) investors' assessment of management 
credibility after the disclosure of a cyber-breach. 
H2b: Assessments of management credibility mediate the effects of CRM assurance on 
investors’ valuation judgments. 
 
Expectancy Violations Theory 
Another aspect relevant to understanding the demand for CRM assurance is whether 
investors take into consideration the consensus use of such services (whether assurance is 
expected or not expected) by peer companies within the same industry. Prior research suggests 
that investors' evaluation of a company depends on whether the company’s accounting choices 
conform to the industry norms (Clor-Proell 2009; Koonce, Miller, and Winchel 2015). Moreover, 
Mercer (2004, 192) argues that "a disclosure that deviates significantly from investors' 
expectations will be less credible than one that does not." This effect is conceptualized in 
expectancy violations theory (EVT) (Burgoon and Hale 1988; Burgoon 1993) which provides a 
theoretical basis for understanding why voluntary CRM assurance would have similar effects 
when engaging in such assurance services is considered an industry norm.  
EVT establishes that individuals develop expectancies to assess communication 
outcomes and that these expectancies are influenced by the communicator characteristics, 
relationship factors, and context characteristics (Burgoon and Hale 1988; Burgoon 1993). 
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Expectancies are violated when the communication outcomes are not in conformity with 
expectations or preferences about social norms and known idiosyncrasies (Burgoon and Hale 
1988). EVT posits that the impact of a violation depends on the violation valence, such that 
positive violations produce favorable communication consequences while negative violations are 
detrimental compared to outcomes that conform-to-expectancies. As such, it is expected that the 
arousal that is triggered by the violation results in an intensification of evaluations of the 
communicators. 
As such, consistent with EVT, I predict that violation of expectancies will result in more 
extreme assessments of management credibility (see Figure 5, Panel B for predictions), such that 
positive violations (presence of assurance when it is not expected) result in more extreme 
positive assessments of management credibility and negative violations (absence of assurance 
when assurance is expected) result in more extreme negative assessments of management 
credibility. Moreover, I predict that investors' assessments of management credibility, based on 
whether the company violates or conforms to the expectations, will mediate the relationship 
between the presence (absence) of assurance and investor’s assessments of future stock prices. 
This leads to the third set of hypotheses (as illustrated in Figure 5): 
H3a: The effect of CRM assurance on users’ assessment of management credibility is 
more extreme in the presence of expectancy violations. 
H3b: Assessments of management credibility mediate the expectancies moderated effects 
of CRM assurance on investors’ valuation judgments. 
 
Methods 
To test the research model, I use a 2 x 2 experimental design in which assurance 
(assurance versus no-assurance) and investors’ expectations of the presence of assurance 
(violate-expectancies versus conform-to-expectancies) are manipulated between-participants. A 
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sample of non-professional investors are recruited to complete the experimental case in order to 
observe decision behavior. The focus of the experimental study is on how investor decision 
making changes in light of the presence or absence of assurance based on when company 
practices violate or conform-to-expectancies.  
Participants 
Participants are 168 individuals recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in 
exchange for either $1.00 or $2.50, based on their qualifications.25 26 27 Participation is limited to 
MTurk workers that have completed at least 500 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) and with at 
least a 95 percent approval rate, or alternatively to participants designated as "Masters.28  
Research finds that MTurk workers are a source of reliable data (Buhrmester, Kwang, and 
Gosling 2011) and that it is an appropriate participant source for research on nonprofessional 
investors (Koonce et al. 2015).  
                                                     
25 Data for the main analysis was collected concurrently with the data for additional analysis. Initially, I conducted a 
pilot test using Mturk participants that have at least 500 completed HITs and 95 percent approval rate. The initial 
desired sample size for pilot testing was 120 (20 participants per cell) participants. After eliminating invalid attempts 
to complete the survey, the total usable responses was 106. Then, I collected data intended to be used for the main 
analysis and participants were required to have the Mturk “Masters” qualification. The desired sample size was 180 
(30 participants per cell) responses from Mturk Masters. However, I collected 146 usable responses. Given the 
failure to meet the desired sample size, I merged the responses from the pilot test and the main data collection and 
setup a Qualtrics quota to achieve equal cell sizes. There were 1,406 attempts to complete this study. From the 1,406 
attempts, there were 252 usable responses (42 per cell), 274 incomplete surveys, 497 surveys in which participants 
failed to meet the qualification criteria, 343 incomplete surveys given that participants failed to pass the review 
questions or manipulation checks, and 38 surveys with either a duplicate IP address or Mturk ID. 
26 On average, participants spent about 12 minutes to complete the experiment. As such, compensation is deemed 
reasonable, considering MTurk workers’ average hourly wage of $3.00 (Rennekamp, Rupar, and Seybert 2015). 
Compensation is based on the participant’s Mturk qualifications as participants with more HITs completed and with 
higher approval rates are expected to receive greater compensation considering that these participants have higher 
approval rates and a low number of abandoned HITs  (Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby 2017). Only participants who 
successfully completed the study and accurately answered all the review questions (including the attention check 
questions) and manipulation checks were compensated. 
27 The experiment in this study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Human Participants. 
28" Specifically, 85 participants in the sample have at least 500 completed HITs and 95 percent approval rate and 83 
participants that hold the Mturk “Masters” qualification. Amazon grants the “Masters” qualification to workers that 
consistently demonstrate a high degree of success in performing a wide range of HITs across a large number of 
requesters. All participants, regardless of their Mturk qualification, are required to meet the additional screening 
requirements. Participants’ demographics are not significantly different between groups, including the time to 
complete the survey, and the inferences of the study are unchanged when controlling for participant’s qualifications 
as a covariate in the analyses.  
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I conducted screening procedures to select only participants at least 18 years of age, 
United States citizens, and that are native English speakers. Also, consistent with prior research 
that uses MTurk as a source for non-professional investors (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; Koonce et al. 
2015; Asay, Elliot, and Rennekamp 2017), participants are required to have taken at least two 
accounting or finance classes and have experience reading financial statements. On average, 
participants are 29 to 38 years old and full-time employed. About 60 percent of the participants 
are male, 72 percent of the participants have at least a bachelor’s degree, and 90 percent of the 
participants have investment experience.29  
Only participants who successfully completed the study and accurately answered all the 
review questions (including attention checks) and manipulation checks were compensated. In 
addition, to alleviate issues of repeated participation, access to the experimental materials is 
restricted to avoid duplicate responses from the same IP address (Arnold and Triki 2017).30   
Task 
The experimental task requires participants to evaluate a company, based on the 
information that is available. First, participants are provided with a brief description of the 
company. I use Aplus Auto Care to resemble a company in the car warranty and related solutions 
industry. After reading the description of the company, participants are required to make an 
initial valuation of the company’s stock price.  
Participants then receive a press release in which the company announces a data breach, 
along with information regarding the extent of the breach and a link to resources provided by the 
company to remediate the impact of the breach (e.g., dedicated Website, credit monitoring 
                                                     
29 65 percent of the participants have over three years of investment experience. 
30 Consistent with suggestions provided by Arnold and Triki (2017), a reminder about the importance of scientific 
research was also presented to discourage participants to participate a second time. 
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services). The format and content of the press release are consistent with press releases used to 
announce known data breaches, such as the Home Depot, TJ Maxx, and Target breaches. 
Participants also receive selected financial information about the company, background 
information on assurance over cybersecurity, and information about the presence or absence of 
assurance (manipulated between participants). After being provided with all the relevant case 
facts, participants updated their initial valuation of the company’s stock price, answer additional 
case questions, answer manipulation check questions, and provide demographic information.   
Independent Variables 
The first independent variable is assurance. Assurance is operationalized by notifying 
participants whether the company engaged or not in CRM assurance for the fiscal year prior to 
the breach. For the assurance condition, participants learn that the company has a cybersecurity 
risk management program in place, controls are operating effectively, the company engaged in 
voluntary assurance over cybersecurity, and the auditors issued a clean audit opinion. In contrast, 
for the no-assurance condition participants will be notified that, although the company has not 
engaged in assurance over cybersecurity, the company has a cybersecurity risk management 
program in place and that controls are operating effectively. Before participants are informed 
about the presence or absence of CRM assurance, they receive general information about the risk 
of cyber-breaches and cyber-risk management and assurance. In particular, participants are 
notified about the AICPA initiative to develop a cybersecurity risk management program and are 
provided with a description of what a SOC for cybersecurity implies.  
The second independent variable is expectancies of the presence or absence of assurance. 
Expectancy is operationalized by providing participants with information on whether the 
company’s decision to engage (or the decision not to engage) in CRM assurance is consistent or 
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inconsistent with industry practices. This manipulation was adapted from Clor-Proell’s (2009) 
work on expected and actual accounting choices and tailored to the context of CRM assurance. 
Consistent with Clor-Proell (2009), participants are first provided with information about the 
industry expectancies and then they receive information about the firm choice to engage or not 
engage in CRM assurance. Together, these two manipulations (assurance and expectancies) 
result in two violate-expectancies (there is assurance and assurance is not expected, or there is 
no-assurance and assurance is expected) and two conform-to-expectancies (there is assurance 
and assurance is expected, or there is no-assurance and assurance is not expected) conditions.  
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variable of interest is investors’ perceived value of a company stock price 
(valuation judgments). The measure of valuation judgments is consistent with the measure used 
by Asay et al. (2017) that asks for participants’ initial valuation judgments (before the 
manipulations) and for updated valuation judgments after participants are presented with 
additional information and the manipulations.31 Valuation judgments are measured using a 7-
point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7).32 
As such, valuation judgment represents a participant’s updated valuation judgment using the 
initial valuation judgment as a covariate.  
Management credibility is a mediator in the theoretical model. Consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Clor-Proell 2009; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005; Rennekamp 2012), management 
credibility is measured using participants’ assessment of management competence and 
trustworthiness, the two components of management credibility. To measure participants’ 
                                                     
31 Consistent with Asay et al. (2017), participants are anchored on the scale's mid-point to be able to use the initial 
valuation as a baseline to measure investor's reactions to the manipulations.  
32 Fully labeled 7-point scales are used consistent with recommendations from Eutsler and Lang (2015).  
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assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, I use a 7-point, fully labeled, scale 
that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and from 
“very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively. In order to 
confirm the validity and reliability of the management credibility construct, I first conducted 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and generated the construct Cronbach’s alpha. The results of 
EFA confirmed that assessment of management competence and assessment of management 
trustworthiness loads into a single construct with factor loadings of 0.790 and 0.784, 
respectively, while the construct’s Cronbach’s alpha is 0.934.33 As such, I use the average value 
of these two measures as a single measure of management credibility for the analysis.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks and Comprehension Questions 
 The experimental materials were pre-tested with a similar participant pool to confirm the 
success of the study manipulations. Then, the final version of the experiment was released with 
three main manipulation check questions, three review questions, and one attention check. Only 
participants who answered all the main manipulation check questions, review questions, and 
attention checks were allowed to complete the experimental materials.  
The two main manipulation check questions to test the manipulation of the presence or 
absence of assurance asks participants whether or not Aplus Auto Care engaged in CRM 
practices and CRM assurance, respectively, based on the case information. The main 
manipulation check question to test the manipulation of expectancies of assurance asks 
participants whether or not most firms in the industry choose to engage in CRM assurance 
                                                     
33 Factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha were all above the recommended threshold of 0.50 and 0.70, respectively 
(Nunnally 1978).  
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practices, based on the case information. An additional question to test the manipulation of 
expectancies of assurance is included and asks participants about their agreement with the 
following statement: "Aplus Auto Care was expected to engage in CRM assurance before the 
data breach”.34 I find that participants in the assurance-expected condition (mean=5.11) agree to 
a greater extent that Aplus Auto Care was expected to engage in CRM assurance (t=-4.090, 
p<0.001) compared to participants in the assurance-not-expected condition (mean=4.05).  
 Review questions are included to ensure that participants understand the information 
provided in the case. One review question is designed to confirm that participants understand the 
instructions and two review questions are included to ensure that participants understand the 
selected financial information presented. An attention check question is also included to ensure 
that participants are actively engaged in the task. 
Testing of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
H1 predicts that voluntary CRM assurance (no-assurance), prior to the occurrence of a 
cyber-breach, results in less negative (more negative) investor valuation judgments after the 
disclosure of a cyber-breach. Panel A of Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the 
participant's final valuation judgments adjusted for initial valuation judgments (initial valuation 
is a covariate in the model).35 I tested this prediction using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), 
and the results are graphically presented in Figure 6 and tabulated in Panel B of Table 5. 
As indicated in Table 5, I find support for the hypothesized relationship between 
assurance and valuation judgments. Although I do not hypothesize an interaction of assurance 
                                                     
34" The participants use a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” (equal to 1) to “strongly 
agree” (equal to 7).  
35 Unadjusted means are not significantly different and in the same direction as adjusted means. 
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and expectancies, the analysis considers this interaction to determine the significance of the 
direct effect from assurance to valuation judgments. Consistent with the predictions, participants 
in the assurance condition assessed a higher stock value than participants in the no-assurance 
condition (F=15.817, p<0.001). 
Hypothesis 2  
H2a predicts that voluntary CRM assurance (no-assurance), before the occurrence of a 
cyber-breach, will result in less negative (more negative) investors' assessments of management 
credibility after the disclosure of a cyber-breach. I present descriptive statistics for participants’ 
assessments of management credibility in Panel A of Table 6. The results of  the analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), tabulated in Panel B of Table 6, support the hypothesized relationship and 
indicate that assurance is positively associated with assessments of management credibility 
(F=54.489, p<0.001). Moreover, H2b predicts that management credibility mediates the 
relationship of assurance and valuation judgments. Results of the mediation analysis, following 
Hayes (2017) process analysis, are graphically presented in Figure 7 and tabulated in Panel A 
and Panel B of Table 7.36 Inspection of bootstrap confidence intervals for the analysis of indirect 
effects, included in Panel B of Table 7, confirms the hypothesized mediation.37 The results 
suggest that the relationship of Assurance and Valuation Judgments is fully mediated by 
Management Credibility, as the coefficient of Assurance on Valuation Judgments is not 
significant (p=0.797) when including Management Credibility in the model. 
                                                     
36 We use Hayes (2017) Process model 4 to test mediation. 
37 The analysis of bootstrap confidence interval does not include zero which denotes statistical significance (Hayes 
2017). 
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Hypothesis 3 
H3a predicts that the effect of CRM assurance on users’ assessment of management 
credibility is more extreme in the presence of expectancy violations. As shown in Panel A of 
Figure 8, the graphical representation of the interaction of assurance and expectancy violations 
on management credibility is consistent with the predicted pattern. I present descriptive statistics 
for participants’ assessments of management credibility in Panel A of Table 6. The results of the 
ANOVA, as presented in Panel B of Table 6, shows a significant interaction between assurance 
and expectancy violations (F=9.820, p<0.001). As such, I derive contrast weights to test the 
predicted disordinal interaction. The results of planned contrast analysis, as presented in Panel C 
of Table 6, confirm that assessments of management credibility are more extreme in the presence 
of expectancy violations for, both, positive and negative violations. In particular, contrast 
Weights to test the effect of positive violations on assessments of management credibility (0 for 
no assurance when assurance is expected, 0 for no assurance when assurances is not expected, -1 
for assurance when assurance is expected, and +1 for assurance when assurance is not expected) 
is marginally significant (t=1.562, p=.061). Moreover, contrast weights to test the effect of 
negative violations on assessments of management credibility (-1 for no assurance when 
assurance is expected, +1 for no assurance when assurances is not expected, 0 for assurance 
when assurance is expected, and 0 for assurance when assurance is not expected) is significant 
(t=2.747, p=.004). Overall, the results support H3a and confirm that investor's expectancies 
moderate the effect of assurance on assessments of management credibility.  
H3b predicts a moderated mediation in which expectancy violations moderate the effects 
of CRM assurance on investors’ valuations through management credibility as a mediator. A 
graphical representation of the model is included in Panel 2 of Figure 8. To test the model, I 
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follow Hayes (2017) approach for conditional process analysis.38 Results of the model estimation 
are consistent with the ANOVA conducted to test H1 and H2. In particular, there is evidence of a 
significant positive effect of assurance and the interaction of assurance and expectancy violations 
on management credibility, as shown in Panel A of Table 8. Inspection of bootstrap confidence 
intervals for the analysis of conditional indirect effects and the index of moderated mediation, 
included in Panel B and Panel C of Table 8, confirms the hypothesized moderated mediation.39 
Specifically, the analysis reveals that the effect of management credibility on valuation 
judgments is larger when expectancies are violated (effect = 0.8970) compared to when 
Assurance conforms to expectancies (effect = 0.3624) and that the difference in these effects is 
positive and significant.  
Additional Analysis 
Perceived Benefits of Assurance-as-Insurance – The Insurance Hypothesis 
 As discussed earlier, I use the Insurance Hypothesis to theoretically motivate the 
predicted effect of CRM assurance on investors’ valuation judgments. This conceptualization is 
based on Wallace’s four arguments for the insurance hypothesis to explain the demand for 
voluntary assurance as an alternative to traditional insurance products used to control for 
litigation exposure. Accordingly, I conducted additional analysis to test whether the perceived 
benefits of using CRM Assurance-as-Insurance (AAI) influence investors’ behavior.  
                                                     
38 Specifically, following Hayes (2017), the first stage moderation mediation is estimated to assess 1) the direct 
effect of assurance and the interaction of assurance and expectancy violations on management credibility (the 
mediator), and 2) the total effect of assurance and management credibility on valuation judgments (the dependent 
variable). Then, the conditional indirect effect is assessed as the product of the effect of assurance and the effect of 
the moderation of assurance and expectancy violations on management credibility and the effect of management 
credibility on valuation judgments, controlling for assurance. The difference between the conditional indirect effect 
at different values of the moderator (i.e., violate or conform to expectancies) represents the index of moderated 
mediation used to test the hypothesized relationship. We use PROCESS model 8. 
39 The analysis of bootstrap confidence interval does not include zero which denotes statistical significance (Hayes 
2017). 
 
 
66 
First, I developed a four-item formative construct for participants’ alignment with the insurance 
view of assurance, denoted AAI, based on a review of Wallace’s (1980) arguments for the 
demand for assurance as posited through the insurance hypothesis. In particular, I ask 
participants about their agreement with beliefs that 1) “cybersecurity audits are necessary to 
substantiate professional care”, 2) “cybersecurity audits are beneficial as they allow the auditor 
to be used as a codefendant”, 3) “cybersecurity audits are beneficial as the auditor and the 
company shares an interest to protect both of their reputation in case of litigation”, and 4) 
“cybersecurity audits are beneficial as the auditor shares a portion of the company’s legal 
responsibility”. To validate the construct’s validity and reliability, I conducted principal 
components analysis (PCA) and tested the items for multicollinearity.40 PCA corroborates that 
all items load on the same construct with item loadings above the 0.5 threshold (Nunally 1978). 
Also, test for multicollinearity shows that VIF is below 3.3 (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006) 
for all items. Thus, I use the average value of the four items as a single measure of AAI.  
 I find that, on average, participants agree that CRM assurance is beneficial and can be 
used as an alternative for traditional insurance (mean=5.338). I used a median split based on the 
median value (5.375) of the AAI variable to generate a Hi/Low AAI dichotomous variable and 
then I split the sample and re-run all the hypotheses test for each group (Hi and Low perceptions 
group) to explore the impact of higher (versus lower) perceived benefits of AAI. I present the 
results, graphically, in Panel A and Panel B of Figure 9. The results of the ANCOVA, 
untabulated, shows that CRM only results in higher valuation judgments when investors have 
higher perceptions of the benefits of AAI. In contrast, CRM assurance is positively associated 
                                                     
40 In contrast with reflective constructs, formative indicators do not reflect the same underlying constructs and as 
such multicollinearity is not desirable (Chin, Marcolin, and Newsted 2003). Petter, Strub, and Rai (2007) suggest 
using PCA, rather than traditional EFA, to assess construct validity and to assess collinearity (i.e., VIF < 3.3) to 
evaluate the construct's reliability. 
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with investors’ assessments of management credibility for, both, the higher and lower AAI 
perception groups. On average, valuation judgments are higher for the Hi-AAI assurance 
(mean=4.37) group than for the Low-AAI assurance (mean=4.15), but not statistically 
significantly different (t=0.687, p=0.217). However, valuation judgments are significantly higher 
(t=3.340, p<0.001) for the Low-AAI no assurance (mean=3.93.) group than for the Hi-AAI no 
assurance group (mean=3.20). In addition, only negative violations remain significant for both 
groups. Last, the results (untabulated) of the mediation analysis and the mediated moderation 
analysis hold for both groups.  
Altogether, the results suggest that investors’ perceptions about the benefits of AAI 
influences valuation judgments. In particular, results of the ANOVA and inspection of mean 
valuation judgments between groups, suggest that investors with higher perceptions of the 
benefits of AAI reward firms that engage in voluntary CRM assurance and penalize firms with 
no assurance. Also, the results suggest that within these subgroups negative violations result in 
stronger negative reactions compared to the positive reaction of positive violations.  
Perceived Accountant’s Cyber-expertise 
 Prior studies (e.g., Gendron and Barrett 2004) reveal that the perceived accountants’ lack 
of technology expertise may have contributed to the failure of the AICPA and CICA’s Web 
assurance initiatives in the early 2000s. Therefore, I conducted additional analysis to explore 
participant’s perceptions of accountant’s cyber-expertise (ACE) and to explore how lower and 
higher perceptions of ACE affect the main analyses.  
Accordingly, I developed a four-item formative construct, denoted ACE, adapted from 
Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) work on auditor’s accounting information systems (AIS) expertise. 
Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) constructs include five items and is intended to capture aspects of 
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domain particular-experience and training, which are believed to be the main determinants of 
auditor expertise (Bonner 1990). While the items in Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) construct were 
developed as a self-reported measure of auditors’ AIS expertise, in general, I adapted their items 
to capture participants’ perceptions of accountant’s specific cyber-expertise.41 In particular,  I 
ask participants about their agreement with beliefs that 1) “accountants have significant 
experience auditing information security and cybersecurity controls”, 2) “accountants spend a 
significant portion of their time auditing information security and cybersecurity controls”, 3) 
“accountants receive significant combined informal and formal training in relation to information 
security and cybersecurity controls”, and 4) “accountants have a high level of information 
security and cybersecurity controls expertise”. Consistent with the analysis to test the validity 
and reliability of the AAI construct, I conducted PCA and confirmed that all items load in the 
same construct with item loadings above the 0.5 threshold (Nunally 1978) and also confirmed 
that VIF is below the 3.3 threshold (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006) for all items. Thus, I use 
the average value of the four items as a single ACE measure for the analysis.  
The analysis reveals that, on average, participants disagree that accountants have the 
sufficient level of domain particular-experience and training necessary to be considered cyber-
experts (mean=3.770). I use a median split based on the median value (3.750) of the ACE 
variable to generate a Hi/Low ACE dichotomous variable and then I split the sample and re-run 
all the hypotheses test for each group (Hi and Low ACE) to explore the impact of higher (versus 
lower) perceptions of accountant’s cyber-expertise. I present the results, graphically, in Panel A 
and Panel B of Figure 10. The analysis (untabulated) shows that assurance is positively 
associated with valuation judgments and assessments of management credibility, regardless of 
                                                     
41 All items in Brazel and Agoglia’s (2007) AIS expertise construct were included, except for an item that captures 
auditor’s self-reported AIS experience (time) relative to peer auditors.  
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the level of perceived ACE. Nevertheless, I find that valuation judgments are significantly higher 
(t=2.109, p=0.018) when participants have higher perceptions of ACE and have assurance 
(mean=4.51) compared to valuations from the Low-ACE assurance group (mean =4.02). Further, 
assessments of management credibility for the Hi-ACE assurance group (mean=5.45) are 
marginally significantly higher (t=1.511, p=0.068) than for the Low-ACE assurance group 
(mean=5.14) but are not significantly different between the Hi and Low-ACE no assurance 
conditions. Moreover, the result of planned contrast analysis shows that the interaction of 
assurance and expectancy violations (both positive violations and negative violations) is only 
significant for the Hi-ACE group. Finally, the results of the mediation analysis (untabulated) 
hold for both groups, but the hypothesized mediated moderation is only significant for the Hi-
ACE group.  
Overall, the results indicate that perceived ACE explains investors’ decision behavior when 
evaluating a firm’s value and credibility, in light of information about the presence or absence of 
assurance and industry expectancies. In particular, the analysis suggests that in evaluating a 
firm’s value and management credibility, participants place more Iight on their own perceptions 
of the ACE than on the industry consensus (peer firms behavior).  
Disclosure of Cyber-risk Management Practices 
I also conducted additional analysis to test whether disclosure of the existence (or lack) of 
management’s CRM provides incremental rewards (penalties). In order to explore the value of 
management’s CRM, I collected data for an additional experimental condition in which 
participants are informed that there is no risk management program and no assurance (84 
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additional participants were recruited through Mturk).42 Given that in the main analysis 
participants in the assurance condition are notified that the firm engaged CRM and CRM 
assurance, and the participants in the no assurance condition are notified that the firm only 
engaged in CRM, the additional data collected yields a 3 x 2 experimental design with 
assurance/risk management (CRM assurance, CRM-only, and no-CRM) and expectancy 
violations manipulated between groups.  
Mean values are graphically illustrated in Panel A and Panel B of Figure 11. Results of 
contrast Weights (untabulated) support that investors reward firms that disclose the existence of 
a CRM program. In particular, participants in the CRM-only conform-to-expectancies condition 
provided higher management credibility ratings (mean=4.40), compared to participants in the no-
CRM conform-to-expectancies condition (mean 3.94) and also participants in CRM-only violate-
expectancies condition provided higher management credibility ratings (mean=3.65), compared 
to participants in the no-CRM violate-expectancies condition (mean 3.34).43 Although on 
average, valuation judgments for the CRM-only condition are higher than for the no-CRM 
condition, results do not support that there is a statistically significant difference in valuation 
judgments between groups in the CRM-only and no-CRM conditions.  
Conclusion 
This study provides theoretical and empirical evidence of the cost and benefits of 
voluntary CRM assurance. Specifically, I find that companies engagement in CRM assurance 
results in more favorable assessments of management credibility, leading to higher stock price 
                                                     
42 Participant qualifications and screening are performed consistent with the main experiment. Also, participants 
were required to answer all the review questions (including the attention check questions) and manipulation checks 
to be allowed to complete the task. 
43 Contrast weights are significant (p=.027) for the assurance expected condition (-1,1,0,0,0,0) and marginally 
significant (p=.099) for the assurance not expected condition (0,0,-1,1,0,0).  
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valuations. Moreover, this study finds evidence of positive violations, such that investors reward 
companies that engage in CRM assurance when assurance is not expected, and negative 
violations, such that investors penalize companies that do not engage in CRM assurance when 
assurance is expected, in the context of assurance.  
This study has relevant implications. First, this study is particularly informative to the 
AICPA as it provides evidence that investors knowledge about whether assurance is expected or 
not expected, based on industry norms, may help drive the demand for the proposed CRM 
assurance services. Moreover, additional analyses conducted highlights the importance of users 
perceptions of the benefits of assurance-as-insurance and their perceptions of accountant’s cyber-
expertise. These results provide insights to regulators expecting that the market will drive the 
demand for CRM assurance and CRM disclosures. Specifically, the results suggest, in general, it 
is users with higher perceived benefits of assurance and higher perceptions of accountant’s 
cyber-expertise that primarily reward and penalize companies as initially hypothesized. As such, 
the results of this study may help better shape the underlying requirements of the AICPA 
proposed services and may provide insights on relevant aspects to address, such as marketing 
initiatives to inform users. 
Second, this study informs financial statement stakeholders about the cost and incentives 
associated with voluntary CRM assurance. In addition to the results of the main analysis, 
additional analysis sheds light on the benefits of CRM disclosures. In particular, I provide 
evidence of the incentives associated with CRM practices as companies that disclose the 
existence of a CRM program receive more favorable investors’ assessments of management 
credibility and stock price valuations, compared to companies that do not have a CRM program 
in place and operating effectively.  
 
 
72 
Third, this study contributes to the literature and theory on investor judgment and 
decision making and provides insights on the factors that explain the market reaction toward 
negative events and disasters, such as cyber-breaches, and the potential use of voluntary 
assurance to mitigate the damage on firms’ value and credibility. In particular, this study 
provides evidence consistent with Wallace’s (1980) insurance hypothesis and supports the 
benefits of voluntary assurance as a tool to control for litigation outcomes after negative events.  
The results should be evaluated in light of the inherent limitations, which provide 
opportunities for future research. First, in order to explore how users’ expectancies impact 
decision behavior, I operationalized expectancies by providing information about whether the 
firm’s CRM assurance practices violate or conform-to-expectancies. However, whether investors 
are able to form expectancies, based on the industry cyber-risk, is a question beyond the scope of 
this study. As such, future research could explore whether the results hold without providing 
information about expectancies but instead by manipulating the type of industry (using industries 
with different levels of cyber-risk). Moreover, while in this study I hold constant the information 
provided about the source of the breach, recent research suggests that management responsibility 
acceptance influences investor’s reactions to external breaches (Tan and Yu 2018). Thus, future 
research could further explore how managements’ internal and external attributions influence the 
variables in the models and impact decision behavior. 
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STUDY THREE: THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE TIMELINESS AND 
CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE ON INVESTORS 
JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS 
 
Introduction 
As cyber-attacks become more sophisticated, companies increasingly struggle not only to 
prevent attacks but also to detect and disclose them in a timely fashion.  After a cybersecurity 
incident is discovered, managers face competing incentives to delay or release bad news.  
Although managers have incentives to release bad news on a timelier basis to lower litigation 
costs (Skinner 1994, 1997), managers also have financial incentives to delay or obfuscate the 
disclosure of bad news (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009).  In light of these competing incentives, it is 
important to understand the factors affecting how investors react to the timeliness of 
management disclosures. Moreover, one of the main cost drivers of cybersecurity incidents in the 
U.S. are the post data breach costs, including legal expenditures (Ponemon 2018).  As such, 
understanding investors’ reactions to the timeliness of disclosures is even more significant 
considering that the change in share value, in connection with the disclosure of bad news, is one 
of the main factors that influences litigation outcomes (Skinner 1994, 1997).   
The purpose of this study is twofold.  First, I aim to scrutinize how disclosure timeliness 
impacts investor’s judgments and decisions.  Second, I explore the use of voluntary 
cybersecurity risk management (CRM) assurance as a potential tool to mitigate the deleterious 
effects of delayed disclosures of cybersecurity incidents.  This study helps further our 
understanding of how investors incorporate their perceptions of management’s efforts to address 
complex disclosures in their investment decisions.  This understanding is central to studying the 
impact of cybersecurity disclosures considering that the complexities of addressing cybersecurity 
breaches may impede company’s ability to disclose a breach in a timely manner, and companies 
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may seek remedial tactics to mitigate potential adverse reactions toward both management and 
the company for their disclosure strategy.   Moreover, this study is important as regulatory 
bodies, such as the SEC and the AICPA, are actively engaged in developing disclosure 
guidelines and CRM assurance products to address the increased risk of cyber-attacks.  
Understanding the value relevance of CRM assurance may help these regulatory bodies to 
understand and promote the related benefits.   
  The Litigation Reduction Hypothesis posits that timely disclosures are associated with a 
lower risk of litigation as a direct result of a reduced economic impact, given a shorter class 
period that results in a smaller class action, and also indirectly weakens any argument that 
management delayed the disclosure (Skinner 1994, 1997).  Accordingly, drawing on the 
Litigation Reduction Hypothesis, I predict that the timeliness of disclosures is positively 
associated with investors' valuation judgments and assessments of management credibility.  
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Clor-Proell 2009; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005; Rennekamp 
2012), I also predict that assessments of management credibility mediate the effects of disclosure 
timeliness on investors’ valuation judgments.  Further, I also draw on the Insurance Hypothesis, 
which explains the demand for assurance as an alternative to traditional insurance (Wallace 
1980), to predict that voluntary CRM assurance moderates the effect of disclosure timeliness on 
investors’ assessment of management credibility.   
I use a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment, in which participants are required to make 
valuation judgments and to assess the credibility of management after a cybersecurity incident, to 
test the research model.  The independent variables of interest are the timeliness of disclosure of 
a cybersecurity incident and the presence or absence of CRM assurance.  The timeliness of the 
disclosure is manipulated by informing participants that the incident was disclosed three days 
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(for the more timely condition) or three months (for the less timely condition) after the company 
became aware of the incident.  The presence of CRM assurance is manipulated by informing 
participants that the company engaged in voluntary assurance over CRM and received a clean 
opinion from the auditors.  In contrast, participants in the no CRM assurance condition are 
informed that, although the company has not engaged in assurance over CRM, the company has 
a CRM program in place and operating effectively.  To test the predictions, I collect participants 
valuations of the company’s stock price and their assessment of management’s competence and 
trustworthiness, the two components of management credibility documented in prior research. 
Consistent with the predictions, I find that more timely disclosures lead to more favorable 
assessments of management credibility and more favorable valuation judgments. Moreover, I 
find that the relationship of disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments is mediated by 
perceptions of management credibility. Although I find a significant interaction between 
disclosure timeliness and CRM assurance, the analysis shows that the positive effect of CRM 
assurance on credibility assessments and valuation judgments is only significant when a breach 
is disclosed in a timely manner. Additional analysis reveals that perceptions of disclosure 
timeliness, in the context of cybersecurity breaches, is mainly driven by the actual timing of the 
disclosure. These perceptions are also influenced, however, by participants’ perceptions of 
whether delayed disclosure of cybersecurity breaches is acceptable. 
The results of this study inform regulators weighing appropriate mechanisms for 
cybersecurity risk management and disclosure.  Specifically, this study sheds light on how the 
characteristics of cybersecurity disclosures, specifically the information about a company’s 
disclosure timing strategy, is used by investors to assess stock price value. These findings shed 
light on the benefits of timely disclosures and could help regulators promote timely disclosures 
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of cybersecurity breaches. The results are also informative to the AICPA and assurance 
practitioners currently engaged in promoting System and Organization Controls (SOC) for 
Cybersecurity engagements. The results provide evidence that an important part of 
management’s CRM process should include how communication of an identified breach will be 
made public to investors in a timely fashion. Thus, assurance practitioners should carefully 
consider this aspect of management’s CRM process when providing CRM assurance. 
 This study contributes to the literature on market reactions to disclosure timeliness.  The 
results of prior archival research suggest that companies successfully control for the reaction of 
market participants by delaying the disclosure of bad news and spreading the impact on stock 
prices over a longer period.  Based on these findings researchers imply that, given the efficiency 
of markets, delayed news is not new information as investors are able to aggregate the 
information from other more timely sources.  This study adds another component to this body of 
research by examining investors’ reaction to the timeliness of disclosures when the facts about 
the timing are clearly disclosed.  This study also contributes to the disclosure timeliness theory 
by testing both the litigation reduction hypothesis and the insurance hypothesis within the 
context of investors JDM.   
The next section provides background, theory, and hypotheses. Section III discusses the 
methods by providing a description of the participants, the task, and the main variables in the 
analysis. Section IV discusses the results of the hypotheses, and additional analysis and Section 
V concludes.   
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Background, Theory, and Hypothesis 
Disclosure Timeliness and Investment Decisions 
The literature provides mixed evidence regarding the market reaction to the timeliness of 
disclosures.  For instance, Givoly and Palmon (1982) found a stronger market reaction associated 
with earlier earnings announcements than the reaction to late announcements which suggests a 
decrease in the information content of delayed disclosures.  Likewise, in studying the market 
reaction to dividend announcements, Kalay and Loewenstein (1986) report that delayed 
disclosures of bad news had a smaller price effect, compared to earlier disclosures of bad news.  
The authors suggest that market participants appear to set expectations about dividend 
announcements and then gradually adjust the price downward.   
On the other hand, evidence suggests that the market imposes penalties on companies 
with delayed disclosures.  BenYousset and Khan (2016) found that companies with longer 
restatement disclosure lags experience significantly stronger negative market reactions than 
companies with shorter disclosure lags.  Moreover, research exploring whether managers delay 
disclosure of bad news, use the magnitude of the stock price reaction to proxy reporting 
timeliness under the assumption that there is a stronger negative reaction toward companies that 
withhold negative news (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009).   
Although the archival literature provides some evidence of the impact of disclosure 
timeliness, only a handful of experimental studies indirectly address the market reaction 
associated with the timing of disclosures.  Mercer (2005) establishes the timeliness of the 
disclosure as an important predictor of investors’ perceived disclosure forthcomingness.  Mercer 
(2005) provided evidence that management forthcomingness in disclosing bad news is positively 
associated with investors’ assessments of management credibility.  Libby and Tan (1999) 
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similarly report results that suggest that management forthcomingness, operationalized by 
warning participants about unexpected earnings, is positively associated with analysts’ 
assessments of management credibility.  Together these studies provide some evidence that 
suggests that more forthcoming, and perhaps more timely, disclosures may result in positive 
market reactions.   
Further research is needed to explore gaps in the literature.  Given that prior literature 
suggests that management credibility is positively associated with investment decisions, 
additional research could provide insight on how disclosure forthcomingness (i.e., timeliness) 
impacts investors’ valuation judgments.  These insights would add to the cumulative knowledge 
on disclosure forthcomingness by capturing the effect of disclosure timeliness.  Isolating the 
effect of disclosure timeliness may shed light on how investors evaluate a company’s disclosure 
strategy and provide clarity to the mixed findings reported in prior archival studies.  
Disclosure Timeliness and the Litigation Reduction Hypothesis 
Prior research on bad earnings news indicates that more timely disclosures are associated 
with lower settlement amounts (Skinner 1997) and overall lower incidences of litigation 
(Donelson, McInnis, Mergenthaler, and Yu 2012).  These findings are attributed to the litigation 
reduction hypothesis which suggests that "more timely disclosure of bad news leads to lower 
expected legal costs" (Skinner 1997, 251).  The legal rationale for this phenomena is explained, 
in the context of bad earnings news, using the SEC disclosure requirements which mandate 
prompt announcements of material facts regarding a company’s financial condition and the 
timely disclosure of any material fact regarding a previous disclosure that has become 
misleading (Skinner 1997).  Accordingly, the more timely disclosure of bad news is expected to 
deter litigation motivated by allegations of non-compliance with SEC-mandated disclosures. 
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Skinner (1997) challenges conflicting evidence reporting that pre-disclosure of bad 
earnings news does not deter litigation (Francis 1994) and finds that the timeliness of disclosures 
reduces the likelihood of stockholder litigation and for companies that undergo litigation, the 
magnitude of litigation outcomes is negatively related to the timeliness of disclosures.  Skinner 
(1994, 1997) claims that timely disclosure of bad earnings news shortens the nondisclosure 
period and weakens the arguments that management failed to disclose the news resulting in 
fewer potential plaintiffs and legal damages and lower settlement cost.  Further, pre-disclosure of 
poor performance is believed to reduce litigation risk considering that timelier disclosures 
"spread the stock price decline over multiple dates" (Healy and Palepu 2001) before the earnings 
announcement date; in turn, litigation motivated by a sudden stock price decline is less likely. 
Consistent with federal securities laws, public companies are required to disclose timely, 
comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events relevant to an investment 
decision (SEC 2011, SEC 2018).  Although there are no specific disclosure requirements that 
address cybersecurity incidents, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC)   “Corporate 
Finance Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2” (U.S. 2011) highlights other mandated disclosures, 
such as the disclosure of significant events in the Management Disclosure and Analysis 
(MD&A) section of the annual report, that may require companies to disclose cybersecurity 
incidents if the cost and consequences represent a material event.  As such, consistent with prior 
literature on timely disclosure of bad earnings news and considering that similar disclosure 
requirements will be applicable, I argue that more timely disclosure of cybersecurity incidents 
will deter litigation, leading to lower expected legal costs.  The delayed disclosure of 
cybersecurity incidents should put investors at greater risk due to increased exposure to legal 
liability; in turn, the perceived failure of management to contain the damage results in investors' 
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lower performance expectations and lower valuation judgments.  This leads to the first 
hypothesis:  
H1: More (less) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident, will result in more 
favorable (less favorable) investors’ valuation judgments.   
 
Disclosure Timeliness and Management Credibility 
Prior research suggests that the observed negative impact of announcements of 
cybersecurity incidents on a company’s market value may be due to investors' perceptions about 
the loss of reputation and consumer confidence. These expectations impact investors’ estimation 
of future cash flows (Cavosuglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2004).   Investors’ perceptions of 
management forthcomingness may also explain prior findings that support the litigation 
reduction hypothesis.  For instance, prior research documents a positive relationship between 
perceptions of disclosure forthcomingness and assessment of management credibility (Libby and 
Tan 1999; Mercer 2005).  Libby and Tan (1999) examined disclosure forthcomingness by 
warning (or not warning in the case of less forthcomingness) analysts about adverse earnings; in 
their sample, analysts presented with more forthcoming disclosures assessed higher levels of 
management integrity compared to analyst presented with less forthcoming disclosures.  Mercer 
(2005) similarly examined management forthcomingness and reported higher investors’ 
assessments of management competence and trustworthiness when management is more 
forthcoming about bad news.  Although the timeliness of disclosure was not a focus of the study, 
Mercer (2005) identifies disclosure timeliness as one of the factors, along with disclosure 
completeness and accuracy, which influence investors' perceptions of management 
forthcomingness.  Accordingly, more timely disclosures of cybersecurity incidents should lead to 
more favorable investor assessment of management credibility.   
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The assumption that “timely disclosure may enhance managers’ perceived competence or 
credibility, engendering a less severe negative stock price reaction” (Donelson et al. 2012, 1970) 
suggests that the timeliness of disclosures should impact investors’ valuation judgments through 
investors' assessment of management credibility.  As predicted in the first hypothesis, disclosure 
timeliness is expected to have a direct effect on investors' valuation judgments, but I also expect 
that investors' assessments of management credibility will mediate the relationship between 
disclosure timeliness and investors' valuation judgments.  This leads to the second set of 
hypotheses: 
H2a:  More (less) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident, will result in more 
favorable (less favorable) investors’ assessment of management credibility.   
H2b:  Investors' assessments of management credibility mediate the effects of disclosure 
timeliness on investors’ valuation judgments. 
 
 
Voluntary Assurance and the Insurance Hypothesis 
The baseline hypotheses predict that the timeliness of disclosures will be positively 
associated with investors' assessments of management credibility and valuation judgments; these 
predictions are mainly motivated given the negative legal consequences of delayed disclosures of 
bad news which leads to investors' lower performance expectations and management credibility 
assessments.  Management has competing incentives to delay or accelerate the disclosure of bad 
news.  Although management may have a legitimate reason to delay the disclosure of a 
cybersecurity incident, research consistently highlights the deleterious impact of this practice.  
Findings from prior research suggest that companies engage in voluntary assurance services, 
mainly, to enhance their credibility and reputation (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009).  This 
is explained theoretically by viewing the use of assurance as a remedial tactic. I build on 
Wallace's (1980) insurance hypothesis to explore the potential usefulness and value of voluntary 
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assurance as a mitigating factor that may help offset the negative impact of delayed disclosures 
of bad news. 
Wallace (1980) provides four main reasons that explain the demand for audit services as 
a form of insurance: 1) the need for auditors to substantiate professional care, 2) the use of the 
auditor as a codefendant, considering the expertise that companies have developed to deal with 
liability suits, 3) the shared interests between the auditor and the client to protect both of their 
reputation and to lower any associated legal cost, and 4) the perception that auditors are the 
guarantor of the information release to investors, which shifts a portion of a company’s legal 
liability to the auditor.  Considering these factors, I argue that engaging in voluntary CRM 
assurance services may be even more valuable in the event of a cybersecurity incident.  
Considering the unique characteristics of these incidents, such as the complexity to assess 
damages and the uncertainty around these events, companies may find it challenging to disclose 
accurate and comprehensive information promptly. 
Accordingly, although assurance over CRM should be valuable in any disclosure scenario 
(regardless the timeliness of disclosure), CRM assurance services should be even more valuable 
in circumstances where management is unable to make timely disclosures, as the higher the 
litigation risk, the more the need for insurance.  Hence, perceptions about management 
competence in making decisions on behalf of investors that arise through prior acquisition of 
voluntary CRM assurance should result in more favorable management credibility assessments 
and will mitigate the negative impact of delayed disclosures of cybersecurity incidents.  This 
leads to the third hypothesis (See Figure 12): 
H3: CRM assurance will have a more (less) positive effect on investor perceptions of 
management credibility in the presence of less (more) timely disclosures.  
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Methods 
A 2 x 2 experimental design is used in which the timeliness of disclosure (more timely 
versus less timely) and CRM assurance (assurance versus no assurance) are manipulated 
between-subjects.  A sample of non-professional investors is recruited to observe participants’ 
decision behavior.  Specifically, this study investigates how the timeliness of disclosure of a 
cybersecurity incident and the presence or absence of CRM assurance impact investors’ 
valuation judgments and assessments of management credibility.    
Design and Participants 
I recruited 144 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Prior research suggests 
that MTurk workers are a source of reliable data (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011) and 
that the participants drawn from this source are appropriate for research on nonprofessional 
investors judgment and decisions (Koonce et al. 2015).44  As an additional control measure for 
the quality of the participant pool, only MTurk workers that have completed at least 1,000 
human intelligence tasks (HITs) and have at least 98% approval rate over their HITs were 
recruited to complete the study. Also, additional screening was used to select only participants at 
least 18 years of age, United States citizens, fluent English speakers, that have taken at least two 
accounting or finance classes and have experience reading financial statements.  These screening 
procedures are consistent with prior research that surveys non-professional investors’ recruited 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; Koonce, Miller, and Winchel 2015; 
                                                     
44 Initially, the desired sample size was 120 (30 participants per cell) participants. To achieve equal cell sizes, the 
Qualtrics survey was set-up to randomly assign participants to one of the four experimental conditions. After 
gathering the data and eliminating invalid attempts to complete the survey, valid responses yield unequal cell-sizes. 
As such, I setup a Qualtrics quota to achieve equal cell sizes.  There were 393 attempts to complete this study. From 
the 432 attempts, there were 144 usable responses (36 per cell), 35 incomplete surveys, 141 surveys in which 
participants failed to meet the qualification criteria, 65 incomplete surveys given that participants failed to pass the 
review questions, and 8 surveys with either a duplicate IP address or Mturk ID. 
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Asay, Elliot, and Rennekamp 2016).  To alleviate issues of repeated participation, responses 
were screened to avoid duplicate responses from the same IP address or the same MTurk ID 
(Arnold and Triki 2017).45  
On average, participants are 29 to 38 years old and full-time employed. About 62 percent 
of the participants are male, 80 percent of the participants have at least a bachelor’s degree, and 
91 percent of the participants have some investment experience. 
Task 
Participants are instructed to evaluate a company for stock price valuation, based on the 
information available.  First, participants receive information about Aplus Insurance, described 
as a leading corporation in the health and well-being industry.  After being provided with a brief 
description of the company, participants are instructed to make an initial valuation of the 
company’s stock price.  Participants then review a press release that announces a data breach.  
The press release includes information about the disclosure timeliness, the extent of the breach, 
and resources dedicated to help victims of the attack.  Selected financial information and 
information about the presence or absence of CRM assurance is presented next.  Participants are 
asked to reconsider their initial valuation judgments, and to answer additional case and 
demographic questions.    
Independent Variables 
The first independent variable of interest is disclosure timeliness.  Timeliness is 
operationalized as the difference between the date when the company learned of the breach and 
the date the breach was disclosed.  The information about the disclosure timeliness is presented 
                                                     
45 Consistent with suggestions provided by Arnold and Triki (2017), a reminder about the importance of scientific 
research will be presented to discourage participants to participate a second time. 
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as part of the press release.  Participants in the more timely condition are notified that the 
company disclosed the incident within three days, while in the less timely conditions participants 
are notified that the company disclosed the incident three months after discovery.  Moreover, 
participants are informed whether the disclosure was considered timely or not timely, based on 
disclosure of similar cyber-attacks.   
The second independent variable of interest is voluntary CRM assurance.  In both 
conditions (assurance and no assurance), participants learn that the company has a CRM program 
in place and that controls are operating effectively.   This variable is operationalized by notifying 
participants whether the company engaged or did not engage in CRM assurance in the fiscal year 
prior to the incident.  Prior to the operationalization of this variable, participants receive 
information about the benefits of cybersecurity risk management, and are informed about the 
AICPA cybersecurity risk management guidelines and SOC for cybersecurity engagements.   
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variable is investors’ perceived value of a company’s stock price 
(valuation judgments).  This variable is captured as participants’ valuation judgments after they 
receive a description of the company but before the manipulations, and then again after the 
additional information is presented (after the manipulations).46  The measure of valuation 
judgments is represented by the participant’s updated valuation judgments, while their initial 
valuation judgment serves as a covariate. Valuation judgments are measured using a 7-point, 
fully labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 47     
                                                     
46This is consistent with Asay et al.’s (2016) measure of investors’ perceived value of a company’s stock.   
47 Eutsler and Lang (2015) find that using a fully labeled 7-point scale result in reduced response bias, maximization 
of variance, maximization of power, and minimization of error.     
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Management credibility is a mediator in the model. Management credibility represents 
participants’ assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, the two components of 
management credibility.  Participants’ assessment of management competence and 
trustworthiness are measured using 7-point, fully labeled, scales that range from “very 
incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and from “very untrustworthy” (equal 
to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.  The average value of these two measures is 
used to assess the measure of management credibility.   
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 To test the effectiveness of the disclosure timeliness manipulation, I gathered 
participants’ perceptions of disclosure timeliness by asking participants to indicate the extent to 
which they agree that the company disclosed the breach on a timely manner using a 7-point, fully 
labeled, scale that ranges from “extremely disagree” (equal to 1) to “extremely agree” (equal to 
7).  I find that participants assessment of disclosure timeliness are higher for participants in the 
timely condition (mean=6.29) than for participants in the not timely condition (2.62). This 
difference is statistically significant (F=289.077, p<0.001) which confirms that timeliness was 
successfully manipulated between participants. Moreover, to confirm the successful 
manipulation of CRM assurance, I asked participants to indicate whether or not Aplus Insurance 
engaged in CRM assurance. Only participants that passed the manipulation check were allowed 
to complete the experiment. 
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Testing of Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1 
H1 predicts that less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to more 
(less) favorable investors judgments. Panel A of Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for 
participant’s final valuation judgments. I tested H1 using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the 
results are presented in Panel B of Table 9. The results support the hypothesized relationship 
between timeliness and valuation judgments (F=29.426, p<0.001) and suggest that more timely 
disclosures lead to more favorable investor valuation judgments.  
Hypothesis 2 
H2a predicts that less (more) timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident leads to more 
(less) favorable assessments of management credibility. Panel A of Table 10 presents descriptive 
statistics for participant’s assessments of management credibility. The results of the ANOVA, as 
shown in Panel B of Table 10, support H2a, and indicate that disclosure timeliness is positively 
associated with management credibility assessments (F=41.118, p<0.001). The results are 
graphically presented in Figure 13. 
H2b predicts that management credibility mediates the relationship between disclosure 
timeliness and valuation judgments. The results of the PROCESS mediation analysis, as shown 
in Panel A and Panel B of Table 11, confirm the results of the ANOVA and indicate that 
disclosure timeliness is positively associated with management credibility assessments (t=3.487, 
p<0.001) and confirms my expectation that more favorable assessments of management 
credibility leads to higher valuation judgments (t=7.872, p<0.001). Moreover, the analysis of the 
indirect effect of disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments, in particular the evidence from 
bootstrap confidence interval shown in Panel C of Table 11, confirm that management credibility 
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mediates the relationship between disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments. This result 
supports H2b. 
Hypothesis 3 
H3 predicts that a more (less) positive effect on investor perceptions of management 
credibility in the presence of less (more) timely disclosures. As shown in Panel A of Table 10, 
the mean management credibility assessments in the not timely/CRM assurance condition 
(mean=4.21) is higher than the mean in the not timely/not CRM assurance condition 
(mean=3.90) and the mean management credibility assessments in the timely/ CRM assurance 
condition (mean=5.64) is higher than the mean in the timely/no CRM assurance condition 
(mean=4.94). However, visual inspection of the interaction plot, as shown in Panel B of Figure 
13, suggest that assurance has a greater positive impact on the favorability of credibility 
assessments for the timely condition than for the not timely condition. The simple effects 
analysis, reported in Panel C of Table 10, confirms a disordinal interaction between timeliness 
and CRM assurance but the moderation effect of the interaction is in the opposite direction of the 
hypothesis (t=2.594, p<0.005). Moreover, while the difference in management credibility 
assessments between the timely/CRM assurance and timely/no CRM assurance conditions is 
statistically significant (t=2.547, p=0.006), management credibility assessments are not 
statistically significantly different (t=1.121, p=0.132) between the not timely/CRM assurance 
and not timely/no CRM assurance. These results do not support H3 and suggest that CRM 
assurance enhances management credibility only when a breach has been timely disclosed. 
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Additional Analysis 
Perceived Timeliness 
To further the understanding of the determinants of perceptions of timeliness in the 
context of cybersecurity, I collected supplementary data to capture participants’ 1) perceptions 
that delayed disclosures are acceptable (Delay_Acceptable), and 2) participants perceptions of 
the benefits of timely disclosures (Timely_Benefits). To gather participants perceptions that 
delayed disclosures are acceptable,  participants indicated their agreement with the following 
statements: 1) “delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the increased 
sophistication of hacking techniques”, 2) “delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable 
given the complexity of determining the scope of the breach”, 3) ‘delaying the disclosure of a 
cyber-attack is acceptable to conduct required investigations”, 4) “delaying the disclosure of a 
cyber-attack is acceptable even when there is loss of identifiable information from customers and 
employees”. Moreover, to gather participants perceptions of the benefits of timely disclosures, 1) 
“timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident reduces the risk of litigation”, 2) “timely disclosure 
of a cybersecurity incident reduces the risk of lost business”, and 3) “timely disclosure of a 
cybersecurity incident is the right thing to do”. Principal components analysis (PCA) confirms 
that the Delay_Acceptable and the Timely_Benefits are two different constructs and that all 
items load on a single construct with item loadings above the 0.5 threshold (Nunally 1978). 
Moreover, as expected for formative constructs, all items have a VIF below 3.3 (Diamantopoulos 
and Siguaw 2006).48 As such, I created a Delay_Acceptable and a Timely_Benefits variable 
using the average of all items for each construct. 
                                                     
48 PCA is desirable for formative constructs to assess construct validity (Petter, Strub, and Rai 2007). 
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I used the disclosure timeliness manipulated variable, the Delay_Acceptable variable, the 
Timely_Benefits variable, and their interaction with disclosure timeliness to explore how these 
variables impact perceptions of disclosure timeliness. The results of regression analysis, as 
shown in Table 12, show that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
disclosure timeliness (t=3.333, p<0.001) and perceptions that delayed disclosures are acceptable 
(t=8.755, p<0.001) with participants’ perceptions that the breach was disclosed in a timely 
manner. Moreover, a significant and negative interaction of disclosure timeliness and perceptions 
that delayed disclosures are acceptable (t=-6.681, p<0.001) suggests that delayed disclosures are 
considered more timely when perceptions that delayed disclosures are acceptable are higher. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that although the timing of the disclosure is the main determinant 
of perceived timeliness, there are context specific perceptions that also influence investors 
disclosure of timeliness and, in turn, influence investors judgments and decisions.49 
Conclusion 
This study explores the impact of the timeliness of cybersecurity breach disclosures and 
CRM assurance on investors’ valuation judgments and management credibility assessments. I 
predict and find that more timely disclosure of a cybersecurity breach increases management 
credibility assessments and result in more favorable stock price valuations. I also find that the 
relationship between disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments is mediated by management 
credibility assessments. 
The results of this study are important considering the evidence of the increasing cost of 
cybersecurity breaches and in particular the negative market reaction to cyber-attacks. My findings 
suggest that timely disclosures could help mitigate the negative stock price reaction associated 
                                                     
49 I used the perceived timeliness variables as a disclosure timeliness measure for the main analysis and the results 
are consistent and qualitatively similar to the results using the manipulated variable for timeliness. 
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with the disclosure of cyber-attacks and that a combination of timely disclosure and prior CRM 
assurance provide the highest benefits. These results are relevant for companies interested in 
reducing the cost of cyber-attacks and also inform regulators and standard setters, such as the SEC 
and the AICPA, interested in promoting and developing guidance for cybersecurity disclosures. 
I also find that CRM assurance leads to more favorable assessments of management 
credibility and valuation judgements only when the breach is disclosed in a timely fashion. This 
finding adds to the literature and theory on voluntary assurance and is relevant for the AICPA 
and audit practitioners given their current efforts to promote the SOC for cybersecurity. This 
study highlights the importance of management’s ability to communicate a breach in a timely 
fashion as part of its CRM process and suggests that auditors should be attuned to this need when 
providing assurance over CRM processes. 
Altogether, this study contributes to the literature and theory on the market reaction to 
disclosure timeliness. While prior archival research argues that there is not a negative market 
reaction to the timeliness of disclosures given the lack of information content of delayed 
disclosures (Givoly and Palmon 1982; Kalay and Loewenstein 1986), I provide evidence that 
timely disclosures are a strong signal that significantly impact investors judgments and decisions. 
Moreover, evidence from additional analysis suggest that there are context specific perceptions 
and expectations that drive perceptions of timeliness. This may help explain mixed findings 
documented in prior research on the market reaction to disclosure timeliness.  
This study also brings opportunity for future research to further the understanding on 
remedial tactics for delayed disclosures.  For instance, recent research suggests that management 
responsibility acceptance influences investor’s reactions to external breaches (Tan and Yu 2018). 
Moreover, results from additional analysis suggest that perceptions that delayed disclosures are 
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acceptable influence perceptions of timeliness. As such, although the use of management 
justifications for their disclosure timing strategy is beyond the scope of this study, future research 
could explore whether management explanations and justifications could help influence 
perceptions of timeliness and in turn help mitigate the negative impact of delayed disclosures. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The three studies in this dissertation explore the impact of cybersecurity disclosure and 
assurance. Study One investigates how jurors react to the timeliness of a cyber-attack 
announcement and to the plausibility of the explanations provided to justify the disclosure 
timing. In Study Two I explore whether voluntary CRM assurance, prior to a cyber-breach, 
affects non-professional investors’ judgments and decisions, after the breach, and investigate 
whether the changes in investors’ judgments and decisions differ when CRM assurance practices 
violate or conform to expectancies, based on industry norms. Study Three explores how 
disclosure timeliness and voluntary CRM assurance affect investor’s assessment of management 
credibility and valuation judgments. 
Findings from Study One confirm the prediction that more timely disclosure leads to 
more favorable assessments of causal attribution and liability and that assessments of causal 
attribution mediate the relationship between disclosure timeliness and liability. However, I was 
unable to find evidence that the use of justifications as a remedial tactic helps reduce liability. 
Additional anaysis reveals that more timely disclosures lead to greater beliefs that disclosures are 
plausisible and that perceptions of the acceptability of delayed disclosures also influence 
plausibility assessments and in turn affect causal attribution and liability assessments. 
Evidence of the legal cost of delayed disclosure of cybersecurity breaches, as shown in 
Study One, informs companies and market participants. Moreover, these findings inform 
regulators and standard setters interested in promoting timely cybersecurity disclosures. Study 
One adds to the literature and theory on the use of remedial tactics to reduce litigation and 
suggests that the benefits of remedial tactics may be context specific. Moreover, this study 
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contributes to theory via the Litigation Reduction Hypothesis by developing and testing a more 
comprehensive model for explaining jurors’ judgment and decision making (JDM) processes. 
Study Two finds that CRM assurance results in more favorable assessments of 
management credibility and stock price valuations. Moreover, this study finds that investors 
reward companies that engage in CRM assurance when assurance is not expected and that 
investors penalize companies that do not engage in CRM assurance when assurance is expected. 
Evidence from additional analysis provides additional insights on the benefits of having a CRM 
program, even without the assurance component. 
Study Two has relevant implications to practice as it informs the AICPA by providing 
evidence that investors’ knowledge about whether assurance is expected or not expected, based 
on industry norms, may help drive the demand for voluntary CRM assurance, as currently being 
promoted with the SOC for cybersecurity engagements. This study also informs companies and 
shareholders about the cost and incentives associated with voluntary CRM assurance. Study Two 
also contributes to the literature and theory on investor judgment and decision making by 
providing insights consistent with Wallace’s (1980) insurance hypothesis and is consistent with 
the usefulness of voluntary assurance as insurance to mitigate the damage to firms’ value and 
credibility after a cyber-attack.  
Findings from Study Three show that more timely disclosure of a cybersecurity breach 
leads to more favorable management credibility assessments and stock price valuations and that 
the relationship between disclosure timeliness and valuation judgments is mediated by 
management credibility assessments. I also find that CRM assurance increases credibility 
assessments and valuation judgments when a breach has been disclosed in a timely manner. 
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However, I am unable to support the prediction mitigating effect of CRM assurance on delayed 
disclosures. 
The results of Study Three inform companies interested in reducing the cost of cyber-
attacks by providing evidence that timely disclosures mitigate the negative stock price reaction 
associated with the announcement of a cyber-attack. These results are also relevant for regulators 
and standard setters currently working on cybersecurity disclosure guidance. The findings of Study 
Three close a breach in the accounting literature on disclosure timeliness by documenting context 
specific perceptions and beliefs that impact investors’ perceptions of timeliness and may help 
explain mixed findings from prior research. 
In summary, the results of the three studies have several implications for practice and for 
the accounting literature and theory. The findings of the thesis shed light on desirable CRM 
practices and mechanisms that can help reduce the cost of cyber-attacks. This evidence could be 
used by regulators and standard setters promoting cybersecurity disclosure and assurance. 
Altogether, these studies contribute to the judgment and decision making in accounting and 
provide initial insights into the impact of context specific aspects of cybersecurity that influence 
jurors’ and investors’ judgments. 
 
  
 
 
105 
APPENDIX A: STUDY ONE FIGURES 
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Panel A: Theoretical Model 
 
 
Panel B: Predicted Interactions 
 
 
Figure 1 - Study 1: Model Predictions 
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     *The gray area represents fixed conditions between-subjects. 
 
Figure 2 - Study 1: Experimental Conditions 
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  Timely   Not Timely 
  Plausible Implausible   Plausible Implausible 
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On July 2016, Aplus Insurance announced that in 
November of 2015 hackers executed a sophisticated 
attack … 
  On July 2016, Aplus Insurance announced that in 
August of 2015 hackers executed a sophisticated attack 
… 
The Class Period begins on February 2016, when 
Aplus Insurance filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K 
with the SEC, announcing the Company’s financial and 
operating results for the year ended December 31, 2015 
(the “2015 10-K”).  
  The Class Period begins on November 2015, when 
Aplus Insurance filed a Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q 
with the SEC, announcing the Company’s financial and 
operating results for the quarter ended September 30, 
2015 (the “Q3 2015 10-Q”).  
            
Pl
ai
nt
iff
 A
rg
um
en
ts
 The plaintiff also argues about the timing of Aplus 
Insurance’s disclosures. The plaintiff presented 
evidence of the press-release, dated as of July 15, 2016, 
issued by Aplus Insurance in which the company 
acknowledges that the breach was discovered three 
days before the announcement, almost eight months 
after the attack.  
  The plaintiff also argues about the timing of Aplus 
Insurance’s disclosures. The plaintiff presented 
evidence of the press-release, dated as of July 15, 2016, 
issued by Aplus Insurance in which the company 
acknowledges that the breach was discovered three 
months before the announcement, almost eight 
months after the attack.  
            
D
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's 
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ts
 The defendant establishes that the incident was 
disclosed three days after it was discovered, in the 
most expedient time possible, and without unreasonable 
delay, as required by the regulations of the state of 
California. 
  The defendant establishes that the incident was 
disclosed three months after it was discovered, in the 
most expedient time possible, and without unreasonable 
delay, as required by the regulations of the state of 
California. 
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The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 
47 days for a company to disclose a cybersecurity 
breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast 
with other firms that have disclosed a cyber-attack, 
Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three days. 
The disclosure was made 44 days earlier than the 
average disclosure. 
  The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 
47 days for a company to disclose a cybersecurity 
breach of a similar magnitude. However, in contrast 
with other firms that have disclosed a cyber-attack, 
Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three 
months. The disclosure was made 44 days later than 
the average disclosure. 
The plaintiff questions 
Aplus Insurance’s 
disclosure timing as, 
despite the incident being 
disclosed three days after 
it was discovered, it took 
them another three 
months to release 
comprehensive and 
accurate information 
about the extent of the 
breach.  
The plaintiff questions 
Aplus Insurance's 
disclosure timing as it is 
unlikely that a company 
would be able to gather 
comprehensive and 
accurate information and 
disclose the information 
within three days of 
discovery. 
  The plaintiff questions 
Aplus Insurance's 
disclosure timing as it took 
them three months to 
disclose the incident and 
to release comprehensive 
and accurate information 
about the extent of the 
breach. 
The plaintiff questions 
Aplus Insurance's 
disclosure timing as it took 
them three months to 
disclose the incident and it 
took them another three 
months to release 
comprehensive and 
accurate information 
about the extent of the 
breach. 
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The attorney states that the 
Company made every effort 
to gather all the relevant 
facts of the impact of the 
breach. 
The attorney states that the 
Company made every 
effort to gather all the 
relevant facts of the impact 
of the breach. 
  The attorney states that the 
Company made every 
effort to gather all the 
relevant facts of the impact 
of the breach. 
The attorney states that the 
Company made every effort 
to gather all the relevant 
facts of the impact of the 
breach. 
A press release was issued 
quickly to notify customers, 
so they could take actions to 
protect their identities.  
A press release was issued 
quickly to notify 
customers, so they could 
take actions to protect their 
identities.  
  
    
      Given the initial 
uncertainties, management 
was unable to release 
accurate information about 
the extent of the breach 
when the breach was 
discovered. 
Given the initial 
uncertainties, management 
was unable to release 
accurate information about 
the extent of the breach 
when the breach was 
discovered. 
  
    However, a press release 
was issued in the most 
expedient time possible to 
notify customers, so they 
could take actions to 
protect their identities.  
However, a press release 
was issued in the most 
expedient time possible to 
notify customers, so they 
could take actions to protect 
their identities.  
Given the initial 
uncertainties, management 
was unable to release 
accurate information about 
the extent of the breach at 
the time of the 
announcement.    
      
A dedicated website was 
established for customers to 
access additional 
information.  
    
  
A dedicated website was 
established for customers to 
access additional 
information.  
After gathering all the 
information, three months 
after the breach was 
disclosed, the company 
issued additional press 
releases that included 
comprehensive and accurate 
information about the extent 
of the breach.  
The press release included 
comprehensive and 
accurate information about 
the extent of the breach.  
  The press release included 
comprehensive and 
accurate information about 
the extent of the breach.  
After gathering all the 
information, three months 
after the breach was 
announced, the company 
issued additional press 
releases that included 
comprehensive and accurate 
information about the extent 
of the breach.  
  A dedicated website was 
established for customers 
to access additional 
information.  
  A dedicated website was 
established for customers 
to access additional 
information.  
  
 
Figure 3 - Study 1: Operationalization of Plausibility  
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ᵃ Bold arrows are significant at the 0.10 level. 
Variable definitions:  
Liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant liable  
Causal attribution is participants’ assessment of causal attribution and participants’ level of confidence in their 
assessment of causal attribution.  
Perceived plausibility is the average of participants agreement that the justification is 1) plausible and 2) believable. 
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) 
otherwise. 
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there 
is no justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are plausible.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Study 1: Additional Analysis 
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Table 1 - Study 1: Test of H1 
 
Liability Assessments 
                    
Panel A: Cell Means                 
    Timeliness 
    Timely  Not Timely 
Plausibility   n   mean S.D.   n   mean S.D. 
Plausible   28   4.500 1.905   28   5.750 1.236 
Control   28   4.321 1.949   28   5.429 1.451 
Implausible  28  4.000 1.769  28  5.607 1.449 
                      
Panel B: Analysis of Covariance                 
Source         d.f.   M.S.   F-value p-valueᵃ 
Timeliness – H1          1  73.339  28.161 <0.001 
Plausibility         1  1.595  0.613 0.543 
Timeliness * Plausibility       1  0.929  0.357 0.701 
Error         162  2.604    
           
ᵃ Reported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
Variable definitions:  
Liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant liable  
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) 
otherwise. 
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there is 
no justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are plausible.  
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Table 2 - Study 1: Test of H2a and H3 
 
Assessment of Causal Attribution 
                      
Panel A: Cell Means                 
    Timeliness 
    Timely  Not Timely 
Plausibility   n   mean S.D.   n   mean S.D. 
Plausible   28   2.490 1.547   28   4.388 1.788 
Control   28   2.674 1.793   28   4.301 1.965 
Implausible  28  2.740 1.919  28  4.694 1.901 
           
Panel B: Analysis of Variance                 
                      
Source         d.f.   M.S.   F-value p-valueᵃ 
Timeliness – H2a         1   140.121   42.118 <0.001 
Plausibility         1   1.236   0.371 0.345 
Timeliness * Plausibility – H3       1   0.427   0.128 0.440 
Error         162   3.327       
ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
Variable definitions:  
Causal attribution is participants’ assessment of causal attribution and participants’ level of confidence in their 
assessment of causal attribution.  
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) 
otherwise. 
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there 
is no justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are plausible.  
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Table 3 - Study 1: Test of H2b and H3 
 
 
Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analysis 
                      
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects 
        Causal Attribution   Liability Assessment 
Variable       Coefficient   p-valueᵃ   Coefficient   p-valueᵃ 
Timeliness     1.883   0.060   0.427   0.034 
        (2.541)       (14.153)     
Plausibility       -0.125   0.303         
        (-0.515)             
Timeliness * Plausibility 
    -0.028   0.467         
        (-0.082)             
Causal Attribution             0.490   <0.001 
                (8.506)     
Constant       2.884   <0.001   2.983   <0.001 
        (5.506)        (8.506)     
                      
Panel B: Conditional Indirect Effects of Timeliness on Liability Assessments 
 
Mediator   Expectancy   Effect   Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
Implausible 1   0.9085   0.2881   0.3937   1.5180 
Control 2  0.8948  0.2087  0.5309  1.3357 
Plausible 3   0.881   0.2461   0.4549   1.4052 
  
Panel C: Index of Moderated Mediation 
                      
Mediator       Index   Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
Plausibility     -0.0137   0.1681   -0.3582   0.3162 
                      
ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
T-values are reported in parenthesis. Bold confidence intervals are significant. 
Variable definitions: 
Liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant liable  
Causal attribution is participants’ assessment of causal attribution and participants’ level of confidence in their assessment of causal 
attribution.  
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) otherwise. 
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there is no 
justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are plausible.  
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Table 4 - Study 1: Additional Analysis 
  
 
                          
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects 
    Perceived Plausibility   Causal Attribution   Liability Assessments 
Variable   Coefficient t-stat p-valueᵃ   Coefficient t-stat p-valueᵃ   Coefficient t-stat p-valueᵃ 
Timeliness -5.123 -6.368 <0.001   0.192 0.258 0.398   0.141 0.212 0.416 
Plausibility 0.099 0.487 0.313   -0.056 -0.331 0.371   0.309 0.151 0.021 
Timeliness * Plausibility 0.057 0.200 0.421   -0.026 -0.110 0.456   -0.154 -0.722 0.236 
Prefer_Accuracy -0.261 -2.598 0.005   -0.127 -1.498 0.068   0.023 0.303 0.381 
Prefer_Accuracy * Timeliness 0.712 5.245 <0.001   -0.051 -0.420 0.338   -0.042 -0.388 0.349 
Perceived Plausibility       -0.751 -11.543 <0.001  -0.620 -7.871 <0.001 
Causal Attribution                 0.090 1.268 0.103 
Constant   6.2121 10.601 <0.001   7.281 11.536 <0.001  6.652 8.701 <0.001 
                          
Panel B: Analysis of Indirect Effects Assessments               
                          
Indirect effect             Effect   Boot SE 
BootLLC
I 
BootULC
I 
Total               3.5386   0.6082 2.3769 4.7595 
Timeliness -> Perceived Plausibility ->Liability Assessment     3.1770   0.8190 1.9084 5.0790 
Timeliness -> Causal Attribution -> Liability Assessment     0.0172   0.0963 -0.2416 0.1674 
Timeliness -> Perceived Plausibility -> Causal Attribution -> Liability Assessment 0.3444   0.3990 -0.3056 1.2740 
ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions.  
Bold confidence intervals are significant.  
Variable definitions: 
Liability assessment is the likelihood that participants find the defendant liable  
Causal attribution is participants’ assessment of causal attribution and participants’ level of confidence in their assessment of causal attribution.  
Perceived plausibility is the average of participants agreement that the justification is 1) plausible and 2) believable. 
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) otherwise. 
Plausibility is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company provided implausible justifications, two (2) if there is no justification provided, and three (3) if justifications are 
plausible.  
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Panel A: Theoretical Model 
 
Panel B: Interaction between CRM assurance and Conformity with Expectancies on 
Management Credibility 
 
  
 
Figure 5 - Study 2: Model Predictions 
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Figure 6 - Study 2: Test of H1  
  
Average Valuation Judgments 
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Mediation Analysis 
 
  
 
*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.001, respectively. 
Variable definitions: 
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.  
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a scale that 
ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from “very untrustworthy” 
(equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively. 
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that 
ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 
 
Figure 7 - Study 2: Test of H2 
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Panel A: Average Management Credibility Assessment – H3a 
 
  
Panel B: Results of Mediated Moderation Analysis – H3b 
 
 
  
*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.001, respectively. 
Variable definitions: 
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.  
Expectancy is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company violates expectancies about CRM assurance practices and zero (0) 
otherwise.  
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a scale that 
ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from “very untrustworthy” 
(equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively. 
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that 
ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 
 
 
Figure 8 - Study 2: Test of H3 
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Figure 9 - Study 2: Additional Analysis 
  
Perceived Benefits of Assurance-as-Insurance  
 
Panel A: Average Valuation Judgments 
 
   
 
Panel A: Average Management Credibility Assessments 
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 Perceived Accountants Cyber-Expertise  
 
Panel A: Average Valuation Judgments 
 
    
 
Panel A: Average Management Credibility Assessments 
  
 
 
Figure 10 - Study 2: Additional Analysis 
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Disclosure of Cyber-risk Management Practices 
 
Panel A: Average Valuation Judgments 
 
  
Panel B: Average Management Credibility Assessments 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 - Study 2: Additional Analysis 
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Table 5 - Study 2: Test of H1 
   
Average Valuation Judgments 
                    
Panel A: Cell Means                 
    Assurance Expectancies ᵃ 
    Conform-to-expectancies  Violate-expectancies 
Assurance   n   mean S.D.   n   mean S.D. 
Assurance   42   4.170 1.048   42   4.329 0.825 
No Assurance   42   3.679 1.289   42   3.489 1.212 
                      
Panel B: Analysis of Covariance                 
Source         d.f.   M.S.   F-value p-valueᵇ 
Assurance – H1          1  18.378  15.817 <0.001 
Expectancy         1  0.010  0.009 0.926 
Assurance * Expectancy       1  1.285  1.106 0.148 
Initial Valuation    1  2.229  1.918 0.084 
Error         163  1.162    
           
ᵃReported means are adjusted by initial valuations (mean=4.10). Unadjusted means are not significantly different and 
in the same direction.  
ᵇReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
ᶜThe values attached are -1, 1, 0, 0 for the negative violation test; and 0, 0, -1, 1 for the positive violation test. 
Variable definitions:  
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully 
labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.  
Expectancy is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company violates expectancies about CRM assurance 
practices and zero (0) otherwise. 
Initial Valuation is the participant’s valuation judgment before being presented with the manipulations. 
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Table 6 - Study 2: Test of H2a and H3a 
 
 
Average Management Credibility Assessments 
                      
Panel A: Cell Means                 
    Assurance Expectancies 
    Conform-to-expectancies  Violate-expectancies 
Assurance   n   mean S.D.   n   mean S.D. 
Assurance   42   5.131 1.048   42   5.452 0.825 
No Assurance   42   4.405 1.289   42   3.655 1.212 
                      
Panel B: Analysis of Variance                 
                      
Source         d.f.   M.S.   F-value p-valueᵃ 
Assurance – H2a         1   66.881   54.489 <0.001 
Expectancy          1   1.929   1.571 0.212 
Assurance * Expectancy – H3a       1   12.054   9.820 <0.001 
Error         164   1.227       
                      
Panel C: Test of Simple Effects – H3a 
  
Simple effectsᵇ         d.f.   M.S.   t-value p-valueᵃ 
Negative Violation         164   0.750   2.747 0.004 
Positive Violation         164   0.321   1.562 0.061 
           
ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
ᵇ The values attached are -1, 1, 0, 0 for the negative violation test; and 0, 0, -1, 1 for the positive violation test. 
Variable definitions:  
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.  
Expectancy is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company violates expectancies about CRM assurance 
practices and zero (0) otherwise. 
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured 
using a scale that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that 
ranges from “very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.  
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Table 7 - Study 2: Test of H2b  
 
Mediation Analysis 
 
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects 
        Management Credibility   Updated Valuation 
Variable       Coefficient   p-valueᵃ   
Coefficie
nt   p-valueᵃ 
Assurance     1.251   <0.001   0.0417   0.797 
        (7.064)       (0.257)     
Management 
Credibility             0.499   <0.001 
                (7.998)     
Initial Valuation     0.100   0.575    0.178   0.216 
        (0.561)       (1.243)     
Constant       3.624   <0.001   0.839   0.185 
        (4.939)        (1.332)     
                      
Panel B: Indirect Effects of Assurance on Valuation Judgments 
                      
Mediator      Effect   Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
Management 
Credibility    0.624   0.131   0.3903   0.8945 
                      
ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
T-values are reported in parenthesis. Bold confidence intervals are significant. 
Variable definitions: 
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a 
scale that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from 
“very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.  
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, 
scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.  
Initial Valuation is the participant’s valuation judgment before being presented with the manipulations. 
 
 
129 
Table 8 - Study 2: Test of H3b 
 
Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analysis 
                      
Panel A: Test of Direct Effects 
        Management Credibility   Updated Valuation 
Variable       Coefficient   p-valueᵃ   Coefficient   p-valueᵃ 
Assurance     0.726   0.002   0.042   0.797 
        (3.004)       (0.257)     
Expectancy       -0.750   0.002         
        (-3.102)             
Assurance * Expectancy     1.071   0.002         
        (3.134)             
Management Credibility             0.499   <0.001 
                (7.998)     
Initial Valuation             0.178   0.216 
                (1.243)     
Constant       4.405   <0.001   0.839   0.1846 
         (25.766)        (1.332)     
                      
Panel B: Conditional Indirect Effects of Assurance on Valuation Judgments 
 
Mediator   Expectancy   Effect   Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
Management Credibility 0   0.3624   0.1419   0.1156   0.6825 
Management Credibility 1   0.897   0.1666   0.5849   1.2407 
  
Panel C: Index of Moderated Mediation 
                      
Mediator       Index   Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
Management Credibility     0.5347   0.1825   0.2012   0.9209 
                      
ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
T-values are reported in parenthesis. Bold confidence intervals are significant. 
Variable definitions: 
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a scale that 
ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from “very untrustworthy” 
(equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively.  
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that 
ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise.  
Expectancy is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company violates expectancies about CRM assurance practices and zero (0) 
otherwise.  
Initial Valuation is the participant’s valuation judgment before being presented with the manipulations. 
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APPENDIX E: STUDY THREE FIGURES 
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Panel A: Theoretical Model  
 
 
Panel B: Interaction between CRM Assurance and Disclosure Timeliness on Management 
Credibility  
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - Study 3: Model Predictions 
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Panel A: Average Valuation Judgments 
 
 
 
Panel B: Average Management Credibility Assessments 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 - Study 3: Test of H1 and H3 
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APPENDIX F: STUDY THREE TABLES 
  
 
 
134 
Table 9 - Study 3: Test of H1 
 
 
 
Average Valuation Judgments 
                    
Panel A: Cell Means                 
    CRM Assurance 
    Assurance  No Assurance 
Timeliness   n   mean S.D.   n   mean S.D. 
Timely   36   4.472 0.971   36   3.917 1.052 
Not Timely   36   3.389 1.178   36   3.278 1.210 
                      
Panel B: Analysis of Variance                 
Source         d.f.   M.S.   F-value p-valueᵃ 
Timeliness – H1          1  22.415  19.426 <0.001 
Assurance         1  4.988  4.323 0.020 
Timeliness * Assurance       1  2.705  2.344 0.064 
Initial Valuation    1  11.120  9.638 0.001 
Error         139  1.154    
           
ᵃ Reported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
Variable definitions:  
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully 
labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to “very high” (equal to 7). 
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company discloses the breach in three days and zero (0) if the 
company discloses the breach in three months.  
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise. 
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Table 10 - Study 3: Test of H2a and H3
 
Average Management Credibility Assessments 
                    
Panel A: Cell Means                 
    CRM Assurance 
    Assurance  No Assurance 
Timeliness   n   mean S.D.   n   mean S.D. 
Timely   36   5.639 0.825   36   4.944 1.241 
Not Timely   36   4.208 1.197   36   3.903 1.303 
                      
Panel B: Analysis of Variance                 
         
Source         d.f.   M.S.   F-value p-valueᵃ 
Timeliness – H2a         1  55.007  41.118 <0.001 
Assurance         1  9.000  6.727 0.005 
Timeliness * Assurance – H3       1  1.361  1.017 0.157 
Error         140  1.338    
           
Panel C: Planned Contrast           
           
Contrastᵇ     d.f.   M.S.   t-value p-valueᵃ 
Assurance      140   1.338   2.594 0.005 
           
ᵃ Reported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
ᵇ The values attached are -1, 1, -1, 1. 
Variable definitions:  
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured 
using a scale that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that 
ranges from “very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively. 
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company discloses the breach in three days and zero (0) if the 
company discloses the breach in three months.  
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise. 
                      
 
 
136 
Table 11 - Study 3: Test of H2b and H3 
                       
  
 Moderated Mediation Analysis 
                       
 Panel A: Test of Direct Effects 
         Management Credibility   Valuation Judgments 
Variable        Coefficient   p-valueᵃ   Coefficient   p-valueᵃ 
Timeliness      2.355   <0.001   0.185   0.125 
         (3.487)       (1.073)     
Assurance        0.295   0.137         
         (1.098)             
Timeliness * Assurance      0.473   0.108         
         (1.241)             
Initial 
Valuation    
 0.379  0.028  0.264  0.024 
     (2.321)    (2.002)   
Management Credibility – H2b            0.518   <0.001 
                 (7.872)     
Constant        2.355   <0.001   4.716   <0.001 
         (3.395)        (13.834)     
                       
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
 
137 
            
 Panel B: Conditional Indirect Effects of Timeliness on Valuation Judgments 
  
Mediator   Plausibility    Effect   Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
Management Credibility 0    0.4902   0.1651   0.1921   0.8250 
Management Credibility 1    0.7351   0.4344   0.4344   1.0690 
   
 Panel C: Index of Moderated Mediation 
                       
Mediator        Index   Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
Management Credibility – H3      0.2449   0.2085   -0.1417   0.6737 
                       
 ᵃReported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions. 
 T-values are reported in parenthesis. Bold confidence intervals are significant. 
 Variable definitions: 
Valuation judgments is the participant’s perceived value of a company stock price measured using a 7-point, fully labeled, scale that ranges from “very low” (equal to 1) to 
“very high” (equal to 7). 
Management credibility is the participant’s assessment of management competence and trustworthiness, measured using a scale that ranges from “very incompetent” (equal to 
1) to “very competent” (equal to 7) and using a scale that ranges from “very untrustworthy” (equal to 1) to “very trustworthy” (equal to 7), respectively. 
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company discloses the breach in three days and zero (0) if the company discloses the breach in three months.  
Assurance is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company engages in CRM assurance and zero (0) otherwise. 
 
 
138 
Table 12 - Study 3: Additional Analysis 
 
 
Regression Analysis for Determinants of Perceived Timeliness  
                          
          Perceived Timeliness 
Variable            Coefficient t-stat p-value 
Timeliness     4.642 3.333 <0.001 
Delay Acceptable     0.769 8.755 <0.001 
Delay Acceptable * Timeliness     -0.858 -6.681 <0.001 
Timely Benefits     0.181 1.302 0.195 
Timely Benefits * Timeliness     0.238 1.124 0.263 
Constant            -0.641 -0.698 <0.001 
             
Observations   144          
R-Squared   0.797          
Variable definitions: 
Perceived timeliness is participants agreement that the disclosure of the breach was made on a timely manner.. 
Timeliness is a dummy variable coded as one (1) if the company delayed the disclosure of the breach and zero (0) otherwise. 
Delay Acceptable is participants perceptions that delayed disclosures of cyber-attacks are acceptable due to 1) the increased 
sophistication of hacking techniques, 2) the complexity of determining the scope of the breach, 3) need to conduct required 
investigations, 4) even when there is loss of identifiable information from customers and employees.  
Timely benefits is participants perceptions that timely disclosure of cyber-attacks: 1) reduces the risk of litigation, 2) reduces the 
risk of lost business, and 3) is the right thing to do. 
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APPENDIX G: STUDY ONE EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
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Start of Block: Screening 
 
Are you at least 18 years of age and a United States Citizen? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Have you ever worked for an insurance company or a health provider? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Have you worked as a lawyer or for a law firm? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Have you suffered financial loss due to identity theft? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
Comments to reviewers are made in Red, Bold, and Italics 
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What is your Mturk Worker ID? 
________________________________________________________________ 
End of Block: Screening 
 
Start of Block: Default Question Block 
 
EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH      
 
Title of Project: Jurors’ liability assessments after cybersecurity breaches: the impact of 
disclosure timeliness and the plausibility of management justifications    
Principal Investigator: Patricia Navarro-Velez   
Faculty Supervisor: Steve G. Sutton   
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore how jurors make liability assessments.   
 
You will assume the role of a juror in a court case involving a group of shareholders and a 
corporation.  In your role as a juror, you will read a summary of the trial testimony and answer 
questions regarding your opinions related to the case.   
 
This study will be administered online. We expect that it will take you approximately 30 
minutes to complete this experiment.   
 
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  
  
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints contact Patricia Navarro-Velez, Doctoral Candidate, UCF Accounting 
Department at (407)823-5837 or Dr. Steve G. Sutton, Faculty Advisor, UCF Accounting 
Department at (407)823-5857.   
 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:     
Research at the University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under 
the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and 
approved by the IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, 
please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Only participants who answer Yes to screening question 1 and No to questions 2-4 are 
allowed to continue the survey. 
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Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901.      
 
Continuing on to the following pages indicates your permission to take part in this research. 
 
End of Block: Default Question Block 
 
Start of Block: Task Description  
 
Page Break  
 
You must complete this task in a single sitting.  The task will take about 30 minutes to 
complete.  If you do not have approximately 30 minutes to complete the task right now, please 
do not start the study. 
 
It is also critical that you do not complete this study twice or discuss this study with 
others.  This is serious research of interest to financial regulators, and the results could be 
compromised or ruined by you discussing this material with others. 
 
End of Block: Task Description 
 
Start of Block: Task Instructions 
 
In this case, you will first read background information. Second, you will assume the role of a 
juror in a court case involving a group of shareholders and a corporation.  In your role as a juror, 
you will read a summary of the trial and answer questions regarding your opinions related to 
the case. There are no right or wrong answers to the case questions you will be asked.  
 
It is important that you read all case materials carefully and answer the included questions 
thoughtfully and honestly.  Throughout the case you will answer the following three types of 
questions: 
 
Review Questions reflect whether you read and understand the presented material. These 
questions will not be difficult if you read the materials carefully.  
Case Questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts described in the 
case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.  
Wrap-Up Questions ask you some miscellaneous and demographic questions.  
   
IMPORTANT:  YOU MUST ANSWER 100% OF THE REVIEW QUESTIONS CORRECTLY TO BE 
COMPENSATED. 
 
Review Question: 
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To be compensated, I must answer at least: 
o 50% of the review questions correctly.  
o 75% of the review questions correctly.  
o 100% of the review questions correctly.  
End of Block: Task Instructions 
 
Start of Block: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS BACKGROUND 
 
Background Information – Disclosure of Cybersecurity Risks and Practices 
The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect investors, 
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.  As such, the SEC 
requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public.   
    
Companies prepare financial statements for investors, lenders, and other users.  Thus, investors 
and lenders use financial statements to assess the financial “health” of the company to 
determine whether to invest in or loan money to the company. Although there are no specific 
SEC enforcements regarding cybersecurity disclosures, the federal securities laws require the 
disclosure of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about material risks and events 
relevant to an investment decision.  Information is considered material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an investment 
decision.  The SEC establishes that disclosures about material risks and events, including 
cybersecurity risks and incidents, may need to complement a company’s financial statements 
and be included in the description of the company’s risk factors, Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A) section, or the disclosures (notes) to the financial statements.     
    
When the disclosure of information about the company is in violation of securities laws 
investors who have suffered economic injury file lawsuits (securities class action) to seek 
compensation to recover the money they lost.  When this occurs, jurors are chosen from the 
general public to evaluate if it is more likely than not that the allegations against the company 
are true.  If the jury finds that it is more likely than not that the allegations against the company 
are true, the company is held responsible for compensating the plaintiff (i.e. the investors who 
lost money because of their reliance on the information disclosed).  If the jury finds that it is not 
likely that the allegations against the company are true, the company is not required to pay any 
damages.    
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Review Questions: 
 
 
 
Investors and lenders use a company's financial statements when making decisions about 
whether to invest in or loan money to that company. 
o True  
o False  
 
 
 
Companies are required to disclose risks and events relevant to an investment decision. 
o True  
o False  
 
 
 
Companies are required to disclose comprehensive and accurate information.  However, the 
timeliness of the disclosure is not relevant for compliance with federal securities laws. 
o True  
o False  
 
 
 
When a company fails to disclose relevant information for investment decisions, investors often 
sue the company to recover the money they lost.    
o True  
o False  
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Start of Block: CASE INFORMATION 
 
Case Information      
Aplus Insurance is a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange and is a 
leading health and well-being company headquartered in California.  Aplus Insurance is one of 
the largest health benefits companies in the United States and delivers a variety of health 
solutions, such as health care, dental, and vision plans, along with other specialty products, 
such as life and disability insurance products.  The 2015 financial statements for Aplus 
Insurance disclosed net revenue of $2.6 billion.  Following the release of the 2015 financial 
statements, the stock price of the company continued on a positive trend. 
 
On July 2016, Aplus Insurance announced that in August of 2015 hackers executed a 
sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized access to one of the company’s IT systems and 
obtained personal information relating to customers and employees.  The information accessed 
included unencrypted personal information, such as names, birthdays, social security numbers, 
street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income 
data.  According to Aplus Insurance, they became aware of the attack eight months after the 
incident and disclosed the incident three months afterward.  Following this announcement, 
Aplus Insurance’s share price fell $4.40, or 4.94%, to close at $84.6.            
 
As a result of the cyber-attack on Aplus Insurance, the aggregate investor losses are estimated 
at $10 billion.  Based on this, a securities class action lawsuit was filed by investors who bought 
or sold Aplus Insurance's securities within the class period.  The Class Period begins on 
November 2015, when Aplus Insurance filed a Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the SEC, 
announcing the Company’s financial and operating results for the quarter ended September 30, 
2015 (the “Q3 2015 10-Q”).      
 
 
  
Not Timely Condition 
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Case Information        
 
Aplus Insurance is a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange and is a 
leading health and well-being company headquartered in California.  Aplus Insurance is one of 
the largest health benefits companies in the United States and delivers a variety of health 
solutions, such as health care, dental, and vision plans, along with other specialty products, 
such as life and disability insurance products.  The 2015 financial statements for Aplus 
Insurance disclosed net revenue of $2.6 billion.  Following the release of the 2015 financial 
statements, the stock price of the company continued on a positive trend.          
 
On July 2016, Aplus Insurance announced that in November of 2015 hackers executed a 
sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized access to one of the company’s IT systems and 
obtained personal information relating to customers and employees.  The information accessed 
included unencrypted personal information, such as names, birthdays, social security numbers, 
street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income 
data.  According to Aplus Insurance, they became aware of the attack eight months after the 
incident and disclosed the incident three days afterward.  Following this announcement, Aplus 
Insurance’s share price fell $4.40, or 4.94%, to close at $84.6.               
 
As a result of the cyber-attack on Aplus Insurance, the aggregate investor losses are estimated 
at $10 billion.  Based on this, a securities class action lawsuit was filed by investors who bought 
or sold Aplus Insurance's securities within the class period.  The Class Period begins on 
February   2016, when Aplus Insurance filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K with the SEC, 
announcing the Company’s financial and operating results for the year ended December 31, 
2015 (the “2015 10-K”).      
 
 
 
Review Question: 
 
 
 
The class action lawsuit against Aplus Insurance alleges investors' losses of $10 billion. 
o True  
o False  
End of Block: CASE INFORMATION 
 
Timely Condition 
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Start of Block: Plaintiff Arguments 
 
 
Summary of the Plaintiff’s Arguments      
 
The Complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, defendants made materially false and 
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's 
business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, defendants made false and/or misleading 
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Aplus Insurance failed to encrypt its users’ personal 
information and/or failed to encrypt its users’ personal data with an up-to-date and secure 
encryption scheme; (ii) consequently, sensitive personal account information from more than 
70 million individuals was vulnerable to theft; (iii) a data breach resulting in the theft of 
personal customer data would foreseeably cause a significant drop in user engagement with 
Aplus Insurance services; and (iv) as a result, Aplus Insurance’s public statements were 
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.       
 
The plaintiff presented evidence of the annual (10K) and quarterly (10Q) reports released by 
Aplus Insurance during the class period.  The evidence presented shows that Aplus Insurance 
failed to disclose the failure to encrypt its users’ personal information and personal data with 
an up-to-date and secure encryption scheme.   
 
The plaintiff argued that the disclosure of cybersecurity risks, within the annual and quarterly 
reports, was limited to the following statement of risk factors:       
 
“Delays or disruptions to our service, or the loss or compromise of data, could result from a 
variety of causes, including cyber-attacks.”       
 
The plaintiff also argues about the timing of Aplus Insurance’s disclosures.  The plaintiff 
presented evidence of the press-release, dated as of July 15, 2016, issued by Aplus Insurance in 
which the company acknowledges that the breach was discovered three months before the 
announcement, almost eight months after the event.        
 
 
  
Not Timely Condition 
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Summary of the Plaintiff’s Arguments      
 
The Complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, defendants made materially false and 
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's 
business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, defendants made false and/or misleading 
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Aplus Insurance failed to encrypt its users’ personal 
information and/or failed to encrypt its users’ personal data with an up-to-date and secure 
encryption scheme; (ii) consequently, sensitive personal account information from more than 
70 million individuals was vulnerable to theft; (iii) a data breach resulting in the theft of 
personal customer data would foreseeably cause a significant drop in user engagement with 
Aplus Insurance services; and (iv) as a result, Aplus Insurance’s public statements were 
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.          
 
The plaintiff presented evidence of the annual (10K) and quarterly (10Q) reports released by 
Aplus Insurance during the class period.  The evidence presented shows that Aplus Insurance 
failed to disclose the failure to encrypt its users’ personal information and personal data with 
an up-to-date and secure encryption scheme.   
 
The plaintiff argued that the disclosure of cybersecurity risks, within the annual and quarterly 
reports, was limited to the following statement of risk factors:       
 
“Delays or disruptions to our service, or the loss or compromise of data, could result from a 
variety of causes, including cyber-attacks.”         
 
The plaintiff also argues about the timing of Aplus Insurance’s disclosures.  The plaintiff 
presented evidence of the press-release, dated as of July 15, 2016, issued by Aplus Insurance in 
which the company acknowledges that the breach was discovered three days before the 
announcement, almost eight months after the event.    
 
 
Page Break  
  
Timely Condition 
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Summary of the Defendant’s Arguments   
 
In response to the allegations of the plaintiff, the defendant, Aplus Insurance, responds that 
cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable business risk, and so Aplus Insurance discloses 
cyber-attacks as a risk factor in their annual and quarterly reports.  In addition, Aplus Insurance 
presented evidence of actions taken to contain the damage promptly.  Evidence included the 
disclosure of the incident, creation of a dedicated website established to provide additional 
information, including frequently asked questions, and provision of two years of free credit 
monitoring and identity protection services to customers and employees. 
 
The defendant establishes that the incident was disclosed three days after it was discovered, in 
the most expedient time possible, and without unreasonable delay, as required by the 
regulations of the state of California.      
 
 
 
Page Break  
 
Plaintiff Closing Statement      
 
The attorney for the plaintiff revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case, 
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should be held responsible for the class action financial 
losses.  The plaintiff argues that the company presented misleading financial reports as Aplus 
Insurance failed to disclose its failure to encrypt users’ personal information and personal data 
with an up-to-date and secure encryption scheme.  The plaintiff alleges that Aplus Insurance’s 
negligence resulted in aggregate investor losses estimated at $10 billion.    
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The plaintiff also presented the following timeline:            
 
The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a 
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude.  However, in contrast with other firms that have 
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three days.  The disclosure 
was made 44 days earlier than the average disclosure.      
 
The plaintiff questions Aplus Insurance’s disclosure timing strategy as, despite the incident 
being disclosed three days after it was discovered, it took them another three months to 
release comprehensive and accurate information about the extent of the breach.               
 
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff. 
 
 
Timely/Plausible Condition 
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The plaintiff also presented the following timeline:           
 
 
The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a 
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude.  However, in contrast with other firms that have 
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after about three months.  The 
disclosure was made 44 days later than the average disclosure. 
  
The plaintiff questions Aplus Insurance’s disclosure timing strategy as it took them three 
months to disclose the incident and to release comprehensive and accurate information about 
the extent of the breach. 
  
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff. 
 
Not Timely/Plausible Condition 
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The plaintiff also presented the following timeline: 
 
   
The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a 
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude.  However, in contrast with other firms that have 
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three days.  The disclosure 
was made 44 days earlier than the average disclosure. 
  
The plaintiff questions Aplus Insurance’s disclosure timing strategy as it is unlikely that a 
company would be able to gather comprehensive and accurate information and disclose the 
information within three days of discovery. 
  
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff. 
 
Timely/Implausible Condition 
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The plaintiff also presented the following timeline: 
  
  
The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a 
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude.  However, in contrast with other firms that have 
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after about three months.  The 
disclosure was made 44 days later than the average disclosure. 
  
The plaintiff questions Aplus Insurance’s disclosure timing strategy as it took them three 
months to disclose the incident and it took them another three months to release 
comprehensive and accurate information about the extent of the breach. 
 
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff.   
 
Not Timely/Implausible Condition 
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The plaintiff also presented the following timeline: 
  
  
The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a 
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude.  However, in contrast with other firms that have 
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after three days.  The disclosure 
was made 44 days earlier than the average disclosure. 
  
 The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
  
Timely/Control Condition 
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The plaintiff also presented the following timeline: 
  
  
The timeline presented shows that on average, it takes 47 days for a company to disclose a 
cybersecurity breach of a similar magnitude.  However, in contrast with other firms that have 
disclosed a cyber-attack, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach after about three months.  The 
disclosure was made 44 days later than the average disclosure. 
 
The attorney for the plaintiff asks the jury to find for the plaintiff. 
 
 
Page Break  
  
Not Timely/Control Condition 
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Defendant Closing Statement 
 
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case, 
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial 
losses.  The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable 
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a 
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.     
 
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy 
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and 
without unreasonable delay.     
 
The attorney states that the Company made every effort to gather all the relevant facts of the 
impact of the breach. A press release was issued quickly to notify customers, so they could take 
actions to protect their identities.  Given the initial uncertainties, management was unable to 
release accurate information about the extent of the breach at the time of the announcement.   
A dedicated website was established for customers to access additional information.  After 
gathering all the information, three months after the breach was disclosed, the company issued 
additional press releases that included comprehensive and accurate information about the 
extent of the breach.   
 
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.     
     
 
 
 
  
Timely/Plausible Condition 
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Defendant Closing Statement 
 
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case, 
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial 
losses.  The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable 
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a 
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.     
 
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy 
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and 
without unreasonable delay.   
 
The attorney states that the Company made every effort to gather all the relevant facts of the 
impact of the breach. A press release was issued quickly to notify customers, so they could take 
actions to protect their identities. 
 
The press release included comprehensive and accurate information about the extent of the 
breach. A dedicated website was established for customers to access additional information.        
 
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.   
     
 
 
 
  
Timely/Implausible Condition 
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Defendant Closing Statement 
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case, 
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial 
losses.  The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable 
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a 
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.     
 
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy 
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and 
without unreasonable delay.   
 
The attorney states that the Company made every effort to gather all the relevant facts of the 
impact of the breach. Given the initial uncertainties, management was unable to release 
accurate information about the extent of the breach when the breach was 
discovered. However, a press release was issued in the most expedient time possible to notify 
customers, so they could take actions to protect their identities.   
 
The press release included comprehensive and accurate information about the extent of the 
breach. A dedicated website was established for customers to access additional information.        
 
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.   
     
 
 
 
  
Not Timely/Plausible Condition 
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Defendant Closing Statement 
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case, 
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial 
losses.  The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable 
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a 
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.     
 
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy 
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and 
without unreasonable delay.   
 
The attorney states that the Company made every effort to gather all the relevant facts of the 
impact of the breach. Given the initial uncertainties, management was unable to release 
accurate information about the extent of the breach when the breach was 
discovered. However, a press release was issued in the most expedient time possible to notify 
customers, so they could take actions to protect their identities.   
 
A dedicated website was established for customers to access additional information.  After 
gathering all the information, three months after the breach was disclosed, the company issued 
additional press releases that included comprehensive and accurate information about the 
extent of the breach.        
 
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance.   
     
 
 
 
  
Not Timely/Implausible Condition 
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Defendant Closing Statement 
 
The attorney for the defense revisits the evidence and reviews the key arguments for the case, 
summarizing why Aplus Insurance should not be held responsible for the class action financial 
losses.  The attorney for the defense maintains that cyber-attacks have become an unavoidable 
business risk, and revisits evidence that shows that Aplus Insurance discloses cyber-attacks as a 
risk factor in their annual and quarterly financial reports.   
 
In addition, the attorney for the defense argues that Aplus Insurance takes consumers' privacy 
very seriously and that the incident was disclosed in the most expedient time possible and 
without unreasonable delay.   
 
The attorney for the defense asks the jury to find for the defendant, Aplus Insurance. 
 
End of Block: Plaintiff Arguments 
 
Start of Block: Judge's Instructions 
 
Judge's Instructions to the Jury:  
 
Before allowing the jury to deliberate and determine a verdict, the Judge provides instructions 
to the jury: 
 
It is your responsibility to determine the facts from the evidence presented to you. You will use 
these facts and the law given in these instructions to decide the case. You should consider the 
evidence in light of your observations and experiences in life. You may draw any reasonable 
inferences from the proven facts. Also, keep in mind that statements made by attorneys are not 
evidence. 
 
The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. The level of proof required is the preponderance of 
the evidence, which means that the allegations are more probably true than not true.  To be 
successful in a claim of liability, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence the 
allegations against Aplus Insurance.  You should consider whether the defendant should be held 
liable for the plaintiff losses.  If you decide that the defendant, Aplus Insurance, should not be 
held liable, you must find in its favor. If you decide that Aplus Insurance should be held liable, 
you must find for the plaintiff.  
 
If you decide for the plaintiff, you must then determine the amount of money that will 
reasonably and fairly compensate the Class Members for its $10 billion loss resulting from the 
stock transactions. The amount of money that you determine must be based on the principle of 
proportional liability. The principle of proportional liability states that jurors must consider the 
Control Condition 
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extent to which the defendant was responsible for the allegations relative to other responsible 
parties. 
 
 
 
Review Question 
 
 
 
It is my responsibility to determine the facts from the evidence presented to me. Statements 
made by attorneys are not evidence. 
o True  
o False  
 
End of Block: Judge's Instructions 
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Start of Block: Case Questions 
 
Case Questions 
 
The following questions are intended to assess your views of the defendant's (Aplus 
Insurance's) level of liability for the plaintiff’s alleged losses. There are no right or wrong 
answers - these questions ask for your personal views.  Please answer the following response 
questions about the case openly and honestly.  
 
 
Page Break  
 
Assume that you are a juror on this case. Would you find Aplus Insurance (the defendant) liable 
with regards to shareholders’ losses in connection with the cyber-attack to Aplus Insurance?  
o Yes, Aplus Insurance is liable.  
o No, Aplus Insurance is not liable.  
 
 
 
  How confident are you in your verdict? 
 
Not 
confident 
at all 
Somewhat 
not 
confident 
Slightly 
not 
confident 
Neither 
not 
confident 
nor 
confident 
Slightly 
confident 
Somewhat 
confident 
Very 
confident 
  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
Page Break  
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  How likely is it that Aplus Insurance is liable? 
 Extremely Unlikely 
Very 
Unlikely Unlikely 
Neither 
Unlikely 
nor Likely 
Likely Very Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
Page Break  
 
Imagine that a majority of the jury has found Aplus Insurance liable and that you will be able to 
impose damages on Aplus Insurance to pay to compensate Class Members for their $10 billion 
loss.  On the scale below, please indicate the percentage of damages, if any, you would be 
willing to require that Aplus Insurance pays Class Members? (Remember that the principle of 
proportional liability applies.)  
 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
Page Break  
 
Do you believe Aplus Insurance was grossly negligent in disclosing the cyber-attack (i.e., Aplus 
Insurance had extreme, reckless disregard for stakeholder’s rights to be notified of material 
events)?  
o Yes, Aplus Insurance was grossly negligent.  
o No, Aplus Insurance was not grossly negligent.  
 
 
Page Break  
  
DV1: Liability Assessment 
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  How likely is it that Aplus Insurance was grossly negligent? 
 Extremely Unlikely 
Very 
Unlikely Unlikely 
Neither 
Unlikely 
nor Likely 
Likely Very Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
Page Break  
 
 
You may assess punitive damages beyond the recoverable damages up to another $20 billion 
on Aplus Insurance. 
On the scale below, please indicate the percentage of punitive damages, if any, you would be 
willing to require that Aplus Insurance pays Class Members?    
 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
Page Break  
 
 
For this question ONLY, please choose 1. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
Page Break  
  
Attention Check 
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Based on the information that you have available, what do you think caused the delayed 
disclosure of the cyber-attack to Aplus Insurance?     
 
Two potential reasons for the timing of Aplus Insurance’s disclosure follow: 1) that the 
disclosure timing was intentional and caused by Aplus Insurance’s intent to strategically 
disclose the cyber-attack to portray the company in a favorable light, or 2) that the disclosure 
timing was incidental and caused by Aplus Insurance’s difficulty in estimating the extent of the 
breach due to the inherent uncertainty of the event.   
 
On the scale below please indicate which reason is the most likely cause of the disclosure 
timing: 
 Completely incidental 
Somewhat 
more 
incidental 
than 
intentional 
Slightly 
more 
incidental 
than 
intentional 
Equally 
incidental 
than 
intentional 
Slightly 
more 
intentional 
than 
incidental 
Somewhat 
more 
intentional 
than 
incidental 
Completely 
intentional 
  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
  How confident are you in your assessment? 
 
Not 
confident 
at all 
Somewhat 
not 
confident 
Slightly 
not 
confident 
Neither 
not 
confident 
nor 
confident 
Slightly 
confident 
Somewhat 
confident 
Very 
confident 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
Page Break  
  
DV2: Causal Attribution 
 
 
166 
 
To what extent do you believe the plaintiff (Class Members) must assume normal investment 
risks when making investments, and therefore is responsible for its loss? 
 
Completely 
Not 
Responsibl
e for Loss 
Not 
Responsibl
e for Loss 
Somewhat 
not 
Responsibl
e for Loss 
Neither not 
Responsibl
e for Loss 
nor 
Responsibl
e for Loss 
Somewhat 
Responsibl
e for Loss 
Responsibl
e for Loss 
Completely 
Responsibl
e for Loss 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
Page Break  
Block: Case Questions 
 
Start of Block: Case Questions 2 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
 
 
 
Class Members should have expected a cyber-attack. 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
The order of the following questions is randomized 
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Aplus Insurance cyber-attack was predictable by Class Members.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Companies in the health and well-being industry have a higher-risk of cyber-attack compared to 
companies in other industries.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach in a timely manner.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Manipulation Check - Timeliness 
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Aplus Insurance’s justification for the disclosure timing is plausible.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Aplus Insurance’s justification for the timing of the disclosure is believable.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Aplus Insurance’s justification for the timing of the disclosure is credible.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Manipulation Check - Plausibility 
Manipulation Check - Plausibility 
Manipulation Check - Plausibility 
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Aplus Insurance’s was more concerned about disclosing comprehensive and accurate 
information about the cyber-attack than in disclosing the information in a timely manner.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Aplus Insurance’s should have emphasized more on disclosing comprehensive and accurate 
information about the cyber-attack than in disclosing the information in a timely manner.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the increased sophistication of 
hacking techniques.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the complexity of determining the 
scope of the breach.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable to conduct required investigations.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable even when a cyber-attack results in the 
loss of identifiable information from customers or employees.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Managers have more incentives to disclose bad news in a timely manner than incentives to 
delay the disclosure of bad news.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Compared to companies with lower risk of cyber-attacks, companies with higher risk of cyber-
attacks are expected to have stronger controls for detecting and disclosing cybersecurity 
incidents in a timely manner.  
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
End of Block: Case Questions 2 
 
Start of Block: Thanks 
 
Thanks for completing the task!  
After completion of the following questionnaire you will receive a validation code to be used to 
process your payment. 
 
 
End of Block: Thanks 
 
Start of Block: Demographics 
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What is your gender? 
o Male  
o Female  
 
 
 
What is your age? 
o 18 to 28 years  
o 29 to 38 years  
o 39 to 48 years  
o 49 to 58 years  
o 59 to 69 years  
o Over 70 years  
 
 
 
Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal (left) to extremely conservative (right). Where would you place yourself on 
this scale? 
 Extremely liberal 
Somewhat 
liberal 
Slightly 
liberal 
Neither 
liberal nor 
conservative 
Slightly 
conservative 
Somewhat 
conservative 
Extremely 
conservative 
1  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received?  
o Less than high school degree  
o High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)  
o Some college but no degree  
o Associate degree in college (2-year)  
o Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)  
o Master's degree  
o Professional degree (JD, MD)  
o Doctoral Degree  
 
 
 
If you studied beyond high school, what was your area of concentration? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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What is your current employment status? 
o Full-time employment  
o Part-time employment  
o Self-employed  
o Full-time student  
o Retired  
o Not currently employed, but looking for work  
o Not currently employed and not looking for work  
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Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are employed? 
o Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support  
o Real estate or rental and leasing  
o Mining  
o Professional, scientific or technical services  
o Utilities  
o Management of companies or enterprises  
o Construction  
o Admin, support, waste management or remediation services  
o Manufacturing  
o Educational services  
o Wholesale trade  
o Health care or social assistance  
o Retail trade  
o Arts, entertainment or recreation  
o Transportation or warehousing  
o Accommodation or food services  
o Information  
o Other services (except public administration)  
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o Finance or insurance  
o Unclassified establishments  
 
 
 
Information about income is very important to understand.  Would you please give your best 
guess?Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in (previous year) 
before taxes. 
o Less than $20,000  
o $20,000 to $39,999  
o $40,000 to $59,999  
o $60,000 to $79,999  
o $80,000 to $99,999  
o $100,000 to $149,999  
o $150,000 or more  
 
 
 
Have you ever worked for an insurance company or a health provider? 
o Yes  
o No  
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Have you ever worked as a lawyer or for a law firm? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Have you been a victim of identity theft?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Have you been a victim of a cybersecurity attack?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a company? 
o Yes  
o No  
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Have you ever served on a jury before? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
End of Block: Demographics 
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APPENDIX H: STUDY TWO EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
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Start of Block: Consent 
 
EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH      
 
Title of Project: Investors’ judgments and decisions   
Principal Investigator: Patricia Navarro-Velez      
Faculty Supervisor: Steven G. Sutton       
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.      
 
The purpose of this study is to explore how investors make valuation judgments.  You will 
receive one of several business contexts/situations.      
 
You will assume the role of an investor to evaluate a company’s stock value in light of some 
information that will be made available to you.      
 
This study will be administered online. We expect that it will take you approximately 20 
minutes to complete this experiment.      
 
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.      
 
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints contact Patricia Navarro-Velez, Doctoral Candidate, UCF Accounting 
Department at (407)823-5837 or Dr. Steve G. Sutton, Faculty Advisor, UCF Accounting 
Department at (407)823-5857.      
 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:     
Research at the University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under 
the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and 
approved by the IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, 
please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901.   search. 
 
End of Block: Consent 
  
  
Comments to reviewers are made in Red, Bold, and Italics 
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Start of Block: Screening M Turk 
 
Are you at least 18 years of age and a United States Citizen? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Are you a native English speaker? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Have you taken 2 or more Accounting or Financial courses at the college level? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
 
Can you read and understand financial statements? 
o Yes  
o No  
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Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a company? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
End of Block: Screening M Turk 
 
Start of Block: Instructions 
You must complete this task in a single sitting.  The task will take about 20 minutes to 
complete.  If you do not have approximately 20 minutes to complete the task right now, please 
do not start the study. 
 
It is also critical that you do not complete this study twice or discuss this study with 
others.  This is serious research of interest to financial regulators, and the results could be 
compromised or ruined by you discussing materials with others. 
 
End of Block: Instructions 
 
Start of Block: Instructions 2 
Your task today is to evaluate a company, in light of selected information that will be made 
available to you.  The information you receive is not intended to include all the information that 
you might desire. However, do your best in light of the information provided and please base 
your answers to the questions on only the information provided.  There are no right or wrong 
answers to the case questions you will be asked.   
 
It is important that you read all case materials carefully and answer the included questions 
thoughtfully and honestly.  Throughout the case you will answer the following three types of 
questions: 
 
Review Questions reflect whether you read and understand the presented material. These 
questions will not be difficult if you read the materials carefully. 
Case Questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts described in the 
case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. 
Wrap-Up Questions ask you some miscellaneous perception and demographic questions.   
 
IMPORTANT: YOU MUST ANSWER 100% OF THE REVIEW QUESTIONS CORRECTLY TO BE 
COMPENSATED. 
 
Only participants who answer Yes to screening question 1-4 are allowed to continue the 
survey. 
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Review Question: 
 
To be compensated, I must answer at least: 
o 50% of the review questions correctly.  
o 75% of the review questions correctly.  
o 100% of the review questions correctly.  
 
End of Block: Instructions 2 
 
Start of Block: Task 1 
 
Some initial background information on the company is provided below: 
 
About Aplus Auto Care: 
 
Headquartered in San Diego, California, Aplus Auto Care is a leading American corporation in 
the car warranty and related solutions industry.         
 
The company was founded in 1987 and serves over 74 million people throughout the United 
States. 
 
 
End of Block: Task 1 
 
Start of Block: Case Question 
 
 
Case Question 1:  
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts 
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.) 
 
On the following scale, please indicate what you believe to be an appropriate common stock 
valuation for Aplus, ranging from very low to very high. 
       
Given that you have very little information about Aplus up to this point, for now, you can 
assume that an “average” common stock valuation for Aplus is appropriate.  In other words, for 
DV1a: Initial Valuation 
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this particular judgment, you should choose a value that is either at or very near ‘4’ on the scale 
below. 
 Very 
Low 
Moderately 
Low 
Slightly 
Low 
Neither 
Low nor 
High 
Slightly 
High 
Moderately 
High 
Very 
High 
The 
appropriate 
common 
stock 
valuation 
for Aplus 
is:  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Case Question 
 
Start of Block: Financial Information 
Relevant Financial Information:   
 
Below you are provided with selected financial information taken from the Annual Reports of 
Aplus Auto Care for the year ended December 31, 2016. 
 
(in million dollars) 
  2016 2015 2014 
Net Assets $65,083 $61,717 $61,676 
Net Income $2,569 $2,560 $2,469 
Earnings per Share  5.56 4.82 4.76 
 
Following the release of the 2016 financial statements in February 2017, the stock price of the 
company continued on a positive trend, and analysts considered this company to be a strong 
investment. 
 
 
Review Questions 
 
As reported in the tabulated information included in Aplus’ annual report, there has been a 
consistent ______ trend in total Net Assets, Net Income, and Earnings per Share (EPS). 
o Positive  
o Negative  
 
 
 
185 
Following the release of the 2016 financial statements on February 2017, the stock price of the 
company continued on a ______ trend. 
o Positive  
o Negative  
End of Block: Financial Information 
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Start of Block: Press Release Info 
 
You also learned that a press release was issued by Aplus Auto Care.  The press release that was 
provided by Aplus Auto Care is presented on the next page.       
 
Please take the time to thoroughly review the press release in order to answer the questions 
that will follow.  The success of this research depends on you paying careful attention to the 
task. 
 
End of Block: Press Release Info 
 
Start of Block: Press Release 
 
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Investigation on Data Breach 
 
LOS ANGELES, July 1, 2017 /PRNewswire/ -- Statement regarding cyber-attack against Aplus 
Auto Care, Inc. 
 
Cyber attackers executed a very sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized access to our parent 
company’s IT systems and have obtained personal information relating to customers and 
employees.  The information accessed includes names, birthdays, social security numbers, 
street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income data.  No 
credit card information was compromised, nor is there evidence at this time that any other 
information was targeted or obtained. 
 
As soon as we learned about the attack, we immediately made every effort to close the security 
vulnerability, contacted authorities and began fully cooperating with their investigation. 
 
Aplus Auto Care will individually notify current and former members whose information has 
been accessed.  Credit monitoring and identity protection services will be provided free of 
charge so that those who have been affected can have peace of mind. 
 
The company has established a dedicated website (www.apbreach.com) where members can 
access information, including frequently asked questions and answers. 
 
We take consumers’ privacy very seriously and are doing everything in our power to make our 
systems and security processes – and most importantly your data – more secure.  In the 
meantime, as we learn more, we will continue to provide updates.   
 
End of Block: Press Release 
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Start of Block: Assurance Info 
 
Relevant Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
 
Upon further investigation, you find that, cyber-attacks are considered a business risk which 
organizations should address with a cybersecurity risk management program.  You also find 
that, in response to the increased threat of cyber-attacks to organizations, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has developed a cybersecurity risk 
management reporting framework for organizations to provide users with information about 
the processes and controls they have implemented to mitigate cybersecurity risks (e.g. 
restricted access to unauthorized users).  This framework is also used by Certified Public 
Accountants (CPAs) to evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity controls within an 
organization and to report the results in a Service Organization Controls (SOC) report.        
 
A SOC over cybersecurity is a report that includes a description of the company’s controls over 
cybersecurity and that also includes an independent audit opinion over the operating 
effectiveness of cybersecurity controls. For instance, a company describes how they restrict 
access to information systems to only authorized users and the independent auditor reports 
whether that control is operating effectively.  
 
A clean opinion in a SOC report denotes that there is reasonable assurance that the 
cybersecurity controls are in place and operating effectively.  This independent auditor’s report 
is desirable for companies with high risk from cyber-attacks.  
 
 
Page Break  
  
 
 
188 
 
Additional Information: 
 
You decided to do some additional research to find out about cybersecurity assurance practices 
in this industry. 
 
You found that cybersecurity assurance is voluntary but that most firms in this industry choose 
to engage in cybersecurity assurance with an independent auditor. 
 
Therefore, you expect that Aplus Auto Care, Inc. will choose to engage in cybersecurity 
assurance with an independent auditor. 
 
 
 
 
Additional Information: 
 
You decided to do some additional research to find out about cybersecurity assurance practices 
in this industry. 
 
You found that cybersecurity assurance is voluntary but that most firms in this industry do not 
choose to engage in cybersecurity assurance with an independent auditor. 
 
Therefore, you expect that Aplus Auto Care, Inc. will not choose to engage in cybersecurity 
assurance with an independent auditor. 
 
 
Page Break  
  
Assurance Expected Condition 
Assurance Not Expected Condition 
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Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
 
Aplus Auto Care reports that they have their own cybersecurity risk management program in 
place and operating effectively.   
 
In addition, you noticed that, consistent with the rest of the firms in the industry, Aplus Auto 
Care voluntarily engaged an Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Aplus’ cybersecurity controls during 2016 (the year before Aplus Auto Care 
learned about the data breach).   
 
Aplus Auto Care’s auditor issued a clean opinion in their SOC report in January 2017 (before  
Aplus Auto Care learned about the data breach).   
 
 
 
 
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
 
Aplus Auto Care reports that they have their own cybersecurity risk management program in 
place and operating effectively.   
 
However, you noticed that, consistent with the rest of the firms in the industry, Aplus Auto Care 
has not engaged an Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their cybersecurity controls.   
 
 
 
 
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:      
 
You noticed that, consistent with the rest of the firms in the industry, Aplus Auto Care does not 
have a cybersecurity risk management program in place and has not engaged an Independent 
Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their cybersecurity 
controls.   
 
 
 
  
Assurance/Conform to Expectancies Condition 
No Assurance/Conform to Expectancies Condition 
Additional Analysis – No CRM/Conform to Expectancies Condition 
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Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices:      
 
You noticed that, in contrast with the rest of the firms in the industry, Aplus Auto Care does not 
have a cybersecurity risk management program in place and has not engaged an Independent 
Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their cybersecurity 
controls.   
 
 
 
 
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
 
Aplus Auto Care reports that they have their own cybersecurity risk management program in 
place and operating effectively.   
 
However, you noticed that, in contrast with the rest of the firms in the industry, which have 
engaged in cybersecurity assurance services, Aplus Auto Care has not engaged an Independent 
Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their cybersecurity 
controls.   
 
 
 
 
Aplus Auto Care, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
 
Aplus Auto Care reports that they have their own cybersecurity risk management program in 
place and operating effectively.   
 
In addition, you noticed that, in contrast with the rest of the firms in the industry, that have not 
engaged in cybersecurity assurance services, Aplus Auto Care voluntarily engaged an 
Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
cybersecurity controls during 2016 (the year before Aplus Auto Care learned about the data 
breach).  
 
Aplus Auto Care’s auditor issued a clean opinion in their SOC report in January 2017 (before 
Aplus Auto Care learned about the data breach).   
 
End of Block: Assurance Info 
 
Start of Block: Case Questions 
No Assurance/Violate Expectancies Condition 
Assurance/Violate Expectancies Condition 
Additional Analysis – No CRM/Violate Expectancies Condition 
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Case Questions: 
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts 
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.) 
 
 
Considering the new information provided, please indicate what you believe to be an 
appropriate common stock valuation for Aplus, ranging from very low to very high. 
 
 Very 
Low 
Moderately 
Low 
Slightly 
Low 
Neither 
Low nor 
High 
Slightly 
High 
Moderately 
High 
Very 
High 
The 
appropriate 
common 
stock 
valuation 
for Aplus is:  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
How competent or incompetent do you believe the management of Aplus to be? 
 Very 
Incompetent Incompetent 
Somewhat 
Incompetent 
Neither 
Incompetent 
nor 
Competent 
Somewhat 
Competent Competent 
Very 
Competent 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
How trustworthy or untrustworthy do you believe the management of Aplus to be? 
 Very Untrustworth
y 
Untrustworth
y 
Somewhat 
Untrustworth
y 
Neither 
Untrustworth
y nor 
Trustworthy 
Somewhat 
Trustworth
y 
Trustworth
y 
Very 
Trustworth
y 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
End of Block: Case Questions 
DV1b: Final Valuation 
DV2a: Management Credibility / Competence 
DV2b: Management Credibility / Trustworthiness 
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Case Questions: 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
The order of the following questions is randomized 
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 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
“Independent 
cybersecurity 
audits are 
necessary to be 
able to 
substantiate 
professional 
care”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
“Independent 
cybersecurity 
audits are 
beneficial, as 
the auditor can 
be used as a 
codefendant in 
case of 
litigation”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
“Independent 
cybersecurity 
audits are 
beneficial, as 
the auditor and 
the company 
share an 
interest to 
protect both of 
their 
reputation in 
case of 
litigation”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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“Independent 
cybersecurity 
audits are 
beneficial, as 
the auditor 
shares a 
portion of the 
company’s 
legal 
responsibility 
in case of 
litigation”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
“Aplus Auto 
Care was 
expected to 
engage in 
cybersecurity 
assurance 
before the data 
breach.”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
“I am worry 
about Aplus 
Auto Care's 
cybersecurity 
risks.”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
“It is very 
difficult 
for Aplus Auto 
Care 
management 
to use their 
skill and 
diligence to 
control (limit) 
the company's 
cybersecurity 
risks.”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
“Aplus Auto 
Care is a 
company with 
high 
cybersecurity.”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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“Aplus Auto 
Care's 
cybersecurity 
risks are likely 
to be 
catastrophic.”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
"Accountants 
have significant 
experience 
auditing 
information 
security and 
cybersecurity 
controls."  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
"Accountants 
spend a 
significant 
portion of their 
time auditing 
information 
security and 
cybersecurity 
controls.”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
"Accountants 
receive 
significant 
combined 
informal and 
formal training 
in relation to 
information 
security and 
cybersecurity 
controls.”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
"Accountants 
have a high 
level of 
information 
security and 
cybersecurity 
controls 
expertise.”  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
196 
For this 
questions, 
select "4".  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Case Questions 2 
 
Start of Block: Manipulation Checks 
 
Review Questions: 
 
 
Based on the case information, you learned that Aplus Auto Care has their own cybersecurity 
risk management program in place and operating effectively.   
o True  
o False  
 
 
 
Based on the case information, you learned that Aplus Auto Care voluntarily engaged an 
Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
cybersecurity controls.  
o True  
o False  
 
 
 
Based on the case information, most firms in the car warranty and related solutions industry 
choose to engage in cybersecurity assurance services with an independent auditor. 
o True  
o False  
 
End of Block: Manipulation Checks 
Manipulation Check -CRM 
Manipulation Check - Assurance 
Manipulation Check – Assurance Expectancies 
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Start of Block: Thanks 
 
Thanks for completing the task! After completion of the following questionnaire you will 
receive a validation code to be used to process your payment. 
 
End of Block: Thanks 
 
Start of Block: Demographics 
 
What is your gender? 
o Male  
o Female  
 
 
 
What is your age? 
o 18 to 28 years  
o 29 to 38 years  
o 39 to 48 years  
o 49 to 58 years  
o 59 to 69 years  
o Over 70 years  
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What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received?  
o Less than high school degree  
o High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)  
o Some college but no degree  
o Associate degree in college (2-year)  
o Bachelor's degree in college (4 years)  
o Master's degree  
o Professional degree (JD, MD)  
o Doctoral degree  
 
 
 
If you studied beyond high school, what was your area of concentration? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
199 
What is your current employment status? 
o Full-time employment  
o Part-time employment  
o Self-employed  
o Full-time student  
o Retired  
o Not currently employed, but looking for work  
o Not currently employed and not looking for work  
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Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are employed? 
o Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support  
o Real estate or rental and leasing  
o Mining  
o Professional, scientific or technical services  
o Utilities  
o Management of companies or enterprises  
o Construction  
o Admin, support, waste management or remediation services  
o Manufacturing  
o Educational services  
o Wholesale trade  
o Health care or social assistance  
o Retail trade  
o Arts, entertainment or recreation  
o Transportation or warehousing  
o Accommodation or food services  
o Information  
o Other services (except public administration)  
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o Finance or insurance  
o Unclassified establishments  
 
 
 
Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in (previous year) 
before taxes. 
o Less than $20,000  
o $20,000 to $39,999  
o $40,000 to $59,999  
o $60,000 to $79,999  
o $80,000 to $99,999  
o $100,000 to $149,999  
o $150,000 or more  
 
 
 
Approximately, how many years of personal investment experience do you have? 
o Less than one year  
o More than one year but less than three years  
o More than three years but less than five years  
o More than five years  
o No experience  
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Approximately, how many times have you purchased common stock of a company as a personal 
investment? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Demographics 
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APPENDIX I: STUDY THREE EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
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Start of Block: Screening M Turk 
Are you at least 18 years of age and a United States Citizen? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
Are you a native English speaker? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
Have you taken 2 or more Accounting or Financial courses at the college level? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
Can you read and understand financial statements? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a company? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Comments to reviewers are made in Red, Bold, and Italics 
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Please provide your Mturk ID: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Screening M Turk 
 
Start of Block: Consent 
 
EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH      
 
Title of Project: Investors Valuation Judgments                              
Principal Investigator: Patricia Navarro-Velez      
Faculty Supervisor: Steve G. Sutton, PhD          
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.      
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. Before you begin, please note that the 
data you provide may be collected and used by Amazon as per its privacy agreement. This 
agreement shall be interpreted according to United States law.      
 
The purpose of this study is to explore how investors make valuation judgments.  You will 
receive one of several business contexts/situations. You will assume the role of an investor to 
evaluate a company’s stock value in light of some information that will be made available to 
you.      
 
This study will be administered online. We expect that it will take you approximately 20 
minutes to complete this experiment. After successful completion of the study, you will be 
compensated with $2.50. Compensation will be processed through your Mturk account.      
 
You must be 18 years of age or older, a United States citizen, native English speaker that have 
taken two or more accounting or financial courses at the college level, and that can read and 
understand financial statements to take part in this research study. You must also have 
completed at least 1,000 Mturk HITs with over 98% approval rate.      
 
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints: Patricia Navarro-Velez, Doctoral Candidate, UCF Accounting 
Department at (407)823-5837 or Dr. Steve G. Sutton, Faculty Advisor, UCF Accounting 
Department at (407)823-5857.      
 
IRB contact about your rights in this study or to report a complaint:   
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or have concerns about the 
conduct of this study, please contact Institutional Review Board (IRB), University of Central 
Only participants who answer Yes to screening question 1-4 are allowed to continue the 
survey. 
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Florida, Office of Research, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901, or email irb@ucf.edu. 
 
End of Block: Consent 
  
Start of Block: Instructions 
You must complete this task in a single sitting.  The task will take about 20 minutes to 
complete.  If you do not have approximately 20 minutes to complete the task right now, please 
do not start the study. 
 
It is also critical that you do not complete this study twice or discuss this study with 
others.  This is serious research of interest to financial regulators, and the results could be 
compromised or ruined by you discussing materials with others. 
 
End of Block: Instructions 
 
Start of Block: Instructions 2 
 
Your task today is to evaluate a company, in light of selected information that will be made 
available to you.  The information you receive is not intended to include all the information that 
you might desire. However, do your best in light of the information provided and please base 
your answers to the questions on only the information provided.  There are no right or wrong 
answers to the case questions you will be asked.   
 
It is important that you read all case materials carefully and answer the included questions 
thoughtfully and honestly.  Throughout the case you will answer the following three types of 
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questions: 
 
Review Questions reflect whether you read and understand the presented material. These 
questions will not be difficult if you read the materials carefully. 
Case Questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts described in the 
case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. 
Wrap-Up Questions ask you some miscellaneous perception and demographic questions.   
 
IMPORTANT: YOU MUST ANSWER 100% OF THE REVIEW QUESTIONS CORRECTLY TO BE 
COMPENSATED. 
 
Review Question: 
 
To be compensated, I must answer at least: 
o 50% of the review questions correctly.  
o 75% of the review questions correctly.  
o 100% of the review questions correctly.  
End of Block: Instructions 2 
 
Start of Block: Task 1 
 
Some initial background information on the company is provided below: 
 
About Aplus Insurance: 
 
Headquartered in San Diego, California, Aplus Insurance is a leading American corporation in 
the health and well-being industry.         
 
The company was founded in 1987 and serves over 74 million people throughout the United 
States. 
 
 
Page Break  
End of Block: Task 1 
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Start of Block: Case Question 
 
 
Case Question 1:  
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts 
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.) 
On the following scale, please indicate what you believe to be an appropriate common stock 
valuation for Aplus, ranging from very low to very high.       
Given that you have very little information about Aplus up to this point, for now, you can 
assume that an “average” common stock valuation for Aplus is appropriate.  In other words, for 
this particular judgment, you should choose a value that is either at or very near ‘4’ on the scale 
below. 
The appropriate common stock valuation for Aplus is: 
 Very 
Low 
Moderately 
Low 
Slightly 
Low 
Neither 
Low nor 
High 
Slightly 
High 
Moderately 
High 
Very 
High 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Case Question 
 
  
DV1a: Initial Valuation 
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Start of Block: Financial Information 
 
Relevant Financial Information:   
 
Below you are provided with selected financial information taken from the Annual Reports of 
Aplus Insurance for the year ended December 31, 2016. 
 
(in million dollars) 
  2016 2015 2014 
Net Assets $65,083 $61,717 $61,676 
Net Income $2,569 $2,560 $2,469 
Earnings per Share  5.56 4.82 4.76 
 
 
Following the release of the 2016 financial statements in February 2017, the stock price of the 
company continued on a positive trend, and analysts considered this company to be a strong 
investment. 
 
 
 
Review Questions 
 
As reported in the tabulated information included in Aplus Insurance’s annual report, there has 
been a consistent ______ trend in total Net Assets, Net Income, and Earnings per Share (EPS). 
o Positive  
o Negative  
 
 
 
Following the release of the 2016 financial statements on February 2017, the stock price of the 
company continued on a ______ trend. 
o Positive  
o Negative  
 
End of Block: Financial Information 
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Start of Block: Press Release Info 
 
You also learned that a press release was issued by Aplus Insurance.  The press release that was 
provided by Aplus Insurance is presented on the next page.       
 
Please take the time to thoroughly review the press release in order to answer the questions 
that will follow. 
 
End of Block: Press Release Info 
 
Start of Block: Press Release 
 
 
Aplus Insurance, Inc. Investigation on Data Breach 
 
LOS ANGELES, July 15, 2017 /PRNewswire/ -- Statement regarding cyber-attack against Aplus 
Insurance, Inc. 
 
On November 2016 cyber attackers executed a very sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized 
access to our parent company’s IT systems and have obtained personal information relating to 
customers and employees.  The information accessed includes names, birthdays, social security 
numbers, street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income 
data.  No credit card information was compromised, nor is there evidence at this time that any 
other information was targeted or obtained. 
 
As soon as we learned about the attack, three days ago, on July 13, 2017, we immediately made 
every effort to close the security vulnerability, contacted authorities and began fully 
cooperating with their investigation. 
 
Aplus Insurance will individually notify current and former members whose information has 
been accessed.  Credit monitoring and identity protection services will be provided free of 
charge so that those who have been affected can have peace of mind. 
 
The company has established a dedicated website (www.apbreach.com) where members can 
access information, including frequently asked questions and answers. 
 
We take consumers’ privacy very seriously and are doing everything in our power to make our 
systems and security processes – and most importantly your data – more secure.  In the 
meantime, as we learn more, we will continue to provide updates.   
 
 
Page Break  
Timely Condition 
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Aplus Insurance, Inc. Investigation on Data Breach 
 
LOS ANGELES, July 15, 2017 /PRNewswire/ -- Statement regarding cyber-attack against Aplus 
Insurance, Inc. 
 
On August 2016, cyber attackers executed a very sophisticated attack to gain unauthorized 
access to our parent company’s IT systems and have obtained personal information relating to 
customers and employees.  The information accessed includes names, birthdays, social security 
numbers, street addresses, email addresses and employment information, including income 
data.  No credit card information was compromised, nor is there evidence at this time that any 
other information was targeted or obtained. 
 
As soon as we learned about the attack, three months ago, on April 15, 2017, we immediately 
made every effort to close the security vulnerability, contacted authorities and began fully 
cooperating with their investigation. 
 
Aplus Insurance will individually notify current and former members whose information has 
been accessed.  Credit monitoring and identity protection services will be provided free of 
charge so that those who have been affected can have peace of mind. 
 
The company has established a dedicated website (www.apbreach.com) where members can 
access information, including frequently asked questions and answers. 
 
We take consumers’ privacy very seriously and are doing everything in our power to make our 
systems and security processes – and most importantly your data – more secure.  In the 
meantime, as we learn more, we will continue to provide updates.   
 
End of Block: Press Release 
 
  
Not Timely Condition 
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Start of Block: Assurance Info 
 
 
Relevant Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
 
Upon further investigation, you find that, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach promptly, 
compared with other firms that have experienced a cybersecurity incident. You also find that 
cyber-attacks are considered a business risk which organizations should address with a 
cybersecurity risk management program.  You also find that, in response to the increased threat 
of cyber-attacks to organizations, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
has developed a cybersecurity risk management reporting framework for organizations to 
provide users with information about the processes and controls they have implemented to 
mitigate cybersecurity risks (e.g. restricted access to unauthorized users).  This framework is 
also used by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
controls within an organization and to report the results in a Service Organization Controls 
(SOC) report.      
 
A SOC over cybersecurity is a report that includes a description of the company’s controls over 
cybersecurity and that also includes an independent audit opinion over the operating 
effectiveness of cybersecurity controls.   For instance, a company describes how they restrict 
access to information systems to only authorized users and the independent auditor reports 
whether that control is operating effectively.  
 
A clean opinion in a SOC report denotes that there is reasonable assurance that the 
cybersecurity controls are in place and operating effectively.  This independent auditor’s report 
is desirable for companies with high risk from cyber-attacks.  
 
 
Page Break  
  
Timely Condition 
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Relevant Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
 
Upon further investigation, you find that, Aplus Insurance disclosed the breach late, compared 
with other firms that have experienced a cybersecurity incident. You also find that cyber-
attacks are considered a business risk which organizations should address with a cybersecurity 
risk management program.  You also find that, in response to the increased threat of cyber-
attacks to organizations, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has 
developed a cybersecurity risk management reporting framework for organizations to provide 
users with information about the processes and controls they have implemented to mitigate 
cybersecurity risks (e.g. restricted access to unauthorized users).  This framework is also used 
by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity controls 
within an organization and to report the results in a Service Organization Controls (SOC) 
report.      
 
A SOC over cybersecurity is a report that includes a description of the company’s controls over 
cybersecurity and that also includes an independent audit opinion over the operating 
effectiveness of cybersecurity controls.   For instance, a company describes how they restrict 
access to information systems to only authorized users and the independent auditor reports 
whether that control is operating effectively.  
 
A clean opinion in a SOC report denotes that there is reasonable assurance that the 
cybersecurity controls are in place and operating effectively.  This independent auditor’s report 
is desirable for companies with high risk from cyber-attacks.  
 
 
Page Break  
  
Not Timely Condition 
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Aplus Insurance, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
 
Aplus Insurance reports that they have a cybersecurity risk management program in place and 
operating effectively.  In addition, you noticed that during 2016 Aplus Insurance voluntarily 
engaged an Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of 
their cybersecurity controls during 2016 (the year before Aplus Insurance learned about the 
data breach). Aplus Insurance’s auditor issued a clean opinion in their SOC report on January 
2017 (before Aplus Insurance learned about the data breach).   
 
 
 
 
Aplus Insurance, Inc. Cyber-risk Management and Assurance Practices: 
Aplus Insurance reports that they have a cybersecurity risk management program in place and 
operating effectively.  However, you noticed that Aplus Insurance has not engaged an 
Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
cybersecurity controls.   
 
 
Page Break  
 
End of Block: Assurance Info 
 
Start of Block: Case Questions 
  
Assurance Condition 
No Assurance Condition 
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Case Questions: 
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts 
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.) 
 
 
 
Your initial stock valuation for Aplus was ${DV1A/ChoiceGroup/SelectedAnswers}.   
 
Considering the new information provided, please indicate what you believe to be an 
appropriate common stock valuation for Aplus, ranging from very low to very high. 
 
 Very 
Low 
Moderately 
Low 
Slightly 
Low 
Neither 
Low nor 
High 
Slightly 
High 
Moderately 
High 
Very 
High 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
How competent or incompetent do you believe the management of Aplus to be? 
 Very 
Incompetent Incompetent 
Somewhat 
Incompetent 
Neither 
Incompetent 
nor 
Competent 
Somewhat 
Competent Competent 
Very 
Competent 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
How trustworthy or untrustworthy do you believe the management of Aplus to be? 
 Very Untrustworth
y 
Untrustworth
y 
Somewhat 
Untrustworth
y 
Neither 
Untrustworth
y nor 
Trustworthy 
Somewhat 
Trustworth
y 
Trustworth
y 
Very 
Trustworth
y 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
End of Block: Case Questions 
DV1b: Final Valuation 
DV2a: Management Credibility / Competence 
DV2b: Management Credibility / Trustworthiness 
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Start of Block: Manipulation Checks 
 
Review Questions: 
 
Based on the case information, you learned that Aplus Insurance has their own cybersecurity 
risk management program in place and operating effectively.   
o True  
o False  
 
 
 
Based on the case information, you learned that Aplus Insurance voluntarily engaged an 
Independent Auditor to complete an examination to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
cybersecurity controls.  
o True  
o False  
 
End of Block: Manipulation Checks 
 
Start of Block: Case Questions 2 
 
Case Questions: 
(Note that case questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes of the facts 
described in the case. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.) 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
 
 
Manipulation Check: Assurance 
The order of the following questions is randomized 
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“Independent cybersecurity audits are necessary to be able to substantiate professional care” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“Independent cybersecurity audits are beneficial, as the auditor can be used as a codefendant 
in case of litigation” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“Independent cybersecurity audits are beneficial, as the auditor and the company share an 
interest to protect both of their reputation in case of litigation” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“Independent cybersecurity audits are beneficial, as the auditor shares a portion of the 
company’s legal responsibility in case of litigation” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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 “Aplus Insurance disclose the breach on a timely manner.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“I am worry about Aplus Insurance's cybersecurity risks.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“It is very difficult for Aplus Insurance management to use their skill and diligence to control 
(limit) the company's cybersecurity risks.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“Aplus Insurance is a company with high cybersecurity risk.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Manipulation Check - Timeliness 
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“Aplus Insurance's cybersecurity risks are likely to be catastrophic.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
"Accountants have significant experience auditing information security and cybersecurity 
controls." 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
"Accountants spend a significant portion of their time auditing information security and 
cybersecurity controls.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
"Accountants receive significant combined informal and formal training in relation to 
information security and cybersecurity controls.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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"Accountants have a high level of information security and cybersecurity controls expertise.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
For this question, select "4". 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
"Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the increased sophistication of 
hacking techniques." 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable given the complexity of determining the 
scope of the breach.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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“Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable to conduct required investigations.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“Delaying the disclosure of a cyber-attack is acceptable even when a cybersecurity attack 
results in the loss of identifiable information from customers or employees.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“Managers have more incentives to disclose bad news on a timely basis than incentives to delay 
the disclosure of bad news.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
“Companies in the health and well-being industry have a higher-risk of cyber-attack compared 
to companies in other industries.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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“Compared to companies with lower risk of cyber-attacks, companies with higher risk of cyber-
attacks are expected to have stronger controls for detecting and disclosing cybersecurity 
incidents on a timely basis.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
“Timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident reduces the risk of litigation.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
“Timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident reduces the risk of lost business.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
“Timely disclosure of a cybersecurity incident is the right thing to do.” 
 Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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End of Block: Case Questions 2 
 
Start of Block: Thanks 
 
Thanks for completing the task! After completion of the following questionnaire you will 
receive a validation code to be used to process your payment. 
 
End of Block: Thanks 
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Start of Block: Demographics 
 
What is your gender? 
o Male  
o Female  
 
 
What is your age? 
o 18 to 28 years  
o 29 to 38 years  
o 39 to 48 years  
o 49 to 58 years  
o 59 to 69 years  
o Over 70 years  
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What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received?  
o Less than high school degree  
o High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)  
o Some college but no degree  
o Associate degree in college (2-year)  
o Bachelor's degree in college (4 years)  
o Master's degree  
o Professional degree (JD, MD)  
o Doctoral degree  
 
 
 
If you studied beyond high school, what was your area of concentration? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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What is your current employment status? 
o Full-time employment  
o Part-time employment  
o Self-employed  
o Full-time student  
o Retired  
o Not currently employed, but looking for work  
o Not currently employed and not looking for work  
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Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are employed? 
o Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support  
o Real estate or rental and leasing  
o Mining  
o Professional, scientific or technical services  
o Utilities  
o Management of companies or enterprises  
o Construction  
o Admin, support, waste management or remediation services  
o Manufacturing  
o Educational services  
o Wholesale trade  
o Health care or social assistance  
o Retail trade  
o Arts, entertainment or recreation  
o Transportation or warehousing  
o Accommodation or food services  
o Information  
o Other services (except public administration)  
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o Finance or insurance  
o Unclassified establishments  
 
 
Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in (previous year) 
before taxes. 
o Less than $20,000  
o $20,000 to $39,999  
o $40,000 to $59,999  
o $60,000 to $79,999  
o $80,000 to $99,999  
o $100,000 to $149,999  
o $150,000 or more  
 
 
Approximately, how many years of personal investment experience do you have? 
o Less than one year  
o More than one year but less than three years  
o More than three years but less than five years  
o More than five years  
o No experience  
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Approximately, how many times have you purchased common stock of a company as a personal 
investment? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Have you suffered financial loss due to a cybersecurity breach? 
o Yes  
o No  
End of Block: Demographics 
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APPENDIX J: IRB APPROVALS 
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